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Of all tyrannies a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its
victims may be the most oppressive. It may be better to live under
robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies.1
-C.S. Lewis
INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, the United States declared a "war on drugs."2 Provoked in
part by the emergence of widespread crack cocaine use in a number of large
cities3 and media accounts of open drug trafficking, gang violence, and
rampant property crime,4 the federal government and many states increased
public spending on antidrug law enforcement and dramatically augmented
criminal penalties for the sale and possession of illegal drugs.5 But these
provisions contained few resources for treatment-oriented responses to the
problems.6
1. C.S. Lewis, The Humanitarian Theory ofPunishment, 6 RES JUDICATAE 224,228 (1953).
2. See EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL (1996); JAMES A.
INCIARDI, THE WAR ON DRUGS: HEROIN, COCAINE, CRIME, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1986); see also
OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, NATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL STRATEGY (1989) [hereinafter NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY].
3. See Steven P, Belenko, Crack and the Evolution ofAnti-Drug Policy, in CONTRIBUTIONS IN
CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY No. 42, at 10, 13 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1993); see also BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: DRUG USE TRENDS 1-2 (1995); DOUGLAS
S. LIPTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TREATMENT FOR DRUG ABUSERS UNDER
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUPERVISION 3 (National Inst of Just. ed., 1995).
4. See Belenko, supra note 3, at 10-21; John A. Martin, Drugs, Crime, and Urban Trial Court
Management: The Unintended Consequences of the War on Drugs, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 117, 134
(1990); Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in Context: Politics and Media in the Making of a
Drug Scare, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 535, 539-43 (1989).
5. See, e.g., Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181; Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat 3207. "In 1981, the total drug enforcement budget
was $1.5 billion; by fiscal year 1995, this budget had grown to $13.1 billion." James t Brown, Note,
Drug Diversion Courts: Are They Needed and Will They Succeed in Breaking the Cycle of Drug-
Related Crime?, 23 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 63, 70 (1997).
6. Although the official statement of federal government policy was "to disrupt, to dismantle,
and ultimately to destroy the illegal market for drugs by attacking both the supply and demand sides of
the drug problem," NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 2, at 1, the overwhelming bulk
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This war on drugs was grafted onto an existing criminal justice system
that, in many jurisdictions, was already overburdened by high case volumes.7
The increased enforcement efforts and stiffened sentencing provisions of the
new drug laws exacerbated this overload, leading to substantial delays in the
disposition of cases.8 In addition, the elimination of nonincarcerative
penalties for some offenses and the designation of statutorily-mandated
minimum sentences of imprisonment for many offenses led to a dramatic
increase in the number of inmates in state and federal prisons.9 Expedited
case management strategies emerged for dealing with the expanding number
of drug-related cases,' 0 and new prison construction was undertaken to house
the swelling inmate population." Despite these developments, many actors in
the system, including a number of judges, prosecutors, and corrections
of appropriated funds went to law enforcement and not to treatment programs. See id; see also Brown,
supra note 5, at 70 (noting that Bush Administration allocated 70% of federal drug budget to
enforcement and interdiction).
7. See Richard C. Boldt, The Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 2245, 2316-19 (1992); Brown, supra note 5, at 71 (reporting that "[i]n 1993, 1,126,300 arrests
were made for drug abuse violations, compared to 661,400 in 1983").
8. See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF GROWTH,
CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE,
AND THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 14-15 (1997) [hereinafter
DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW]; William D. McColl, Comment, Baltimore City's Drug Treatment Court:
Theory and Practice in an Emerging Field, 55 MD. L. REV. 467, 475 (1996).
Although drug-related cases have long plagued American courts and criminal justice agencies,
drug-related felony cases began inundating courts in the late 1980s. The greater volume of cases, along
with stiffer penalties for drug-related crimes, "produced a sense of crisis in many American courts."
CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL SERIES 23, TREATMENT DRUG COURTS: INTEGRATING
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT WITH LEGAL CASE PROCESSING 1 (1996) [hereinafter TREATMENT
DRUG COURTS].
9. See generally BARBARA BOLAND & KERRY M. HEALEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROSECUTORIAL RESPONSE TO HEAVY DRUG CASELOADS: COMPREHENSIVE PROBLEM-REDUCTION
STRATEGIES 7-8 (1993); LIPTON, supra note 3, at 3.
Recently, the New York Times reported that the Connecticut Legislature was considering a "major
overhaul of its drug laws that would shift the emphasis from punishment toward treatment of drug
abuse as a public health problem, in part as an attempt to reduce the costs of imprisonment."
Christopher S. Wren, Hartford Mulls an Overhaul of Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997, at B5.
The article quoted legislative leaders as saying that the impetus for this "politically radioactive"
approach was fiscal rather than ideological. The figures provided in support of this claim are
significant:
Connecticut, [the legislator] said, now spends more to run its prisons-about $400 million a
year--than its public universities and colleges. The state's prison population, he said, has grown
from 3,800 inmates in 1980 to about 15,000, nearly a quarter of whom are locked up for selling or
possessing drugs.
Id.
10. See BOLAND & HEALEY, supra note 9, at 7; DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 22
n.l.
11. See LIPTON, supra note 3, at 10 (reporting that nation's prison population passed one million
mark in 1994); see also McColl, supra note 8, at 476.
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officials, expressed interest in devising systematic procedures for diverting
drug-addicted defendants out of the traditional criminal justice process and
into treatment."2
To be sure, in some jurisdictions, individual sentencing judges had for
some time made participation in substance abuse treatment a condition of
probation for addicted offenders in minor cases.13 A number of correctional
facilities around the country also experimented with voluntary and
mandatory drug treatment for inmates with addiction histories.' 4 Beginning
in 1989, however, the criminal system in Miami took a new approach to the
problem of melding substance abuse treatment and punishment. Described as
a "slow-track, court-based treatment progra[m],"'15 the Miami experiment
contained several key features that have become central in the design of
many "drug treatment courts?'16 now operating throughout the United
12. In addition to concerns about criminal case management and prison overload, these officials
were reacting to the growing perception that lengthy mandatory drug sentences are less effective in
reducing drug-related crime than treatment and prevention-based responses.
With a new debate beginning over cocaine penalties, a Rand Corp. study concluded yesterday that
mandatory minimum sentences are far less effective at reducing drug use and drug-related crime
than normal law enforcement and treatment of heavy users.
Mandatory Drug Sentences Are Less Effective, Study Finds, BALTIMORE SUN, May 13, 1997, at 3A.
William McColl reports that
there remained a sense in some jurisdictions that despite the new case-management techniques,
the criminal justice system was not addressing the heart of the matter. Merely incarcerating drug
users more efficiently did little to stop the cycles of recidivism that appeared to account for a
majority of crime in these jurisdictions. This inadequacy was unsatisfying to reformers, and
perhaps more importantly, to prosecutors and corrections officials, who repeatedly prosecute,
incarcerate, and release the same drug defendants back into the community.
McColl, supra note 8, at 476 (citations omitted).
13. See JOHN S. GOLDKAMP, JUSTICE AND TREATMENT INNOVATION: THE DRUG COURT
MOVEMENT 4 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice's First Nat'l Drug Court Conference Working Paper, 1994); Sally
L. Satel, Observational Study of Courtroom Dynamics in Selected Drug Courts, 1 NAT'L DRUG
COURT INST. REV. 43,45 (1998).
14. See LIPTON, supra note 3, at 5; Harry Y. Wexler & Douglas S. Lipton, From Reform to
Recovery: Advances in Prison Drug Treatment, in 27 DRUG TREATMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 209
(James A. Inciardi ed., 1993); see also Sandra Tunis et al., EVALUATION OF DRUG TREATMENT IN
LOCAL CORRECTIONS (Final Summary Report Presented to the Nat'l Inst. of Justice, 1996) (evaluating
effectiveness of several drug treatment programs in local jails).
15. Philip Bean, Current Topic: America's Drug Courts: A New Development in Criminal
Justice, 1996 CRIM. L. REV. 718, 719. As the longest running drug treatment court, the Miami court
reported that by December 31, 1996, 80% of its 11,600 enrolled offenders had completed the program.
The Miami court also had a 73% retention rate. See DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 58. For
more on Miami's drug treatment court, see Brown, supra note 5, at 94-95; John S. Goldkamp, Miami's
Treatment Drug Court for Felony Defendants: Some Implications ofAssessment Findings, 73 PRISONS
J. 110 (1994).
16. Although many in the field refer to courts based on the Miami model as "drug courts," this
Article uses the term "drug treatment courts," in order to distinguish these efforts from courts that offer
expedited case management strategies but no treatment component. While there is some variation from
one jurisdiction to the next, this well established model is characterized by several common
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss4/2
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States.
17
First, treatment courts following the Miami model have adopted a
relatively restrictive definition of eligibility. In general, they use screening
criteria to insure that only nonviolent defendants thought to be amenable to
substance abuse treatment participate.' 8 Second, treatment court planners
have developed procedures designed to delay the final disposition of cases
and have arranged for judges to maintain frequent ongoing contact with
defendants. This feature enables treatment court judges to retain
jurisdictional leverage over participants as they navigate their way through
relapse and recovery.19 In this respect, the treatment court approach differs
characteristics. Most often, these drug treatment courts target defendants who are substance abusers.
Typically, participants are required to undergo addictions treatment and regular urine testing, and their
progress is monitored directly by the treatment court judge at periodic status hearings. If these
defendants are successful in treatment, they are able to avoid the imposition of lengthy sentences of
incarceration. If they fail to adhere to the treatment regime, participants face a series of escalating
penalties that may include more frequent contact with the court, more intensive drug treatment, or
periods of incarceration.
The U.S. Department of Justice also uses the term "drug treatment courts" to refer to
special court calendars or dockets designed to achieve a reduction in recidivism and substance
abuse among nonviolent, substance abusing offenders by increasing their likelihood for successful
rehabilitation through early, continuous, and intense judicially supervised treatment; mandatory
periodic drug testing; and the use of appropriate sanctions and other rehabilitation services.
DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 22 n.1.
17. See generally DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE & TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE DRUG COURT EXPERIENCE (1997); DRUG COURTS
OVERVIEW, supra note 8.
18. See DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 10 (reporting results of GAO survey of drug
court programs which "most frequently reported that program participants were adult, nonviolent
offenders with a substance addiction"); Bean, supra note 15, at 720 (contrasting Louisville Drug
Court, which permits defendants charged with property crimes to participate, with Jacksonville Drug
Court, which limits participation to minor possession offenders); McColl, supra note 8, at 472, 480
(describing Baltimore Drug Treatment Court, in which potential participants are assessed by "Pre-Trial
Services" with recommendations based on current charges, past criminal record, and performance on
tests such as "Addiction Severity Index."); see also CAROLINE S. COOPER, DRUG COURTS: AN
OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 6-10 (1995)
[hereinafter COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS]. An expanded, more recent survey of drug
treatment courts reports that they are increasingly targeting chronic recidivists as well as first
offenders. See CAROLINE S. COOPER, 1997 DRUG COURT SURVEY REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
(1997) [hereinafter COOPER, 1997 SURVEY].
19. As a procedural matter, this leverage can be accomplished in one of several ways. In a
preadjudication diversion program, the defendant undertakes treatment before entering a plea. Usually,
the formal proceedings are stayed pending the outcome of treatment. If the defendant is successful, the
charges are dismissed and no conviction results. In a probation-based system, the defendant must enter
a guilty plea before starting the treatment regime. In this configuration, the various obligations
mandated by the court, including participation in treatment, are made conditions of probation. In yet
another variation, the required treatment may be scheduled to occur after entry of a plea but before
imposition or execution of sentence. See DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 23; Bean, supra
note 15, at 720; Caroline S. Cooper & Joseph A. Trotter, Jr., Recent Developments in Drug Case
Management: Re-engineering the Judicial Process, 17 JUST. SYS. J. 83, 95-96 (1994); McColl, supra
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from other "drug courts" by shifting the focus away from the expedited
management of cases through consolidation and "fast tracking" of drug
prosecutions in one courtroom or division of a criminal court. Instead, the
new focus is on the supervised referral of identified defendants into
treatment.
20
Another important characteristic of most drug treatment courts is the
relatively nonadversarial environment within which decisions are made about
the imposition of sanctions.21 This element directly relates to the
management of otherwise confidential information concerning a defendant's
addiction and treatment.22 In place of the adversarial configuration
characteristic of a traditional criminal proceeding,23 the treatment courts
adopt an ethic of cooperation, in which judge, prosecutor, defense counsel,
corrections personnel, and addictions treatment providers share considerable
data concerning defendants and their progress in treatment.24
note 8, at 481.
20. See Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 87-93; McColl, supra note 8, at 471-72; see also
CAROLINE S. COOPER & JOSEPH A TROTTER, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, I DRUG CASE
MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT STRATEGIES IN THE STATE AND LOCAL COURTS 9 (1994);
TREATMENT DRUG COURTS, supra note 8, at 2 (describing potential benefits of integrating substance
abuse treatment with judicial system case processing).
21. See DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFFICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE KEY COMPONENTS 6 (1997) [hereinafter KEY COMPONENTS]
(arguing that traditional adversarial system is ineffective in addressing alcohol and drug abuse and
may contribute to these problems rather than helping to solve them).
22. One commentator notes:
Treatment providers give up-to-date, sometimes daily evaluations of the offender's response to
treatment. They are directly responsible to case managers who a... officials of the court
undertaking all the necessary administrative duties including being responsible for urinalysis,
court records, et....
Bean, supra note 15, at 719.
23. See generally MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975);
Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trials, 78 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1997). For an interesting effort at defining the limits of partisanship in criminal
defense practice, see Harry I. Subin, The Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission": Reflections on the
"Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 125 (1987).
24. A recent Department ofJustice publication setting out the "key components" of an effective
drug treatment court suggests that
the prosecutor and defense counsel must shed their traditional adversarial courtroom relationship
and work together as a team. Once a defendant is accepted into the drug court program, the team's
focus is on the participant's recovery and law-abiding behavior-not on the merits of the pending
case.
KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 21, at 11; see also COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, supra
note 18, at 39-42 (describing kinds of information provided to drug treatment court judges and
lawyers); OFFICE OF STATE COURTS ADMIN., STATE JUSTICE INST., FLORIDA'S TREATMENT BASED
DRUG COURTS 6 (1993) (describing cooperative information sharing approach).
In addition to creating a relatively nonadversarial environment at odds with the partisan norms of
most criminal courts, this treatment court model also generates information management protocols that
fit uncomfortably with the restrictive mandates of federal law governing the confidentiality of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss4/2
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Initially, offenders have an incentive to participate in the program
because, if they are successful in treatment and adhere to all of the conditions
identified at the start of the process, they can avoid the potential of lengthy
incarceration.25 If they stumble along the way, however, they face a system
of graduated penalties.26 Although there is variation from one treatment court
to the next, these penalties may include more frequent contact with the court,
increased urine testing, and short periods of so-called "shock
incarceration." 27 Because recovery from addiction often involves a pattern of
missteps and temporary setbacks by the substance abuser,28 observers think
this array of gradually increasing penalties is a better match for the
therapeutic goals of the system than the usual all-or-nothing approach found•• 29
in most criminal sentencing and parole revocation decisions.
Some endorse the shift from a due process-derived adjudication model to
a more informal "treatment team" approach,30 given the identified goal of
helping defendants overcome their substance abuse problems and the relative
substance abuse treatment information. See Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L.
No. 92-255, § 408, 86 Stat. 65, 79 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994)). This law and
its implementing regulations, Public Health Services, Department of Health and Human Services,
Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.67 (1994), apply to
virtually all treatment providers likely to be utilized by drug treatment courts. For further discussion of
this regulatory scheme, see Richard C. Boldt, A Study in Regulatory Method, Local Political Cultures,
and Jurisprudential Voice: The Application of Federal Confidentiality Law to Project Head Start, 93
MICH. L. REV. 2325, 2330-34 (1995); see also infra notes 358-63 and 531-37 and accompanying text.
25. See Brown, supra note 5, at 88-89; see also COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS,
supra note 18, at 9-10 (setting out typical sanctions for targeted drug treatment court population prior
to initiation of program); COOPER, 1997 SURVEY, supra note 18, at 23 (same).
26. See DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 26 (describing typical treatment court
responses to relapse); COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 18, at 33-34 (reporting
on program use of graduated sanctions).
27. See DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 26. This system of graduated sanctions is
said to support the therapeutic goals of the drug treatment court by "creat[ing] immediate
consequences for the defendant and retum[ing him to treatment." McColl, supra note 8, at 482. Shock
incarceration has been described as "a brief period of incarceration designed to force a defendant into
entering and remaining in drug treatment programs. In treatment terms, shock incarceration is intended
to overcome 'denial,' which is a symptom of the disease of alcoholism." Id. at 482 n.129 (citations
omitted).
28. See OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
TREATMENT PROTOCOL EFFECTIVENESS STUDY 12 (1996) [hereinafter TREATMENT EFFECTIVENESS
STUDY] (drug addiction is often "a chronic, relapsing disorder"); see also DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW,
supra note 8, at 79-83 (discussing studies of relapse rates among drug treatment court participants).
29. See PETER FINN & ANDREA K. NEWLYN, MIAMI'S "DRUG COURT": A DIFFERENT
APPROACH 9 (Program Focus by Nat'l Inst. of Justice, 1993).
30. See Michael P. Judge, Critical Issues for Defenders in the Design and Operation of a Drug
Court, INDIGENT DEFENSE (Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n), Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 1. Bean provides
the following description of a typical drug treatment court:
The Drug Court atmosphere is unique. Applause for success is common. The judge may publicly
congratulate, even hug an offender, or hand out court 'T' shirts with the Drug Court logo on it.
Bean, supra note 15, at 719.
1998] 1211
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subordination of punishment as a defining feature of this process.31 In cases
where defendants entirely fail to complete the treatment regime, however,
they often risk a total sentence of incarceration longer than that which would
have been imposed in a traditionally configured criminal court setting.
32
Many jurisdictions throughout the United States have implemented
versions of this model. As of mid-1997, forty-seven states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and two federal districts had either
established such courts or had plans to do so.33 In all, about two hundred drug
treatment courts have been established across the country.34 In general, this
"movement" has enjoyed broad support.35 While some conservatives have
expressed concern over the potential inclusion of violent offenders or serious
drag traffickers,36 funding and political support for the experiment has
remained relatively stable.37
It is unlikely that these innovations mark a full return to the "rehabilitative
ideal"38 of a generation ago, given the limiting effect of the eligibility
31. See DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 26 ("most drug court programs use sanctions
not to simply punish inappropriate behavior but to augment the treatment process").
32. See COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 18, at 37 (setting out sanctions
imposed for unsuccessfully terminated defendants); COOPER, 1997 SURVEY, supra note 18, at 28
(same).
33. See COOPER, 1997 SURVEY, supra note 18, at 1. Drug treatment court planning is also
underway in twenty Native American tribal courts, located in ten states. As of mid-1997, there were
over 370 drug treatment courts in a variety of states of development: 84 had been operating for at least
two years; 120 had been implemented more recently; 4 were about to start; 150 were in the planning
process; and 13 jurisdictions were exploring the possibility of establishing such courts. See id.
34. See id. The states which account for the most drug treatment court activity are: "California
(sixty-four programs); Florida (thirty programs); Oklahoma (twenty programs); New York (nineteen
programs); and Ohio (sixteen programs)." Id. at 2.
35. McColl notes:
In December 1993 the First National Drug Court Conference was held in Miami, Florida,
attracting more than 400 individuals. As a result of that meeting, the National Association of Drug
Court Professionals was formed .... The working paper produced at the first conference reflected
enough confidence about the strength of DTCs to refer to their proliferation as a "Drug Treatment
Court Movement."
McColl, supra note 8, at 515.
36. Commentators refer to this concern as "net-widening." Id. Many of the treatment courts in
operation have received funding under Title V of the 1994 Violent Crime Act, which authorized $1
billion over six years for drug treatment court programs. See DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8,
at 41. That legislation prohibits grants from being awarded to any program that admits violent
offenders. See id. at 38.
37. The GAO study reported that "since 1989, over $125 million in resources derived from
federal, state, and local governments; private sources; and participant fees have been provided to plan,
implement, enhance, and/or evaluate drug court programs." DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8,
at 38. The 1996 Federal Crime Bill provided funds to bolster drug court development and allowed
many local drug court planning efforts to take root. See COOPER, 1997 SURVEY, supra note 18, at 1.
38. The phrase "the rehabilitative ideal" is generally associated with Francis Allen's classic
account of the rise and fall of rehabilitative practice and theory. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE
OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss4/2
1998] THE DRUG TREATMENT COURT MOVEMENT 1213
restrictions typically built into drug treatment court programs. Nevertheless,
many of the defining features of the rehabilitative approach are present to
some degree in these undertakings. In light of these parallels,39 it is important
to revisit the story of the rise and fall of rehabilitation in American penal
practice in the mid-twentieth century. That account provides valuable
insights into both the potential advantages and dangers inherent in
contemporary efforts to "treat" the problem of drug addiction within an
institutional structure ordinarily designed to assign blame and mete out
punishment4  Especially insightful in this regard is the critique of
rehabilitative practices offered by left-liberal commentators such as the
American Friends Service Committee.41
Development of the treatment court model presents a host of difficult
problems for medical personnel, judges, corrections officials, prosecutors,
and others.42 One of the most intractable of these difficulties has been the
39. There is good reason to believe that drug treatment courts represent but the first of a series of
new efforts as reviving the rehabilitative ideal. In a published interview, Judge Jeffrey S. Tauber, a
leading proponent of drug treatment courts and the president of the National Association of Drug
Court professionals, was asked whether drug courts are "leading a broader movement-away from
purely punitive, incarcerative approaches back toward what used to be called rehabilitation?" An
Interview with Judge Jeffrey S. Tauber, President, National Association of Drug Court Professionals,
INDIGENT DEFENSE (National Legal Aid and Defender Association), Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 11. Tauber
replied in the following terms:
I think clearly there is a larger movement of programs that address rehabilitation issues, and
drug courts are the initial wave. I have every expectation that the drug court model will be
duplicated and is being duplicated in domestic violence court, in juvenile drug court, in family
drug courts and other courts that are using comprehensive treatment, supervision and judicial
monitoring.
Id. For another example of this larger trend, see Dail Willis, Juvenile Offenders Offered A Break,
BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 10, 1998, at BI (describing program begun in 1970s, discontinued and
revived recently, in which juvenile offenders are diverted from Juvenile Court in exchange for
counseling and supervised community service).
40. For a full discussion of the criminal system's focus on blame and punishment as opposed to
medicine's focus on diagnosis and treatment, see Boldt, supra note 7, at 2304-07.
41. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971) [hereinafter STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE]; see also DAVID
FOGEL, WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF: THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS (2d ed. 1979); Lewis,
supra note I.
42. See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ-
144531, PROGRAM BRIEF: SPECIAL DRUG COURTS (1993). According to a 1997 survey of nearly 100
drug treatment courts, the most serious problems encountered by judges include "difficulties in
obtaining stable funding ... ; breaking down barriers among the coordinating agencies and treatment
providers... ; and obtaining support from other judges." COOPER, 1997 SURVEY, supra note 18, at 31.
The most difficult problems faced by prosecutors involve "developing appropriate eligibility criteria;
convincing law enforcement of the merits of the program; and developing procedures to assure prompt
disposition of cases involving defendants who are unsuccessfully terminated [sic] from the drug
court." Id. at 33-34. Defense counsel reported problems with "the prompt identification of eligible
defendants; assuring adequate protection of defendants' legal rights; and developing a stable funding
source for treatment services." Id. at 36. Correctional agency officials identified "overwhelming
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question of professional role for defense attorneys charged with representing
the interests of drug treatment court defendants.43 This issue forms a direct,
conceptual link between the critique of rehabilitation offered in the late 1960s
and 1970s and the current effort to merge penal and therapeutic practices
within the drug treatment court setting. Nevertheless, few have engaged in
searching discussions of the proper role of the drug treatment court defense
attorney, 4 one actor on the "team" who owes a competing set of loyalties
and responsibilities that grow out of very different institutional and
ideological premises.45 Proper management of this clash of expectations and
philosophical differences with other participating agencies; providing bedspace for participants who
are sanctioned by the court; difficulties in communication and coordination with other participating
agencies; and obtaining adequate space for community-based activities" as the most significant
problems they experience. Id. at 41.
43. Some of these professional ethics issues were identified initially in working papers from the
First National Drug Court Conference, held in December of 1993. See GOLDKAMP, supra note 13, at
11-16. The Conference papers underscored the point that successful treatment of criminal defendants
in a drug treatment court setting requires active participation and open cooperation by defense
attorneys. See id. at 12; see also KEY COMPONENTS, supra note 21, at 11-12. Similarly, the Conference
documents noted that defense counsel must occasionally continue representation of defendants who
fail to complete the treatment process and are returned to the traditional, punishment-oriented
adjudication system. See GOLDKAMP, supra note 13, at 14-15. This mix of cooperation and
adversariness raises concerns about the waiver of defendants' trial rights often built into drug
treatment court procedures, including requirements that reverse or at least ameliorate the usual
presumption of innocence, and about dangers that participation in the treatment process may result in
greater punishment than that imposed on similarly situated defendants who do not participate. See
ROBERT BURKE, DEFENSE ADVOCACY MEETS TREATMENT: CAN CRIMINAL DEFENSE STANDARDS BE
RECONCILED WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION OF DRUG COURTS (1995); MICHAEL P.
JUDGE, CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF A DRUG COURT PROGRAM: CURRENT
AND EMERGING: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (1995). The report of the 1995 State Justice Institute's
National Symposium on the Implementation and Operation of Drug Courts identified other concerns
regarding the role of defense attorneys in the drug treatment court process. In particular, problems with
respect to diminished standards of confidentiality, the potential use of treatment records in other
prosecutions, and overarching concerns about paternalism all present difficult theoretical and practical
ethics considerations. See CAROLINE S. COOPER, 1995 NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION OF DRUG COURTS, REPORT OF SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS: WHERE
HAVE WE BEEN? WHERE ARE WE GOING? (1995); ROBERT WARD, CONFIDENTIALITY AND DRUG
TREATMENT COURTS: THE PERSPECTIVE OF A DEFENSE LAWYER (1995).
44. To date, several participants in the drug treatment court effort have written "practitioner's"
articles on various aspects of the professional responsibility problems mentioned above. See BURKE,
supra note 43; JUDGE, supra note 43; WARD, supra note 43. While these papers accurately frame some
of the professional ethics problems facing defense counsel, they understandably do not seek to place
the issues in a larger historical or theoretical context. This Article attempts to provide some of that
context by bringing to bear the lessons of an earlier rehabilitative era on the contemporary treatment
court movement
45. There is an extensive literature on the institutional and ideological foundations of defense
counsel's advocacy role. For a general discussion of advocacy roles, see DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS
AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 52 (1988); William Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural
Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 36-37 [hereinafter Simon, Ideology of
Advocacy]. For a more detailed analysis of and debate about the limits of criminal defense counsel's
partisan role, see David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993);
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responsibilities is critical to any satisfactory implementation of the drug
treatment court model.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the history of rehabilitative penal
practice in the United States during the twentieth century. The discussion
pays special attention to the sustained critique of the rehabilitative ideal
offered by left-liberal commentators twenty-five to thirty years ago. The
discussion analyzes particular shortcomings that plagued corrections
practices at this earlier juncture and explores the relevance of that history to
today's drug treatment courts.
Part II builds on the observation of the left-liberal critics that
rehabilitative penal regimes, by blending punitive and therapeutic impulses,
often seek to accomplish incompatible goals.46 This Part suggests that this
conflict in objectives manifests itself predominantly in the tension between
the norms of adversary adjudication that characterize traditional criminal law
practice and the procedural informality and judicial activism that characterize
rehabilitative undertakings. The consequences of this tension for defendants
are illuminated by examining the role conflicts faced by their attorneys in
these settings. This general discussion regarding the distorting effect that
rehabilitative penal practice has on defender role also includes a more
particular analysis of the special problems facing defense attorneys and, by
extension, their clients in drug treatment courts.
Part I examines a similar set of departures from traditional adversarial
adjudication in the context of juvenile court proceedings. The analogy
between drug treatment courts and juvenile courts is useful because attorney
role problems associated with procedural informality have received extensive
scholarly discussion in the juvenile court area.4 7 Part III then reviews some of
the most relevant literature from that area, giving particular attention to
several of the more thoughtful proposals offered for guiding defense
attorneys in the formulation of an appropriate role conception. This
John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin's
Position on the Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission," 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 339 (1987); William
H. Simon, The Ethics OfCriminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1703 (1993) [hereinafter Simon, Ethics
of Criminal Defense]; Subin, supra note 23.
46. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 27.
47. See, e.g., Wallace J. Mlyniec, Who Decides: Decision Making in Juvenile Delinquency
Proceedings, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER 105 (Rodney J.
Uphoff ed., 1995); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing The
Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991); Katherine
Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and
Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655 (1996); Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be
Represented But Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76
(1984).
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discussion concludes by arguing that these accounts of attorney role in the
juvenile court context do not adequately address the problems faced by
defense counsel in drug treatment courts.
Finally, Part IV evaluates whether defense attorneys in drug treatment
court can practice in a way that responds to the enduring insights of the left-
liberal critics of the rehabilitative ideal. This Part offers a role conception
formulated by reference to the critics' assertion that rehabilitative processes
are often morally suspect, because they undermine defendants' dignity
interests, obscure the unique perspective of those who are the objects of
coercive treatment, and deteriorate into unalloyed punishment.48 Part IV
examines several concrete measures designed to guard against these dangers,
particularly by paying specific attention to the special needs of defendants
suffering from addiction. Part IV concludes that these minimum
requirements for responsible defense practice in drug treatment courts are
unlikely to be met on a consistent basis.
This somewhat pessimistic conclusion stems from a premise fundamental
to liberal legal theory, that all state-sponsored punishment is inherently
suspect.49 While liberal theory recognizes that coercive measures may be
justified if their use promotes other important public interests,50 this
perspective relies on the diligent efforts of defense counsel to insure that the
state has met its burden of demonstrating a need for such coercive measures
in any individual case. By contrast, when the government acts to provide
assistance to individuals, rather than to punish them, it is possible to regard
the individuals' interests as consistent with those of the state. In such
instances, particularly when the government gives individuals a choice either
to accept or reject the proffered help, the danger of overreaching is greatly
reduced, 51 and the need for vigorous defense advocacy is ameliorated.
This Article draws on the history of rehabilitative penal practice in the
recent past, as well as more contemporary information from juvenile courts
and drug treatment courts, to support its conclusion that a reduced advocacy
role for defense counsel is not warranted. Even though defendants in these
settings may receive needed rehabilitative services, they still face the
potential of coercive, even punitive, dispositions. This fact alone is sufficient
to require the interposition of procedural and substantive legal barriers
48. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 44-56; STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 22-27.
49. See R.A. Duff& David Garland, Introduction: Thinking About Punishment, in A READER ON
PUNISHMENT 1, 2-3 (FLA. Duff& David Garland eds., 1994); see also infra text accompanying notes
175-81.
50. See Duff& Garland, supra note 49, at 3.
51. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 27.
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between the state and individual citizens. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact
that these courts may be less punitive than their traditional counterparts, they
still pose a danger that "precisely because of their less overtly punitive
content, [they] may become the occasion for significantly widening the reach
and scope of the social control apparatus.,
52
This risk, in turn, suggests an additional reason for viewing the drug
treatment court movement with skepticism. This final objection applies to
drug treatment courts even if all of the conditions for vigorous defense
advocacy could be met. Stated simply, the objection is that the drug treatment
court movement not only presents difficulties for individual defendants and
their attorneys, it also undermines larger efforts to develop an effective drug
policy premised on a public health model. There is considerable irony in this
claim, given that treatment court officials place relatively greater emphasis
on rehabilitative services than do most other actors in the traditional criminal
justice system. In this sense, the treatment court approach is a step in the
direction urged by many policy makers and academics who have called for a
"medicalization" of the drug problem. 53 There is an important difference,
however, between the removal of some categories of drug-related cases from
the criminal system altogether, as called for by advocates of medicalization
or decriminalization, and the introduction of treatment functions into the
process of criminal prosecution and punishment 54
At least since the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act in 1914,55
"patterns of thinking" dominating public policy discourse about addictive
drugs have been rooted in what recent commentators have called the
52. Andrew Scull, Community Corrections: Panacea, Progress, or Pretense?, in THE POLITICS
OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (Richard Abel ed., 1982).
53. I include myself among those who have called for such an approach. See Boldt, supra note 7,
at 2314-16; see also ERIC GOODE, BETWEEN POLITICS AND REASON: THE DRUG LEGALIZATION
DEBATE (1997); Ethan A. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs. Consequences,
and Alternatives, 245 SCL 939 (1989); James Ostrowski, Thinking About Drug Legalization, 121
POL'Y ANALYSIS 1 (1989); Kurt L. Schmoke, An Argument in Favor of Decriminalization, 18
HOFSTRA L. REV. 501 (1990) (testimony before U.S. House of Representatives).
It is important to distinguish between a policy of "decriminalization" or "medicalization" on the
one hand and "legalization" on the other.
A strategy of decriminalization relies on a recharacterization of chemical dependency as a concem
of the public health system, and stresses the continuation and strengthening of regulatory controls
governing the manufacture and distribution of addictive substances. Legalization, on the other
hand, grows out of libertarian concepts that press toward a more generalized deregulation of the
area.
Boldt, supra note 7, at 2314 (citations omitted).
54. See Kevin F. Ryan, Clinging to Failure: The Rise and Continued Life of U.S. Drug Policy, 32
L. & Soc'Y REV. 221, 231-36 (1998).
55. See generally DAVID E. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL
(1973).
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"prohibition model 56 or the "punitive paradigm. 57 This discourse regards
substance abuse as a problem either of individual moral failing or individual
pathology. As a consequence, it has been virtually taken for granted that the
criminal justice system, with its emphasis on individual blame and
responsibility, is an appropriate institutional setting for responding to the
problems associated with drugs.
Even though the punitive and therapeutic goals of the treatment court
movement are in significant tension, they share one important characteristic:
they both proceed from a highly individualistic perspective. Thus, while the
criminal law component focuses on matters of individual responsibility and
blame, the treatment component defines the problem as one of individual
pathology and personal recovery.58 By contrast, the removal of some
categories of drug-related behavior from the criminal justice system
altogether represents an entirely different conception of drug policy, which is
built upon a public health model. This alternative "sees drug use as a public,
not an individual, problem," 59 and focuses on prevention and larger structural
change as well as treatment.
The decision of drug treatment court planners to employ the criminal
justice system as a site for the provision of treatment not only reflects the
dominance of an individualistic perspective, but it also makes it less likely
that public discussion of these alternative policy choices will take place. This
is but one example of the general claim made by adherents of constructivist
social theory that law is "both [a] constituent of social reality and is created
by it in a dialective process. 60 In the final analysis, this Article asserts that
this sort of reinforcement of the dominant discourse governing drug
treatment policy is too high a price to pay for the likely benefits that drug
treatment courts may produce.
61
I. TWENTIETH CENTURY REHABILITATIVE PENAL PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES
The contemporary drug treatment court movement is assessed here in
light of the history of an earlier effort at rehabilitative penal practice. This
56. Ryan, supra note 54, at 222.
57. BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 61.
58. See Ryan, supra note 54, at 234, 237.
59. Id. at 238.
60. Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1090.
61. Indeed, as the left-liberal critics pointed out a generation ago, because rehabilitative penal
practices tend to obscure the structural causes of crime, they make it less likely that fundamental social
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history centers on the rise and precipitous decline of the rehabilitative ideal in
the United States and Great Britain in the mid- twentieth century. Although
the effort to build treatment into the punishment system at that time drew
critics from across the political spectrum, perhaps the most telling attacks
came from the left and from liberals.62 The left-liberal critics lodged concrete
criticisms against American and British penal 1iolicy in the 1960s and
1970s. 63 These criticisms, although fairly grounded with respect to the
system as it functioned in the 1950s and 1960s, play out somewhat
differently within the context of the contemporary drug treatment court
movement This historical account explores the ways in which modem drug
treatment courts are both alike and significantly different from corrections
practices in the middle portion of the century. At the same time, the assault
mounted a generation ago is of considerable contemporary interest once the
discussion moves beyond the concrete concerns expressed by the critics, in
order to consider the larger theoretical perspectives that motivated their
analysis. Thus, this assessment concludes by examining both the liberal and
radical perspectives64 adopted by the critics of rehabilitation in the 1970s.
These perspectives offer significant critical purchase today and suggest
important reasons to be concerned about the growth of contemporary drug
treatment courts.
A. The Development and Repudiation of the Rehabilitative Ideal
As Francis Allen and others have documented in detail,65 from the period
between the World Wars until the early 1970s, discourse about state-
sponsored punishment in the United States and Great Britain was dominated
by a consequentialist perspective in general 66 and by a focus on rehabilitation
62. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41; FOGEL, supra note 41; NORVAL MORRIS,
THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); Lewis, supra note 1; Herbert Morris, Persons and
Punishment, 52 MONIST 475 (1968).
63. In particular, these attacks were focused on a trinity of features ordinarily found in
rehabilitative or therapeutic criminal law institutions. These features were described as individualized
treatment, indeterminate sentencing, and broad discretionary power. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE,
supra note 41, at 84.
64. For a good discussion of the basic elements of liberal and radical "world-views," see Howard
Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on Perspectives, 1991 DUKE
LJ. 413,426-39.
65. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 5-7; Duff& Garland, supra note 49, at 8-12.
66. As used in text, the phrase "consequentialist perspective" is intended to describe a utilitarian
approach to punishment. In this sense, a consequentialist account "justifties] punishment by its
contingent, instrumental, contribution to some independently identifiable good. That is to say, the good
that punishment is to promote-whether this is happiness, dominion, autonomy, welfare, or crime
prevention-can be identified without reference to punishment itself." Duff& Garland, supra note 49,
at 6.
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in particular.67 By 1980, however, striking changes had occurred in both the
practice and theory of punishment. Consequentialist (or utilitarian) goals and
justifications for punishment fell into a secondary position behind
deontological (or nonconsequentialist) goals and justifications, centered on
retributive notions ofjust deserts. 8
Others have told the story of this dramatic shift in the ideology of
punishment with great skill. 69 Some of these accounts argue that the
development of the welfare state from the 1930s through the 1970s, and the
adjunct focus of the social sciences on "engineering" human behavior, helped
to push aside longstanding notions of fault and blame in favor of the
consequentialist goals of rehabilitation and deterrence.70 At that time,
scientific research into the causes of crime and the utility of "corrective"
penal measures was regarded as capable of yielding a new system that could
effectively root out and prevent destructive criminal behavior.71 To be sure,
"negative retributivism," the notion that fault was still a precondition for
coercive state intervention, continued to shape sentencing practices.72
67. Allen defines the "rehabilitative ideal" as "the notion that a primary purpose of penal
treatment is to effect changes in the characters, attitudes, and behavior of convicted offenders, so as to
strengthen the social defense against unwanted behavior, but also to contribute to the welfare and
satisfactions of offenders." ALLEN, supra note 38, at 2; see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 5-6 (1987).
68. Allen points to a shift in statutory sentencing provisions in California in the mid-1970s as a
prime example of this decline of the rehabilitative ideal in practice.
The California sentencing act of 1976 serves as a useful indicator. The 1976 act repealed older
sentencing provisions whose overriding purposes, according to a California court, were to
' maximize rehabilitary efforts." The new law states in accents not heard a decade earlier. "The
Legislature finds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment This
purpose is best served by terms proportionate to the seriousness of the offense with provision for
uniformity in the sentences of offenders committing the same offense under similar
circumstances."
ALLEN, supra note 38, at 7-8 (quoting Holder v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Reptr. 853, 855 (1969)); CAL.
CRIM. CODE § 1170(a)(1) (Deering 1977)).
A similar shift in the academic literature also occurred during the 1970s. In particular, this shift in
the theory of punishment was marked by the work of Andrew von Hirsch and others who pressed the
notion of "just deserts" as the proper retributive basis for sentencing practice. See, e.g., ANDREW VON
HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); Andrew von Hirsch, Desert and
Previous Convictions in Sentencing, 65 MINN. L. REV. 591 (1981).
69. See generally ALLEN, supra note 38; Anthony E. Bottoms, Introduction to THE COMING
PENAL CRISIS: A CRIMINOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL EXPLORATION 1-24 (A.E. Bottoms & R.H.
Preston eds., 1980).
70. See Duff& Garland, supra note 49, at 8-10.
71. See id Some writers have referred to this as "positivistic penology," meaning that it is
characterized by "the assumption that external, deterministic factors such as heredity, environment, or
social conditions cause criminal behavior, not an evil exercise of free will on the part of the criminal,
and that unraveling the causes of crime will tell us what sentencing policies to adopt." Ainsworth,
supra note 47, at 1104 n.131.
72. See Duff & Garland, supra note 49, at 7; see also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND
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Nevertheless, "positive retributivism," the idea that the purpose of
punishment is primarily to express moral condemnation,73 was treated as an
inappropriate and vestigial societal impulse.74 In the place of vengeful
responses to antisocial conduct, which advocates of the rehabilitative ideal
regarded as morally debased, many suggested a new concept of punishment
based on the promise of individual therapy.
All of this changed in the mid-1970s, as utilitarian approaches to
punishment in general, and rehabilitation in particular, came under searing
attack. Some writers have argued that the ensuing decline in the fortunes of
consequentialist penal practice and theory was part of a larger reaction
against the "scientistic social engineering" of a welfare state that had come to
be seen as part of the problem and not the solution.76 Francis Allen has gone
even further in arguing that the two principal preconditions for a
rehabilitative regime, which had been in place during the 1950s and 1960s,
no longer pertained by the early 1970s.77
First, Allen has argued that a general societal belief in the malleability of
human nature, essential to a regime focused on the "treatment" of
offenders,78 was severely shaken due to a loss of confidence in institutions
RESPONSIBILITY 242-44 (1968); cf Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal
Responsibility, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 49 (1986) (arguing against mixed theories of
punishment because they are necessarily dominated by retributive principles governing the most
important question of who is selected for sanctioning).
73. See Duff& Garland, supra note 49, at 7.
74. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 5-6 (discussing Justice Black's opinion in Williams v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949)).
75. See, e.g., KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 28 (1968) ("I suspect that all the
crimes committed by the jailed criminals do not equal in total social damage that of all the crime
committed against them." (emphasis omitted)).
76. See Duff & Garland, supra note 49, at 10. Duff and Garland argue that this disillusionment
with the various "institutions of the welfare state" had as much to do with the work of liberal theorists
such as Rawls and Dworkin "assert[ing] the importance ofjustice over utility, and of individual rights
against the claims of the state," id, as it did with publicized studies finding that these efforts were
ineffective in achieving their goals. See, e.g., Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers
about Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974). Ironically, Martinson subsequently amended his
earlier conclusions regarding the futility of rehabilitation to hold open the possibility that some
corrections undertakings might succeed. See Robert Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of
Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 243 (1979).
77, See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 11, 22-24, 30-31.
78. See id. at 11; see also DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TR.EATMENT 14 (1975) ("Liberals and conservatives alike felt that, as James Q. Wilson put it at the
time, '. . . belief in rehabilitation requires not merely optimistic but heroic assumptions about the
nature of man"). In addition, a shared conviction in the ability of institutions to influence individual
decision making is an essential prerequisite for a system of punishment with an identified goal of
deterrence. See generally John C. Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCL 347 (1955).
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concerned with character development and public education. 79 Allen's
assessment emphasized the "displacement and diminution of family
authority" in contemporary American society. 0 In addition, he asserted that a
shift in prevailing attitudes toward public education was significant in
preparing the societal context within which a treatment approach to criminal
offenders was ultimately rejected. Allen's assessment in this respect is
founded on the close relationship he reports between a society's sense of
confidence in its institutions of public education and its institutions of penal
reform. 1 In contrast to the optimism regarding the socializing potential of
public schools, which characterized an earlier era in American social life, 2
Allen has suggested that the 1970s were a time during which the democratic
claims of educators, and by extension, corrections officials, were under fierce
attack.8
3
The second precondition Allen has identified as necessary to the survival
of the rehabilitative ideal is a "sufficient consensus of values to make
possible a working agreement on what it means to be rehabilitated."8 4 With
respect to this requirement, however, he has asserted that the United States
had suffered a radical loss of faith in social and political institutions more
generally, which had led to a diminished sense of public purpose.85 The
emergence of the civil rights movement widespread resistance to the
Vietnam War, and Watergate all brought the legitimacy and efficacy of state
undertakings into question.8 6 At the same time, perceptions of increasing
crime and "a collapse of public order" began to be linked directly to
perceptions of the "American crime problem as one principally of race."87
79. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 11, 22-24.
80. Id. at 19-20. This process was important, says Allen, because the family, along with public
education and criminal law, was one of the principal institutions "traditionally relied on for socializing
the young and directing human behavior to the achievement of social purposes." Id. at 19.
81. Seeid. at22.
82. See id. at 23.
83. See id. at 23-24.
84. Id. at 11. This, in turn, would depend upon some general agreement about what it means to
be unacceptably deviant
85. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 18,30-31.
86. See id. at 30-31. As Francis T. Cullen and Karen E. Gilbert have observed:
Few in leftist circles doubted that the government lacked the will if not the capacity to "do good"
for the casualties of the inequitable order over which it presided. Mistrust and pessimism led all
but the most old-fashioned and idealistic liberals to anticipate that harm, not beneficence, will
result when the poor, the aged, the sick, the retarded, and the mentally ill are brought under the
auspices of state welfare programs or institutional care. The same thinking and sentiment informed
the posture taken by the left toward the criminal justice system and its announced attempt to
rehabilitate lawbreakers.
FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING REHABILITATION 107 (1982).
87. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 30.
[VOL. 76:1205
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss4/2
THE DRUG TREATMENT COURT MOVEMENT
Allen has explained the connection:
It is hardly coincidental that the decline in public support for the
rehabilitative ideal accompanies rising percentages of noncaucasian
inmates in the prisons. Optimism about the possibilities of reform
flourishes when strong bonds of identity are perceived between the
reformers and those to be reformed.
Conversely, confidence in rehabilitative effort dwindles when a
sense of difference and social distance separates the promoters from
the subjects of reform.88
These shifts in the way that ordinary citizens, academics, and
policymakers perceived the efficacy of state-sponsored welfare initiatives, as
well as the possibility of true corrective education, rendered the functioning
apparatuses of the rehabilitative ideal vulnerable to attack. One must
understand the elements of the attack in order to ascertain the continuing
utility of this history for evaluating contemporary efforts at rehabilitative
penal practices, including the drug treatment court movement.
B. The Practical Critique
Regardless of one's assessment of the foregoing account, one element of
the history is relatively clear- the dramatic decline in the influence of
rehabilitative theory in everyday penal practice during the 1970s coincided
with the articulation by left-liberal critics of a particular practical critique.
89
Specifically, the American Friends Service Committee's ("Friends")
influential 1971 Report, A Struggle For Justice, attacked each of the three
characteristics central to a rehabilitative approach to criminal justice.90
88. Id. at 30-31 (citations omitted). For a good contemporary discussion of the disproportionate
representation of African-Americans and other persons of color in the criminal justice system, see
MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 4 (1995) (reporting that one out of three African-
American males between ages of 20 and 29 is under the supervision of criminal justice system). See
also infra note 555 and accompanying text.
89. To be sure, the left-liberal critique was joined by other attacks mounted from the right. Allen
refers to these conservative critics as the "extreme law-and-order advocates." ALLEN, supra note 38, at
62. Nevertheless, given the apolitical character of rehabilitative practice claimed by its supporters, see
infra text accompanying notes 161-64, the left-liberal critique, with its pointed skepticism of the
scientific foundations of penal treatment, was especially powerful. This element of the history is
particularly apparent in the popular media version of the left-liberal critique expressed in books such
as Ken Kesey's One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest (1962) and films like Stanley Kubrick's A
Clockwork Orange (1973).
90. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 84.
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1. The Problems ofDiagnosis, Evaluation, and Prognosis
The first characteristic of the rehabilitative regime to draw the fire of the
critics was an emphasis on individualized treatment.91 Rehabilitation, like
other consequentialist approaches to punishment, is forward-looking. For
rehabilitation, the question for decision makers is not what should be done to
an offender as a normative matter given the past criminal event, but rather
what measures will accomplish a future reduction in criminal behavior.92
This instrumentalist perspective further recognizes that substantially
dissimilar actors often may commit the same or similar offenses, at least as
defined by substantive criminal law doctrine.93 This means that dispositions
cannot simply be determined according to the gross category of wrongdoing
with which the offender has been charged or convicted. Instead, the length
and conditions of a criminal sentence must be tailored to effect beneficial
change in those traits of the individual defendant's personality, character, or
behavioral patterns associated with past untoward conduct and predicted
future,behavior. 94 As the critics pointed out, the scientific perspective at the
core of this individualized approach only yields satisfactory outcomes if
decision makers can accurately assess the offenders' treatment needs,
progress toward "rehabilitation," and likely inclination to recidivate. Thus, in
the words of the Friends' Report, an individualized treatment model requires
effective diagnosis, evaluation, and prognosis. 95
The central problem associated with diagnosis in the criminal context is
practical: society cannot afford to offer each offender a unique treatment
plan.96 Therefore, even the most flexible system must operate according to a
fixed number of diagnostic categories. It must also be capable of sorting
offenders into the group leading to the most appropriate treatment. 97 The left-
liberal critics aptly expressed skepticism regarding the ability of mental
health professionals, criminologists, and others to make these kinds of
91. See id. at 37, 67-68.
92. See Duff& Garland, supra note 49, at 8.
93. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 84.
94. See id Under the most extreme version of this therapeutic model developed in the 1950s and
1960s, a judgment at the time of sentencing that an offender is unlikely to pose any future
dangerousness would lead to the conclusion that no coercive measures are required or mandated. Thus,
offenders convicted of some past criminal event would be entitled to unconditional release from all
coercive measures if they were judged by the system's behavioral experts as posing no future
dangerousness. See, e.g., BARBARA WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW, 32-84 (2d ed. 1981);
Jay Campbell, A Strict Accountability Approach to Criminal Responsibility, 29 FED. PROB. 333
(1965).
95. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 68; see also FOGEL, supra note 41, at 56-57.
96. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 67.
97. See id. at 68.
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diagnostic judgments,98 particularly given the remarkably broad claims made
at the time by rehabilitation-oriented corrections officials. Indeed, in its
extreme form, the claim was that virtually all crime was the expression of
some individual pathology that could be identified and, in most cases,
treated.99 Further, advocates of this regime asserted that offenders who were
likely to be amenable to treatment could be distinguished from those who
were not.1°°
The critics, however, argued that advocates of a rehabilitative, therapeutic
approach based their claims on a fundamental misapprehension about most
offenders. The great majority of those who violate legal norms, the critics
asserted, do not suffer from some mental health deficit or psychological
pathology, and therefore do not need treatment. Instead, offenders "fall into
crime only because their social circumstances make this a normal 'not
pathological' behavioral choice."'' 1 Moreover, even with respect to those
offenders who might have benefited from treatment, the critics argued that
the corrections establishment lacked the diagnostic tools to formulate
effective individual plans. 102 Their assessment in this regard was stark:
"Morass" is an apt description of the present state of affairs in
contemporary criminological science. A survey of the literature
reveals that there is no classification system capable of reliable
(consistent) diagnostic application that is generally accepted by
professionals working in the field. 10 3
With respect to evaluation and prognosis, the critics noted that a
rehabilitative regime must measure the effects of treatment in an individual
case and judge the appropriateness of the termination of therapy and release
from supervision or custody.' 4 Here again, the critics pointed to the
inadequacy of the scientific foundation on which these judgments with
respect to "cure" or "success" were to be made. Indeed, the critics asserted
98. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 57-59; STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 69.
99. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 47; STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 40. In its less
extreme form, mid-century proponents of rehabilitation described a variety of causes of criminal
behavior. "The rationale of these [rehabilitative] programs calls for understanding the sociological,
economic, and cultural sources of criminality, the psychology of criminals, and our reactions to
criminality ..." Henry Weihofen, Retribution Is Obsolete, 39 NAT'L PROBATION & PAROLE NEws 1,
4(1960).
100. In which case, the system typically would shift its focus from rehabilitation to isolation. See,
e.g., Robert Waelder, Psychiatry and the Problem of Criminal Responsibility, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 378,
386 (1952).
101. CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 86, at 113.
102. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 69.
103. Id. at 69.
104. See id. at 68; FOGEL, supra note 41, at 57.
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that not only was there a generalized absence of scientific information on
which to make these critical decisions, there was not even any agreement
among criminologists and other social scientists regarding why this lack of
data persisted 05 The best response the corrections system had to offer was
the premise that an inmate's behavior while in custody is a good indicator of
rehabilitation and likely future behavior on the outside.' 6 The critics
responded, however, by arguing that an institutionalized corrections
environment is not representative of the conditions confronting offenders
upon release into the community, and so patterns of conduct while
incarcerated cannot accurately predict long-term success.1
0 7
This critique based on the difficulties of making accurate decisions with
respect to diagnosis, evaluation, and prognosis supports the adoption of a
cautious approach to the contemporary drug treatment court movement.
Nevertheless, specific reasons suggest that the hurdles articulated by the
1970s critics were much more daunting in the context of the broad-based
rehabilitative regimes then in place than they are in the somewhat more
limited setting of modem drug treatment courts.
In the first place, while substance abuse, chemical dependency, and
addiction form a complex group of diseases, 108 the likely range of diagnostic
categories relevant to the population of offenders in a drag treatment court is
considerably narrower than the full spectrum of diagnoses (and treatment
regimes) required to describe the needs of all criminal offenders. 10 9
Moreover, addiction treatment specialists and other healthcare professionals
have considerable data regarding the effective diagnosis and treatment of
chemically-dependent individuals." 0 The best data show, for example, that
105. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 70. One group argued that there had been
insufficient research, another camp asserted that "unlike cancer or general paresis, crime is viewed as
being so complex and research into it so plagued by uncontrollable variables that the prognosis for any
significant success must be guarded at best." Id.
106. The claim was that "[those who gain 'insight' into their emotional pathology, work to obtain
an occupational skill, and avoid making trouble are good candidates for freedom." CULLEN &
GILBERT, supra note 86, at 113.
107. Seeid.at 114.
108. See generally MARK KELLER ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF WORDS ABOUT ALCOHOL 6-27 (2d
ed. 1982) (setting out terms used to describe types of addiction and alcoholism); Aubrey Lewis,
Introduction: Definitions and Perspectives, in SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF DRUG DEPENDENCE 5, 5-11
(Hannah Steinberg ed., 1969) (defining "drug dependence"); Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism,
Intoxication, and the CriminalLaw, 10 CARDoZOL. REv. 393, 397-98 (1988) (describing addiction in
terms of "loss of control"); Frank A. Seixas et al., Definition ofAlcoholism, 85 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MED. 764 (1976) (setting out definition of"alcoholism").
109. See, e.g., AMERICAN SOC'Y OF ADDICTION MEDICINE, PATIENT PLACEMENT CRITERIA FOR
THE TREATMENT OF SUBSTANCE-RELATED DISORDERS (2d ed. 1996).
110. See TREATMENT EFFECTIVENESS STUDY, supra note 28; see also A.Thomas McLellan et al.,
Increased Effectiveness of Substance Abuse Treatment: A Prospective Study of Patient-Treatment
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younger substance abusers often respond well to therapeutic communities
and other similar treatment modalities that remove patients from their
everyday lives in order to instill more productive behavioral responses,"'
while older patients seem to respond more favorably to therapy-based
programs, also referred to as "psychiatric inpatient programs. ''" 2 Treatment
modalities that use pharmacological agents, including programs that use the
drugs methadone and naltrexone, either to maintain the dependent patient or
to block the effects of the addictive drug, often succeed for high-status
persons and others who have sufficient stability and structure in their
everyday lives." 3
Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear whether the various drug treatment
courts now in operation can meaningfully utilize this diagnostic information
in order to direct individuals into the most appropriate therapeutic settings.
114
Most publicly-funded treatment providers are already operating at full
capacity and have waiting lists." 5 Thus, individuals referred into treatment
by a drug treatment court likely will be referred to whatever program within
the network of affiliated providers happens to have an opening or the shortest
walt for admission." 6 In addition, some drug treatment courts have been
"Matching, " 171 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES 597 (1983); Dennis Dwayne Simpson & L. James
Savage, Client Types in Different Drug Abuse Treatments: Comparisons of Follow-Up Outcomes, 8
AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 401 (1982).
111. See Alfred S. Friedman & Nita W. Glickman, Program Characteristics for Successful
Treatment ofAdolescent Drug Abuse, 174 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASES 669 (1986).
112. See TREATMENT EFFECTIVENESS STUDY, supra note 28, at 10-11. Other patients who appear
to respond well to psychiatric inpatient programs include middle class persons, "blue collar" workers,
and addicted health professionals. See id
113. Seeid at6.
114. In its public comments on the Government Accounting Office's ("GAO") 1997 report to
Congress regarding the development and operation of drug treatment courts, the Department of Health
and Human Services "expressed concems with the lack of a thorough assessment of the adequacy of
treatment being provided to drug court program participants." DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note
8, at 15-16. The GAO report, however, does describe the results of a 1997 survey conducted by the
Drug Court Clearinghouse of 72 drug treatment court programs. Those responding to the survey
"generally reported using an array of substance abuse and individual rehabilitation services, including
detoxification, stabilization, counseling, therapy, drug education, and relapse prevention." Id. at 51-52.
Significantly, these responses also indicated that most treatment courts do not "maintain the capability
to refer program participants to inpatient treatment for more than 30 days," id. at 52 n.2, thus
effectively precluding the use of some treatment modalities such as therapeutic communities. See also
COOPER, 1997 SURVEY, supra note 18, at 48-49 (describing very limited capability of drug treatment
courts to refer individuals to inpatient treatment for more than thirty days).
115. See COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 18, at 52 ("the most serious
problem encountered by the responding programs related to the lack of available funding to provide
necessary treatment services"); Brown, supra note 5, at 82 ("Even as the federal government doubled
treatment funding between 1988 and 1993, treatment efforts failed to reach at-risk populations,
including inmates.").
116. See COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 18, at 52 ("various operational
issues were noted relating ... to the matching of court and treatment resources to the volume (often
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designed to operate with dedicated treatment slots, in part because of the
inadequate treatment resources now available more generally." 7 In these
instances, it is unlikely that treatment referrals will be made based solely on
decisions regarding individual diagnosis and appropriateness of a given
treatment modality; rather, the individual offender frequently will be referred
to that provider with whom the treatment court has reserved beds." l8
With respect to evaluation and prognosis, an application of the critique of
the rehabilitation regime of twenty-five years ago to contemporary drug
treatment court efforts once again suggests the need for caution. Instead of
vague judgments about future behavior and the likelihood of recidivism, the
principal question facing modem treatment court decision makers is whether
an individual participant has successfully entered into a pattern of recovery
from addiction or chemical dependency. 119 The addictions treatment
fluctuating)... of eligible drug court participants").
117. A 1995 survey conducted by the Drug Court Resource Center at American University asked
responding treatment courts to identify unanticipated issues encountered and to describe what steps
were taken to resolve those problems. The Kansas City drug treatment court reported that "inadequate
treatment space," insufficient "reporting from existing treatment providers," and the "needs of special
populations (pregnant women, homeless, dual diagnosis, etc)" had led them to utilize a single
treatment provider under contract with the court, Id. at 56-57.
118. The Center for Substance Abuse Treatment of the Department of Health and Human
Services, in its 1997 planning guide and checklist for drug treatment courts, identified a number of
elements that were critical to the success of such undertakings. Among the elements was the
requirement of "[c]omprehensive, client-oriented treatment to include a range of appropriate
modalities." CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT PLANNING GUIDE AND CHECKLIST FOR TREATMENT-
BASED DRUG COURTS (1997) [hereinafter PLANNING GUIDE AND CHECKLIST]. Despite this
admonition, the GAO's 1997 study reported that "[a]ccording to the Drug Court Clearinghouse, in
most drug court programs, treatment.., is generally administered on an outpatient basis with limited
inpatient treatment as needed to address special detoxification or relapse situations." DRUG COURTS
OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 24. A review of the appendix to the GAO study in which the results of the
Clearinghouse survey are reported reveals a wide variation in the nature of treatment services available
through different drug treatment courts. At one end of the continuum is the Denver program in which
"[t]reatment is individualized," and may include outpatient treatment, acupuncture, group therapy,
intensive residential treatment, and the use of therapeutic communities. Id. app. HI. At the other end of
the continuum are several treatment courts that provide little more than a twelve-step program and
urinalysis. Id.
119. Although the text refers to a "pattern of recovery," it is important to note that experts in the
addiction treatment field often define treatment effectiveness to include measures short of complete
and permanent abstinence. Thus, effective treatment goals might include "reduced time to relapse,
reduced frequency of drug use, and the reduced amount of the drug used in total and during each
episode of use." TREATMENT EFFECTIVENESS STUDY, supra note 28, at 2. It is questionable whether
this sort of expanded and individualized description of treatment outcome success is acceptable
operationally or politically in the context of drug treatment courts. See COOPER, 1997 SURVEY, supra
note 18, at 57 (summarizing how frequently various criteria (including program attendance, urinalysis
results, graduation rates, appearances at court hearings, new arrests, and employment) are used to
assess drug treatment programs).
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community is still debating how to measure treatment outcomes, 120 and there
is a large and contentious literature with respect to the various rates of long-
term success and failure of different treatment modalities.' 21 At the same
time, however, at least in the nearer-term, more objective, concrete measures
of success and failure on which to base decisions in the cases of individual
offenders do exist. For example, rates of attendance in outpatient programs
and ongoing urine testing for both inpatients and outpatients provide better
indicators of an individual's progress in treatment than the data typically used
in the past by parole boards and other corrections officials.122  The
individualization critique, then, is not dispositive in the context of
contemporary drug treatment courts. The critique suggests that any
therapeutic regime will only be as good as the expert judgments that
determine how individual cases are handled. At this point, it is probably fair
to conclude that drug treatment court decision makers have somewhat more
reliable data than did their earlier counterparts, and consequently are
somewhat more likely to make sensible choices with respect to treatment,
release from supervision, and the like.'
23
120. See TREATMENT EFFECTIVENESS STUDY, supra note 28, at 2 n.1; cf Michael T. French eta].,
The Impact of Time in Treatment on the Employment and Earnings of Drug Abusers, 81 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 904 (1991).
121. See, e.g., McLellan et al., supra note 110; Simpson & Savage, supra note 110.
122. Indeed, the Drug Court Resource Center's study reports that "[a]t a minimum, the
information provided to the drug court judge for each [drug [e]ourt participant has included:
appearance at scheduled treatment sessions; appearance for requisite urinalyses; urinalyses results;
appearance at scheduled court sessions; and new arrests." COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS,
supra note 18, at 40.
123. In discussing the lack of reliable data on the possible success or failure of rehabilitative
efforts, the American Friends Service Committee noted that treatment-related assessments require, at a
minimum, "comparison with control groups of similar subjects who are not treated;" "control of other
variables;" and "reasonably reliable criteria for determining success or failure." STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 42. In light of this description of good social science methodology, it is
worth noting the critical assessment offered by the GAO's 1997 review of existing drug treatment
court studies.
Ideally, responding to issues raised by Congress and others and addressing the efficacy of drug
court programs would be more effectively determined by following up on participants and
nonparticipants (i.e., eligible offenders who chose not to participate) for some period after they
leave the program to see if they committed new crimes or relapsed into drug use. Overall, the
evaluation studies we reviewed showed some positive results but did not firmly establish whether
drug court programs were successful in reducing drug relapse and offender recidivism. Many of
the studies involved very short follow-up periods. Some calculated relapse and/or recidivism rates
only for program participants, and only for the period during which they were participating in the
program. Others compared rates of recidivism or relapse for program participants and program
dropouts or with offenders whose arrests occurred prior to the inception of the program.
DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 79.
Washington University Open Scholarship
1230 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
2. The Problems ofIndeterminacy and Discretion
As previously noted, the left-liberal critics suggested that rehabilitative
systems of punishment necessarily exhibit three related characteristics. In
addition to an emphasis on individualized treatment, the other characteristics
to draw their fire were the systems' reliance on indeterminate sentences and
their allowance for broad discretionary decision making.124 The critics argued
that the move to indeterminate sentencing, "which made the need for and
response to treatment the formal standard for determining whether and for
how long to imprison,"' 5 had several negative consequences. 126 Specifically,
as the range of possible sentences available for any given offense widened,
the total amount of punishment imposed on offenders typically increased.
127
Indeed, the data showed that increased indeterminacy in sentencing was
directly correlated with increases in the median length of time actually served
by prisoners. 128 More central to the critique was the notion that
indeterminacy is itself punitive. The critics argued that the very uncertainty
of an indeterminate sentence, particularly when release decisions are highly
discretionary and difficult to predict, constitutes a kind of psychological
harm.
129
The left-liberal critics leveled some of their most pointed attacks against
the broad discretion held by judges, parole boards, and other decision makers
in the rehabilitative regime. 3" Not surprisingly, given the difficulties of
diagnosis, evaluation, and prognosis, the critics found little empirical basis to
believe that offenders' actual sentences bore any relationship to their
124. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 84.
125. Id. at 27.
126. See i at 28. They suggested further that, if the "reformers" were "naive" with respect to
these outcomes, "managers of the correctional establishment were not." With respect to this latter
group, they argued that indeterminacy was supported by corrections officials as a means of gaining
power over inmates and maintaining institutional control. See id.
127. See CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 86, at 119.
128. See FOGEL, supra note 41, at 194; JESSICA MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT: THE
PRISON BUSINESS 92 (1973); Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy
Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 303-04 (1974) ("[Tlhere is evidence, albeit inconclusive, that
prisoners incarcerated under indeterminate sentencing laws serve longer terms of imprisonment . .
129. The Friends noted:
The middle class person who blanches at the thought of the cat-o'-nine-tails apparently accepts
without undue feelings of guilt the cat-and-mouse game whereby the prisoner never knows
whether the sentence is three years or ten and discipline is maintained by the threat of more time.
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 94; see also CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 86, at 119
("Under the pressure of such uncertainty, family ties often disintegrate, thus precipitating a difficult
crisis in an inmate's life and making reintegration into society more problematic once parole is
granted.").
130. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 92-94 (using California system as example).
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amenability to treatment or actual rehabilitation. At the front end of the
process, the critics argued, sentencing judges had neither the specialized
training nor the scientific expertise to support systematically rational decision
making.131 In fact, researchers found that widely divergent sentences for
similar offenses simply could not be explained by any factors clearly related
to rehabilitation. 132 Similarly, at the end of the process, parole decisions were
described as based on hunch, bias, and anecdotal experience. As the Friends'
Report pointed out, "Decisions on parole readiness ... must be reached
without even [a] minimum of data, for there is no conceivably relevant
knowledge in existence to support either the decision to grant parole or to
deny it... ,,133
Taken together, these three features of the rehabilitative regime led the
critics to conclude that the criminal system often operated arbitrarily and
unfairly. In the absence of sentencing statutes that might have fostered more
consistent outcomes, or adequate scientific tools for classification and
prediction, decision makers were forced to make choices about the
imposition of coercive measures based largely on intuition. 34 Such intuition,
the critics asserted, too frequently turned on the judge's or parole board
member's ability to identify and empathize with individual defendants. 135 As
a consequence, especially given the white middle-class background of most
criminal justice decision makers, racism and class bias pervaded the
system.
136
Once again, the practical critique partially applies to contemporary drug
treatment courts. On the one hand, the broad range of possible sentences for a
given offense that drew the attention of critics in the 1970s is virtually
impossible today, given the widespread adoption by most American
jurisdictions of sentencing guidelines and other forms of determinate
sentencing.1 37 Preliminary data from currently operating drug treatment
courts suggest the possibility of a wider range of actual sentences among
participating offenders than the sentences of similar defendants whose cases
are resolved by plea or trial in traditional criminal courts. 138 This greater
131. See CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 86, at 123; cf MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 8 (1972).
132. See CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 86, at 124.
133. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 71.
134. See CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 86, at 124.
135. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 72.
136. See id; see also THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING,
FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 5 (1976).
137. See generally MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING REFORM IMPACTS (1987).
138. As noted earlier, existing studies of drug treatment courts often lack data comparing a study
group of participants with a control group of similar offenders who have not participated. See supra
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variation in outcomes is entirely consistent with the design of modem drug
treatment courts, which tend to link decisions regarding the imposition of
incarcerative sentences and length of supervision to the performance of
offenders in treatment. 39 In addition, the mere fact that final case
dispositions are often delayed beyond the time line typical in traditional
criminal courts contributes to the potential variability of actual time served
under supervision or in jail. 140
On the other hand, concerns about the abuse of discretion, although
relevant to the functioning of modem drug treatment courts, appear to play
out differently today than they did in the earlier rehabilitative era. The design
of some drug treatment courts requires prosecutors and defendants to enter
into an agreement at the beginning of the process. 141 Then, if and when the
defendant fails to comply with a condition of the agreement, a graduated
system of sanctions comes into play.142 In other treatment courts, a similar
system of graduated sanctions is set out for all participants according to a
"fixed sanction algorithm."'143 In either setting, the judge typically exercises
considerable discretion in making findings and in selecting from the array of
escalating penalties. 144 In still other treatment courts, even greater discretion
is permitted because no fixed schedule of penalties is established in
advance.145 All things being equal, however, the range of choices open to the
decision makers in the latter treatment courts is probably more limited than
note 122. Nevertheless, some information permitting limited comparisons does exist. For example, the
Drug Court Resource Center's 1995 study contains information regarding the sanctions that would
have been applicable to the treatment court population prior to the initiation of a drug treatment court
in certain identified jurisdictions. See COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 18, at 9.
In addition, the same study also contains data regarding the disposition of unsuccessful participants,
including sentences of incarceration. See id. at 35; see also COOPER, 1997 SURVEY, supra note 18, at
23,27.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27. Indeed, the GAO's 1997 study reports that "most
drug court programs use sanctions not to simply punish inappropriate behavior but to augment the
treatment process." DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 26.
140. Depending on the design of any given drug treatment court, the final disposition of a
participant's case could be an adjudication of guilt, final entry of judgment, or termination of
probation. See supra note 18.
141. See McColl, supra note 8, at 482.
142. See COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 18, at 33.
143. See Elizabeth Piper Deschenes & Peter W. Greenwood, Maricopa County's Drug Court: An
Innovative Program for First-Time Drug Offenders on Probation, 17 JUsT. SYs. J. 99, 105 (1994)
(providing description of relatively elaborate point system used by Maricopa County, Arizona program
in determining both sanctions and rewards for participants based on their performance in treatment);
Satel, supra note 13, at 62 (reporting on number of treatment courts she studied that use fixed
sanctioning algorithms).
144. See COOPER, OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 18, at 34, 39-44; see also
McColl, supra note 8, at 502-03. For a more detailed discussion of the problems of discretionary
decision making in the drug treatment court setting, see infra notes 332-37 and accompanying text.
145. See Satel, supra note 13, at 62.
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the choices available to judges and other corrections officials during the
height of the rehabilitative ideal, when wide ranges of sentences were the
norm.
146
Perhaps more important is the institutional environment within which
drug treatment judges operate. Advocates of the rehabilitative regime have
long observed a basic incompatibility between the adversary system and a
therapeutic approach to justice. 47 In large part, the tension grows out of the
perception that an offender's assertion of a position adverse to that offered by
the state is itself evidence of the offender's pathology and need for
treatment.148 As one proponent of rehabilitation explained, "There will come
a point at which a personal approach and the 'educational atmosphere' of
good will and cooperation would be frustrated, if prisoner and official
regarded their mutual relationship only from the strict legal point of view."
149
This tension between a traditional, due process model and a much more
informal "helping" approach to decision making may not have arisen often in
the adjudication of cases, even during the height of the rehabilitative regime.
But decisions made at the end of the process (concerning probation and
parole) clearly evidenced this tension, and it was with respect to these
informal processes that the critics offered their most concentrated attacks on
146. McColl reports that the judge in Baltimore City's drug treatment court "almost always
follows the recommendations of treatment providers." McColl, supra note 8, at 497. One might
conclude that this sort of deference to the experts is likely to diminish problems with respect to judicial
discretion. Nevertheless, it merely implicates the problems regarding diagnosis and evaluation
discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 91-123.
147. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 48; Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary
System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7,26.
148. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 48. This poor fit between the adversarial norms of the
traditional criminal trial, in which the defendant is expected to resist a finding of responsibility and to
put the state to its proof, and the treatment objectives of drug treatment courts is especially apparent
given the role that denial plays in the disease model of addiction. Indeed, that a defendant in drug
treatment court seeks to resist the assignment of guilt is likely to be understood as strong evidence that
the defendant is an addict. See Boldt, supra note 7, at 2296-97 (discussing denial and disease model of
addiction); see also Margaret H. Bean, Denial and the Psychological Complications of Alcoholism, in
DYNAMIC APPROACHES TO THE UNDERSTANDING AND TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM 55 (Margaret H.
Bean & Norman E. Zinberg eds., 1981). Allen notes that criminal blaming practices in the People's
Republic of China have also historically equated an accused person's assertion of an adversary
position with his need for treatment:
It is said that wise political prisoners in the People's Republic of China understand that insistence
on their legal rights ofappeal often result in more, rather than less, enforced "political education";
for such insistence is viewed by the authorities as an expression of the very attitudes that the
rehabilitative regime is intended to alter or suppress. The high importance accorded fall
confessions of guilt in the Chinese system likewise reveals the conclusion that the affliction most
in need of cure is the propensity of individuals to fend off the benevolent embrace of state power.
ALLEN, supra note 38, at 48 (citations omitted).
149. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 47 (quoting M. GRUNHUT, PENAL REFORM 117 (1948)).
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broad discretionary power.150 Because the contemporary treatment court
approach has so strongly endorsed the norms of procedural informality and
cooperation, t51 this portion of the left-liberal critique is especially relevant to
the modem undertaking. Sorting out the competing advantages and
disadvantages of a rights-based adversary process versus an informal
treatment team approach is a complicated undertaking. Therefore, in order to
gain some additional hold on this problem, it becomes necessary to set out a
clearer conception of the theoretical perspectives on which the practical
critique rested.
C. The Theoretical Perspective of the Left-Liberal Critics
The American Friends Service Committee's 1971 report, A Struggle For
Justice, is remarkable in a number of respects. 152 Perhaps its most remarkable
feature, which helped to make the report's publication such an influential
moment in the decline of the rehabilitative ideal, was its authors' choice to
mix insights gained from radical criminologists with those offered by the
more traditional liberal skeptics of rehabilitation. Each of these perspectives
is considered below.
1. The Radical Perspective
The phrase "radical criminology" captures a broad range of theoretical
positions regarding state-sponsored punishment'53 Most importantly for
150. See, e.g., FOGEL, supra note 41, at 196-99.
151. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; see also Bean, supra note 15, at 719; McColl,
supra note 8, at 512-15.
152. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41.
153. At a minimum, one should include at least three distinct intellectual traditions within the
general umbrella of "radical criminology." See generally Albert P. Cardarelli & Stephen C. Hicks,
Radicalism in Law and Criminology: A Retrospective View of Critical Legal Studies and Radical
Criminology, 84 J. CRIM. L. 502 (1993). The first consists of those writers who have argued that state-
sponsored punishment cannot be justified under any existing theories given the concrete social and
political realities within which blaming practices take place. These thinkers therefore conclude that
punishment should be abolished rather than reformed. See, e.g., THOMAS MATHIESEN, THE POLITICS
OF ABOLITION (1974); Stanley Cohen, Alternatives to Punishment: The Abolitionist Case, 25 ISRAEL
L. REV. 729 (1991); Louk Hulsman, The Abolitionist Case: Alternative Crime Policies, 25 ISRAEL L.
REv. 681 (1991). The second group consists of Marxist criminologists who contend that crime is
rooted in the material circumstances of capitalist culture and is a manifestation of capitalism's unequal
distribution of wealth. See, e.g., WILLEM ADRIAN BONGER, CRIMINALITY AND ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS (Henry P. Horton trans., 1916). The third intellectual tradition, which is the primary focus
of the discussion in the text, centers around the radical sociology of Michel Foucault and others. These
thinkers maintain that formal penal practices accomplish a variety of latent functions related to the
control of class conflict and the maintenance of existing power relationships. See, e.g., MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977); see also
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present purposes, radical criminology holds that societal blaming practices
are inherently ideological and thus political.15 4 Building on the work of
sociologist Emile Durkheim, the tradition of radical criminology holds that
the rituals and practices of punishment perform "latent functions" aside from
the overt objectives claimed for the penal system. 55 Radical theorists look
far beyond Durkheim's original claims that state punishment serves to mark
out societal boundaries and reinforce social solidarity.156 They have argued
variously that official systems of criminal blaming work to control
oscillations in the labor market,157 pacify the poor and disempowered, 158 and
divert attention from the antisocial conduct of powerful actors in society. 59
The most influential radical analysis of punishment in the modem era was
offered by Michel Foucault. He argued that the role of the prison, along with
schools, factories, and the like, is to "construc[t] and regulat[e] the individual
as a self-controlled subject"'6°
This picture of the criminal system as performing a latent political role in
addition to the overt functions of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and
isolation is (and was) dramatically at odds with the account offered by the
mid-twentieth century luminaries of rehabilitation, including Barbara
Wootton and Karl Menninger.' 61 Their claims for corrections practices then
in place, and their descriptions of an ideal therapeutic model, not only
neglected to consider the latent functions of punishment, but were devoid of
any explicit political analysis whatsoever.
THOMAS L. DUMM, DEMOCRACY AND PUNiSHMENT: DISCIPLINARY ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987); JOHN IRWIN, THE JAIL: MANAGING THE UNDERCLASS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1985).
154. For a good explanation of the terms "ideology" and "ideological" as they are employed here,
see generally KARL MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA 9 (1936). See also Richard C. Boldt,
Restitution, Criminal Law, and the Ideology ofIndividualty, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 969, 977
n.42 (1986).
155. See Duff& Garland, supra note 49, at 32.
156. See EMILE DURKHEIM THE DMISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., 1984); see
also Boldt, supra 154, at 996-98.
157. See GEORG RUSCHE & OTTO KIRCHHEIMER, PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL STRuCTURE (2d ed.
1968).
158. See IRWIN, supra note 153.
159. See Duff& Garland, supra note 49, at 33.
160. Id. Allen describes Foucault's central theme as follows:
Michel Foucault appears to assert that bourgeois society deliberately creates crime both in order to
justify a law-enforcement mechanism quickly adaptable to the suppression of political dissent and
also to divert the more aggressive members of the dispossessed classes into the commission of
ordinary crimes and away from revolutionary action against the dominant social interests.
ALLEN, supra note 38, at 39-40.
161. See MENNINGER, supra note 75; WOOTTON, supra note 94.
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Concerns were focused on the encounter between the convicted
prisoner and the therapist or the therapeutic program. The propriety of
the prisoner's conviction was assumed, and political issues associated
with the definitions of crime and the apprehension, trial, and
commitment of offenders were ignored or slighted.
16 2
Some of the accounts took on a kind of eery scientistic quality. For
example, Wootton hdvocated the complete replacement of the criminal
system with a new two-stage process in which the first determination would
focus solely on whether the defendant had committed a prohibited act. Once
this strict liability determination had been made, Wootton called for the
imposition of compulsory measures based entirely on an assessment of the
actor's characteristics and potential for future harm. This assessment was to
be made by psychiatrists, social workers, and other experts in rehabilitation.
Considerations of public safety would govern the choice of measures,
without regard to any assessment of moral blame or fault.163 Wootton's
system constituted a complete merger of penal and therapeutic functions, as
well as a complete blurring of the notions of wrongdoing and accident.1
64
The radical critique of this apolitical social engineering operated at two
related levels. First, the critics asserted that the claimed neutrality of the
rehabilitative ideal was false. They focused on a number of topics: the public
choices by which some antisocial behavior is designated criminal while other
equally harmful conduct is not;165 the exercise of police and prosecutorial
discretion to bring some matters into the system while resolving others
informally;166 and the biases within the mental health professions and the
social sciences that describe only some points of view or perspectives as
pathological. 167 The critics further argued that the apolitical posture of the
proponents of a therapeutic regime was itself deeply political. They claimed
that by characterizing crime as a matter of individual pathology, and by
characterizing effective responses to criminal violence as therapeutic
encounters between individual prisoners and their therapists, the
162. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 34.
163. See WOOTTON, supra note 94; Barbara Wootton, Crime, Responsibility, and Prevention,
reprinted in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 164, 164-
74 (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972).
164. See WOOTTON, supra note 94; see also H.L.A. Hart, Crime and the Criminal Law, 74 YALE
L.J. 1325, 1327-29 (1965) (book review); Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26
CAMBRIDGEL.J. 273,285-86 (1968).
165. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 102-07 (discussing "manipulation of the
criminal justice system by the powerful").
166. See id. at 124-34, 142 (asserting that discretion in application of criminal prohibitions serves
interests of members of "politically and economically dominant classes of the society").
167. See generally THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1961).
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rehabilitative ideal obscured the structural causes of criminal conduct and the
concomitant need for fundamental social change.
168
The radical critique is extraordinarily apt when mapped onto the
contemporary drug treatment court movement. The insights it offered the
Friends and others still apply to ongoing efforts at rehabilitative penal
innovation. Indeed, drug treatment court advocates who urge the adoption of
these courts use rhetoric remarkably reminiscent of the mid-century
rehabilitationists. Thus, although proponents maintain that specialized
diversion programs are cost-effective and efficient measures for the reduction
of criminal dockets and prison overcrowding, 169 little attention is given to the
political dimensions of the "drug war," including racially discriminatory
sentencing provisions, neighborhood police sweeps, and the like.170 Even
more disturbing is the degree to which the structural foundations of the
problem are obscured. 17 1 Issues relating to the absence of legitimate
employment opportunities, enterprise capital, or adequate educational
resources in the disadvantaged communities that produce the bulk of drug
defendants, 72 all of which contribute in a direct and immediate way to both
the marketing and use of illegal drugs, 173 are not simply put on a back burner
but are rendered irrelevant to a problem that the drug treatment courts help to
168. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 35. Allen draws an interesting parallel between this set of
claims regarding rehabilitative blaming practices in the United States and the "political uses of
psychiatry in the Soviet Union." Id at 105 n.10; see also Thomas Szasz, Soviet Psychiatry: Its
Supporters in the West, INQUIRY, Jan. 2, 1978, at 4-5.
169. See Bean, supra note 15, at 720-21; Brown, supra note 5, at 83-84; McColl, supra note 8, at
500.
170. On claims regarding racial discrimination in drug offense sentencing, see Knoll D. Lowney,
Smoked Not Snorted: Is Racism Inherent in Our Crack Cocaine Laws?, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 121 (1994). With respect to the relationship between race and law enforcement efforts in
the war on drugs, see john a. powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National
Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557 (1991).
171. As the drug treatment court movement matures, it appears that more attention may be given
to other individual problems closely related to a defendant's substance abuse. A 1997 survey of
treatment courts reports that many have expanded their rehabilitation services in recognition of the fact
that "the drug court must treat not only the participants' addiction but the numerous associated
personal problems most participants encounter-physical, mental, housing, family, employment, self
esteem, etc.-if long-term sobriety and rehabilitation is to be achieved and future criminal activity is to
be significantly reduced." COOPER, 1997 SURVEY, supra note 18, at 6 (emphasis in original).
172. See generally William Julius Wilson, Public Policy Research and the Truly Disadvantaged,
in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 460 (Christopher Jencks & Paul Peterson eds., 1991). To say that
disadvantaged communities (especially poor communities of color) produce the bulk of drug
defendants is not to say that these communities also produce the bulk of drug users. Indeed, at the
height of the war on drugs in the late 1980s, data showed that African-Americans comprised only 12%
of the illegal drug users in the country, but accounted fully for 44% of all drug arrests. See Lowney,
supra note 170, at 131 (citations omitted).
173. See David R. Henderson, A Humane Economist's Case for Drug Legalization, 24 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 655 (1991); Ryan, supra note 54, at 221.
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redefine as a matter of individual pathology. 174
2. The Liberal Perspective
In addition to elements from the radical school of criminology, the
Friends and many of the other opponents of rehabilitation in the 1970s also
relied heavily on a critique based on traditional liberal notions of individual
autonomy and limited state power. The liberal account begins with the notion
that punishment is "morally problematic," and therefore requires an
articulable normative justification. 175 All state-sponsored penal practices
raise this normative problem because punishment inherently threatens the
very core values central to the liberal theory of the state. 176 Liberals place
individual freedom at the top of the list of core values and see the citizen's
relationship to the state as properly governed by a system of individual rights
that constrain the uses of official power that otherwise might limit individual
autonomy, privacy, and choice. 177 The need for moral justification arises
because state-sponsored punishment, whether incarceration, probation, or
fine, by definition limits the sanctioned individual's freedom and
autonomy.178 This bundle of related ideas was voiced by the Friends:
Any coercion of another human being goes against our deep respect
for every person's dignity. We believe that all people have the right to
174. See generally DIANA R. GORDON, THE RETURN OF THE DANGEROUS CLASSES: DRUG
PROHIBITION AND POLICY POLITICS (1994). One of the best, and most moving, descriptions of the
larger societal roots of self-destructive drug use is contained in an article by Lucie White on "welfare
dependency." White writes about the range of coping strategies developed by women in poverty whom
she interviewed. She describes a set of coping strategies adopted by one of her interviewees as
"familiar strategies of self-medication, of defeating the double bind by psychically or chemically
escaping the world." Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Different
Ground, 81 GEO. L.L 1961, 1995 (1993). Included in this set of coping techniques are evangelical
Christianity, television watching, sleep, and the use of crack cocaine. With respect to the last of these,
White writes:
[C]rack is hard to resist. Its salesmen are so persistent and compared to the alternatives it works--
at least for those first few minutes.... mhis drug and the AIDS epidemic that has followed it into
despairing African-American communities have mangled lives in ways that defy description.
These lives are not being lost through ignorance, or carelessness, or a will to die. Rather,
[certain] people... must sometimes risk their lives in order to seek relief from their pain.
Id. at 1997. For a second, very different account of the relationship between drugs, poverty, gender and
race, see Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality
and the Right ofPrivacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
175. Duff& Garland, supra note 49, at 2.
176. Seeid. at3.
177. See Boldt, supra note 24, at 2358-59; see also Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the State,
and the ModerniPostmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1018 (1988).
178. See Duff & Garland, supra note 49, at 3; J.G. Murphy, Retributivism, Moral Education and
the Liberal State, 4 CRrM. JUST. ETHICS 3 (1985). %
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autonomy and privacy, to be left alone to find their own way. The very
concept of criminal justice-which inevitably involves coercion-is
thus an anomaly for us.1
7 9
Even given this conception of the normative requirements for legitimate
coercive state practices, liberal theory recognizes that punishment may be
justified to the extent that its use protects the right of other citizens to be free
from crime.180 Because of the background commitments mandated by this
perspective, however, the state "must punish no more than is necessary to
secure the proper aims of punishment, and its penal institutions must not
intrude too far on individual privacy and freedom."''
The liberal critics of rehabilitation argued that penal practices in the mid-
twentieth century often failed this test of moral justification. Their claims fall
into three related categories. Their first group of considerations bore on the
principle that the state should seek to accomplish its legitimate penal
purposes through the least invasive means possible. This argument built on
the observation, set out above,182 that the criminal system, including its
adjunct mental health experts, was incapable of performing the accurate and
effective diagnosis, evaluation, and prognosis of offenders. Advocates of the
rehabilitative ideal conceived of criminal behavior as a symptom of some
individual pathology, but the classification of any individual offender's
"disorder," and the formulation of an appropriate treatment protocol, often
exceeded the ability of the experts.
As a consequence of this inherent vagueness of diagnosis and lack of
clarity about proper treatment, argued the liberal critics, the scope of the
state's power over individuals was dangerously enlarged.18 3 As Francis Allen
has explained, the principle of relevance acts as an important source of
restraint on governmental power. When vague notions of "illness" and
"treatment' define the ambit of authority that corrections officials may use
with respect to offenders, the officials are put at liberty to impose measures
directed not just toward effecting offenders' behavior, but also their "'soul':
[their] motives, [their] history, [their] social environment.' 8 4
The liberal critics coupled this argument about the vagueness of the
state's goals and the resulting expansion of state power with the further claim
that a rehabilitative enterprise naturally collapses into punishment because
179. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 4 1, at 22-23.
180. See Duff& Garland, supra note 49, at 3.
181. Id-
182. See supra text accompanying notes 91-107.
183. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 39-40; ALLEN, supra note 38, at 47.
184. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 47 (quoting MICHEL FOUCAULT, supra note 153, at 19).
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the "natural progress of any program of coercion is one of escalation." 18 5
They concluded that, without regard to the good intentions of corrections
reformers, rehabilitative regimes necessarily expand and become debased
into serving other than therapeutic ends.18 6 Such a collapse of purpose is bad
enough by itself. But the critics argued that the consequences of systematic
debasement in this arena were especially pernicious because of the gaping
distances between the claims of the penal reformers and the realities of their
practice.
In one place or another solitary confinement has been called
"constructive meditation" and a cell for such confinement "the quiet
room." Incarceration without treatment of any kind is seen as "milieu
therapy" and a detention facility is labeled "Cloud Nine." Disciplinary
measures such as the use of cattle prods on inmates become "aversion
therapy" and the playing of a powerful fire hose on the backs of
recalcitrant adolescents "hydrotherapy." Cell blocks are hospitals,
dormitories are wards, latrine cleaning "work therapy." The catalog is
almost endless.1
8 7
If expansion and debasement were the first items on the liberal critics' bill
of particulars, a second set of complaints was equally important to their
overall assault on the rehabilitative regime. In one way or another, all of
these complaints fell into the general category of dignity concerns. First, the
critics argued that coercive therapy is paternalistic and thereby suspect in
light of the commitments of liberal theory to individual autonomy and
freedom of choice. 88 Second, they argued that this sort of paternalism was
especially problematic given that it was invoked by a corrections
establishment, largely white and middle-class at that time, to "run the lives of
185. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 25.
186. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 50-53. The critics argued that debasement is inherent given the
"conceptual weakness of the rehabilitative ideal. Vagueness and ambiguity shroud its most basic
suppositions." Id. at 51. In addition, they pointed out that "[e]qually serious is the vagueness that
surrounds the means to effect rehabilitation," id. at 52, and the fact that "[c]orrectional institutions and
programs must serve punitive, deterrent, and incapacitative ends" in addition to therapeutic goals. Id.
at 53. Finally, they argued that the ready availability of coercive solutions necessarily reduces the
likelihood that "more creative but more difficult and problematic voluntary alternatives" will be
attempted. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 25.
187. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 51 (citations omitted).
188. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 25. For an excellent discussion of paternalism,
including an effort to operationalize the concepts of autonomy and freedom of choice by
distinguishing an actor's values from his or her interests or wants, see David Luban, Paternalism and
the Legal Profession, 1981 Wisc. L. REV. 454, 467-74 ("Paternalism imposes constraints on an
individual's liberty for his or her own good."). For more on paternalism within the context of treatment
courts, see infra text accompanying notes 246-47.
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blacks, Chicanos, Indians, and the poor."' 89 Third, they argued that a
program of involuntary treatment undermines human dignity because it treats
the recipients of therapy as objects and not as responsible moral agents. In
the words of C.S. Lewis, an early and forceful proponent of the liberal
critique:
To be "cured" against one's will and cured of states which we may not
regard as disease is to be put on a level with those who have not yet
reached the age of reason or those who never will; to be classified with
infants, imbeciles, and domestic animals. But to be punished, however
severely, because we have deserved it, because we "ought to have
known better," is to be treated as a human person made in God's
image.190
The notion that penal rehabilitation is offensive because it treats offenders
as malleable objects rather than autonomous moral agents illustrates an
inherent conflict in any effort to merge the ideologies of free choice and
determinism. Ordinarily the criminal law operates according to the premise
of individual freedom of choice and grants excuses in those rare instances in
which a determinist account is recognized. 191 By contrast the helping
professions, including medicine and social work, tend to view human
behavior in causal terms.' 92 The merger of legal and medical models is
problematic because it permits the use of the coercive power of the state for
the service of determinist ends, even though the justification for such
measures stems from a system of blaming that rests on notions of free will.193
This conflating of incompatible ideologies undermines the institutional
mechanisms ordinarily used to maintain societal blaming practices capable of
sorting out intentional from caused behavior. 94 Thus, rehabilitative penal
practices not only treat offenders like children and other groups of actors who
are not regarded as responsible moral agents, they also compound this
"demeaning" categorization by compelling offenders to undergo therapy
designed to "reshap[e] [their] psyche and moral values..., something not
189. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 25.
190. Lewis, supra note 1, at 228.
191. See Boldt, supra note 7, at 2246, 2304-05 (determinist perspective defined as "hold[ing] that
conduct is always the product of some matrix of causal factors that necessarily determines choice").
192. See id. at 2304-05; see also Seymour L. Halleck, Responsibility and Excuse in Medicine and
Law: A Utilitarian Perspective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1986).
193. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 33; Francis A. Allen, The Law as a Path to the World, 77
MICH. L. REv. 157, 166 (1978).
194. See Boldt, supra note 7, at 2321-30. In this earlier article, I argued that criminal blaming does
more than simply reflect social practice in this regard; rather, these practices play an important role in
the construction of notions of individual autonomy and freedom of choice. See id. at 2278-85.
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done to someone whose personhood is respected."'195
The merger is made no less problematic if it is undertaken in good faith.
Although the critics held open the possibility of bad motives on the part of
judges, prosecutors, and corrections officials, their essential complaint
applied notwithstanding the best of official intentions. 96 This argument was
the third and final item in the liberals' bill of particulars, and it was based on
the power of perspective. 197 From the perspective of the corrections
establishment, if the imposition of therapeutic measures is accomplished for
the purely benign purpose of helping offenders overcome individual
pathology, then it is neither punitive nor in conflict with the interests of the
recipients of those services.' 98 From the perspective of the acted-upon
offenders, however, the very fact that treatment is involuntary renders it
punitive. This is especially true if treatment involves institutionalization, the
loss of privacy, or additional restrictions in other areas ordinarily left to the
autonomous choice of individuals. 199 This divergence between the
perspectives of the state and the individual offender deeply disturbed the
critics, especially given liberal theory's axiomatic view that state power must
be constrained by clearly delineated individual rights in order to protect
individual liberties.200 They noted that when the criminal system uses
therapeutic practices, two distinct state functions become intertwined. On the
one hand, state-sponsored punishment, even when morally justified, is
undertaken to benefit society in general and not necessarily to benefit the
offender.201 In this sense, the state's role in maintaining a system of blaming
and punishing is "always at least potentially adverse to that of the
offender."202 On the other hand, the extension of "helping services," the
provision of benefits by the welfare state in the liberals' conception, does not
generate a conflict-potential or actual--between the interests of the
recipient and those of the government. In performing this second function,
195. DRESSLER, supra note 67, at 10.
196. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 25-26; Lewis, supra note 1, at 228.
197. On the importance of perspective in the analysis of legal institutions and legal practices, see
Lesnick, supra note 64, at 413-15, 439-54.
198. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 25-27; MENNINGER, supra note 75.
199. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 25-27; CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 86, at
116.
200. See Boldt, supra note 24, at 2359-60.
201. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 26-27.
The essence of punishment is the state's use of compulsion against the offender for the purported
benefit of society in general, that is, to satisfy public retributive urges, to compel conformity to
social norms, or to deter future violations by others through a demonstration that the state's threats
of punishment are to be taken seriously.
Id.
202. Id. at 27.
[VOL. 76:1205
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol76/iss4/2
THE DRUG TREATMENT COURT MOVEMENT
they argued, the state merely acts "in behalf of society for the benefit of the
recipient who, in the typical situation, can either accept or reject the proffered
help. 2 °3
This set of observations about the confusion of the state's role in
sponsoring systems for blame and punishment on the one hand and for
providing help to needy citizens on the other was central to the liberal
critique of the rehabilitative ideal. It was the theoretical foundation for the set
of practical objections relating to indeterminacy and discretion set out
earlier.2° When the state acts in a way at least potentially adverse to the
interests of an individual, particularly when that individual is likely among
the least advantaged and empowered groups in society, liberal theories of
state power call on the legal system to afford that individual a range of
procedural rights designed to keep the state from overreaching.205 On the
other hand, when the state attempts to assist individual citizens, this account
asserts that the need for such rights of orderly process greatly diminishes.2 °6
The extreme indeterminacy of sentencing provisions called for by the
rehabilitative approach, coupled with the broad discretion accorded judges,
parole boards, and others, was inconsistent with the critics' procedural vision
of a properly limited penal regime.
As with the radical vision, the foregoing liberal account raises troubling
questions when applied to the contemporary drug treatment court movement.
The claim that therapeutic undertakings tend "in practical application to
become debased and to serve other social ends far removed from and
sometimes inconsistent with the reform of offenders' 20 7 is particularly apt in
illuminating the dangers posed by drug treatment courts. Professor Allen
argues that the history of this sort of debasement in the context of mental
health institutions and juvenile courts strongly indicates that such
debasement is inherent in the rehabilitative ideal.208 He asserts that a chief
203. Id.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 124-36.
205. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 26-27. On liberal theory's conception of
procedural rights as important in protecting individuals from abusive state power, see Boldt, supra
note 24, at 2359-60.
206. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 27. In contrast, for a good discussion of the
serious potential conflicts that exist between actors in the welfare bureaucracy and the recipients of
social services, and of the possibility of managing those conflicts so that people "in significantly
unequal situations" can "relate to each other as equal moral agents," see Handler, supra note 177, at
1089-93. See also Boldt, supra note 24, at 2367-76 (arguing for approach that recognizes both
advantages of liberal legalism's rights-based approach and inherently disempowering effects of
treating social service recipients solely as autonomous rights-holders).
207. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 49.
208. See id at 50; see also DAVID ROTHMA, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971)
(discussing this tendency in context of mental institutions); STEVEN L. SCHLOSSMAN, LOVE & THE
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cause of this debasement is a persistent confusion or vagueness in defining
the goals of such treatment.
209
A similar confusion as to the goals of treatment exists in the context of
drug treatment courts. Generally, judges, prosecutors, corrections officials,
and others associated with treatment courts define the goal for participating
offenders as abstinence from illegal drug use and the avoidance of criminal
recidivism.210 Treatment experts, by contrast, understand the need for
individualized treatment goals. Furthermore, they define the goals more
appropriately as "reduced time to relapse, reduced frequency of drug use, and
the reduced amount of the drug used in total and during each episode of
use,"21' rather than as complete abstinence. Similarly, treatment providers
might regard "fewer arrests; fewer convictions; reductions in crimes
committed against self or others; and reductions in property crimes
committed" as more realistic goals for an individual than an absolute
avoidance of future criminality.
212
Allen also argues that a persistent "competition between rehabilitation
and the punitive and deterrent purposes of penal justice ... [in which t]he
rehabilitative ideal is ordinarily outmatched in the struggle" also accounts for
the tendency of penal treatment to devolve into punishment.213 Here again,
competition between the punishment and deterrence aspects of drug
treatment courts on the one side and the goals of therapy on the other will
likely be resolved in favor of the former.2 4 Finally, Allen remarks that the
most corrosive feature of the rehabilitative ideal, in terms of its ability to
withstand these various pressures toward debasement, has been the practice
of advocates of rehabilitation to seek public support by promising savings to
taxpayers. 5 Once again, the parallel with contemporary treatment court
initiatives is plain. Indeed, prominent in all of the public efforts to establish
and fund these modem rehabilitative enterprises has been the rhetoric of
utility and savings promised by an approach designed to clear court dockets
and relieve prison overcrowding.21 6
AMERICAN DELINQUENT (1977) (tracing similar developments in treatment ofjuveniles).
209. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 51-52.
210. See DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 50 (defining terms "completion" and
"retention" in treatment court context).
211. TREATMENT EFFECTIVENESS STUDY, supra note 28, at 2.
212. Id.
213. ALLEN, supra note 38, at 53-54.
214. See infra text accompanying notes 530-44.
215. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 55.
216. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text. This feature is corrosive if, as is often the case,
the initial claims of advocates regarding potential cost savings or other utilitarian outcomes are
overstated or excessively ambitious. For a good assessment of the claims made by drug treatment court
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Modem drug treatment courts raise questions regarding paternalism and
perspective similar to the dignity concerns contained in the arguments of the
1970s critics. With respect to these dangers, the link is most visible in the
explicit shifts in role and function urged on defense counsel representing
defendants in drug treatment courts. These shifts can be summarized in the
following terms. First, the goals of representation are revised so that a
traditional attorney focus on "avoiding or minimizing loss of liberty and the
imposition of other sanctions ' 2 17 become instead a focus on helping to
effectuate "long term general lifestyle outcomes" in which the "loss of liberty
•.. is viewed as one possible part of a total treatment strategy."218 Next, the
traditional understanding of the system as inherently adversarial is replaced
by a revised vision in which the defense lawyer functions as "part of a team
with the court, prosecution, treatment provider, correctional officials ... and
others. 2 19 Finally, notions of loyalty and partisanship, that traditionally have
defined the role of defense counsel, 2°0 are replaced by a conception of
professional role in which defense attorneys may "actively participate in the
design of the 'theatre' of the courtroom, '' 22l including the possibility that they
may occasionally join other drag court professionals to "orchestrate their
responses sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly."222 In short,
defense counsel is no longer primarily responsible for giving voice to the
distinct perspective of the defendant's experience in what remains a coercive
setting. Rather, defense counsel becomes part of a treatment team working
with others to insure that outcomes, viewed from the perspective of the
institutional players and not the individual defendant, are in the defendant's
best interests.
II. CONFLICTING GOALS OF DRUG TREATMENT COURTS AND THEIR
EFFECT ON DEFENSE ATTORNEYS
Many of the theoretical and practical problems implicated by the
rehabilitative ideal in general and drug treatment courts in particular are
rooted in the fundamentally divergent goals and assumptions of traditional
advocates, see DRUG COURTS OVERVIEW, supra note 8, at 67-7 1.
217. JUDE, supra note 43, at 1.
218. Id. at 2.
219. Id. at3.
220. See LUB3AN, supra note 45, at 7, 11; Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L.
REV. 3 (1951); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63
(1980).
221. JUDGE, supra note 43, at 7.
222. Id.
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Anglo-American criminal blaming practices as compared to the goals and
assumptions animating medical practice and the practices of other helping
professions.2M3 This conflict is brought into clearer focus when the analysis is
centered on the imperfect fit between the adversary system and rehabilitative
regimes.2 4 The focus becomes sharper still when the role of the defendant's
lawyer is made the lens through which that analysis takes place.225
A. The Adversary System, Attorney Role, and Rehabilitative Penal
Practice
An adversarial system of decision making has three primary
characteristics, and each directly relates to the role of counsel.226 First, the
parties initiate and control the process, by pursuing their respective positions
through affirmative presentations of evidence and argument coupled with
challenges to their opponent's version of law and fact.227 Second, these
forensic narratives and counternarratives are brought to the attention of the
decision maker according to formal procedural rules. 28 Third, the decisional
figure is charged with being neutral with respect to the conflict until such
time as a decision is rendered through the application of substantive
decisional rules to the parties' evidence.229
Given these characteristics, most adversarial adjudications require the
parties to seek the assistance of counsel. Laypersons usually lack the skill to
present their partisan account according to formal procedural rules.
Additionally, requiring that parties present these accounts with an eye toward
satisfying substantive rules of decision generally militates against pro se
advocacy by nonlawyer litigants.230 Taken together, the three defining
223. See, e.g., KEVIN M. SHERIN, TREATMENT DRUG COURTS: INTEGRATING SUBSTANCE ABUSE
TREATMENT WITH LEGAL CASE PROCESSING (1996) (discussing "values conflicts" between criminal
justice system and treatment and public health systems).
224. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 47-48; see also Handler, supra note 147, at 26 (discussing
inadequacies in juvenile court system because of conflict between adversarial and rehabilitative goals).
225. For a good general discussion of the nature of professional role, see Richard Wasserstrom,
Roles and Morality, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 28 (David
Luban ed., 1983).
226. For a classic account of these characteristics of the adversary system, see Lon L. Fuller, The
Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 34 (Harold J. Berman ed., 2d ed. 1971).
227. See id.; see also LUBAN, supra note 45, at 56-58.
228. See Fuller, supra note 226, at 34-36; see also LUBAN, supra note 45, at 57; Martin P.
Golding, Dispute Settling and Justice, in ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF
PROCEDURE 106, 108-09 (1979).
229. See Fuller, supra note 226, at 35; Martin Shapiro, The Logic of the Triad, in COVER & FISS,
supra note 228, at 284-86.
230. See Simon, Ideology ofAdvocacy, supra note 45; see also Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's
"Amoral Ethical Role". A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
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characteristics of the adversary system have been said to yield a standard
conception2 1 of the lawyer's role that largely is reflected in the A.B.A.'s
Model Code of Professional Responsibility,232 the A.B.A.'s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 233 and various standards governing criminal defense
practice.
234
Because the function of a lawyer in an adversarial proceeding is to
represent the client by directing his or her expertise toward the
accomplishment of the client's self-interested goals, 235 the standard
conception imposes upon the lawyer a set of mutually reinforcing duties. The
first is a duty of partisanship, which recognizes that the advocate is in some
senses standing in the shoes of his or her client. This duty is satisfied,
according to this conception, when the lawyer adopts the client's ends as his
or her own.2 6 Additionally, the attorney is bound to avoid conflicts between
the client's interests and his or her own interests or those of another client
This duty to avoid conflicts of interest is designed to insure that the lawyer's
partisan zeal, his or her unity of purpose with the client, is not diluted by
some competing agenda.237 Finally, the lawyer is forbidden from disclosing
information learned in the course of the representation, unless permitted to do
so by the client This duty of client confidentiality is intended to encourage
clients to speak freely with their lawyers, again in order to safeguard the
unity of purpose between advocate and the client and to facilitate the
lawyers' partisan efforts on their clients' behalf.
238
613, 617 (stating that "for most people most of the time, meaningful access to the law requires the
assistance of a lawyer"). Small claims courts represent an important exception to this general rule.
These courts have been designed to operate without formal procedural rules or strict rules of evidence,
so that litigants can deal directly with the court and without the need for counsel. See Eric H. Steele,
The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 295, 302; Barbara
Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims
Literature, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 219 (1975).
231. See Postema, supra note 220, at 73.
232. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983).
233. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.2, 1.6, 1.7,3.1 (1996).
234. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE Standards 4-3.8, 4-
5.1, 4-5.2,4-6.2 (3d ed. 1993).
235. To be sure, the Code and Model Rules provide that competent representation ordinarily
should include advice and counsel to assist the client in formulating goals for the representation, but
they also make clear that the final decision in this regard is the client's. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b).
236. See Simon, Ideology ofAdvocacy, supra note 45, at 36-37.
237. See LUBAN, supra note 45, at 57.
238. See id. There is a great deal of debate in the academic literature about the standard attorney
role conception. Some scholars support the conception's requirements of partisanship and role
amorality, which is the notion that lawyers ordinarily should pursue clients' ends without regard to
their own morality. See Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 45, at 36; Richard Wasserstrom,
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1 (1975). These scholars have attempted
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On occasion, each of the defining features of the adversary system comes
into conflict with rehabilitative penal practice. As a consequence, the
standard role conception sometimes is ill-suited to the tasks facing counsel
for defendants in such proceedings. The first feature, that the process is
driven by opposing parties who seek to accomplish their respective partisan
goals through the vigorous advocacy of their representatives, does not
account for cases where a defendant recognizes the need for therapeutic
measures and genuinely desires to have the prosecution resolved by way of
treatment. In such cases, it is difficult to describe the process as fully
adversarial,239 although the unity of partisan purpose formed by the
relationship between the defendant and his or her counsel is not jeopardized
by any conflict between the client's expressed desires and judgments by the
attorney regarding the client's best interests. 240 By contrast, in cases where
the defendant's expressed goal is to avoid all coercive measures, including
rehabilitative treatment, defense counsel may or may not be able to adopt a
familiar partisan role. If the defendant's objective of avoiding therapy is
well-grounded, the adversarial model likely will hold, because the
defendant's attorney will be able to pursue this outcome without doing
violence to the standard role conception. If, on the other hand, the
defendant's desire to avoid therapeutic measures is not well-grounded, as is
often the case with defendants whose addictive disorders include a fair
degree of denial,241 the defense attorney will be placed in a difficult
situation.242 According to the standard conception, the attorney should adopt
tojustify lawyers' divergence from ordinary notions of morality by arguing that such practice serves to
maximize client autonomy, which is regarded as a good in itself. See Pepper, supra note 230, at 617.
Alternatively, scholars have asserted that partisan zeal and role amorality are necessary for lawyers to
protect an individual's liberty interests in legal proceedings, where the full power of the state is
directed against a relatively powerless client. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 23, at 2; LUBAN, supra
note 45, at 58. Both attempts at justification have been roundly criticized. See infra text accompanying
notes 433-8 1. For a good response to the autonomy justification of the standard role conception, see
David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES.
J. 637. For a thoughtful reply to the argument that partisanship and role amorality are specially
required of criminal defense attorneys, see Simon, Ethics of Criminal Defense, supra note 45.
239. Although ancillary issues regarding the formal judgment to be entered, the terms of a
sentence of probation, or the like might be a source of some continuing disagreement between the
prosecution and the defendant.
240. This assumes, of course, that it is apparent that the defendant needs treatment. See, e.g.,
Rodney J. Uphoff, The Decision to Challenge the Competency of a Marginally Competent Client:
Defense Counsel's Unavoidably Difficult Position, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYER, supra note 47, at 30, 34 ("The lawyer's role is clear in any case in which the client
and counsel agree that the client's competence should be challenged.").
241. See supra note 148.
242. Cf., David R. Katner, Raising the Insanity Plea, in ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER, supra note 47, at 48.
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the defendant's goals as his or her own2 43 and should pursue them with
partisan zeal,244 despite the fact that the lawyer may believe that it would be
in the client's best interests to undergo treatment.245 A very different role
conception for defense counsel obtains, however, in some institutional
settings where the expressed purpose of the proceeding is the provision of
treatment rather than the imposition of blame and punishment.246 Attorneys
who adopt this alternative role conception often view their clients as
incapable of identifying appropriate goals that further their best interests and
so impose their own judgments regarding the objectives of the
representation.
247
This alternative role conception, which treats the defendant as impaired in
his or her capacity to make sound decisions, is incompatible with an
adjudicatory model characterized by party control. 248 It may be possible to
avoid this conclusion by locating party control in defense counsel instead of
the defendant, but this conceptualization only works if some sort of strong
243. The attorney should only adopt the defendant's goals after reasonable attempts to provide
ameliorating advice and counsel, including a thorough discussion of nonlegal considerations. See, e.g.,
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1983).
244. The concept of partisan zeal appears to come from Canon 15 of the A.B.A.'s Cannons of
Professional Ethics, the predecessor to the Model Code. See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN,
LEGAL ETHICS 138 n.1 (1995).
245. The Model Code provides somewhat contradictory directions to attorneys faced with this
situation. Ethical Consideration 7-7 provides that "it is for the client to decide what plea should be
entered" in a criminal matter. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7. On the other
hand, Ethical Consideration 7-12 provides in relevant part:
Any mental or physical condition of a client that renders him incapable of making a considered
judgment on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his lawyer .... If the disability
of a client and the lack of a legal representative compel the lawyer to make decisions for the client,
the lawyer should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and
advance the interests of his client
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY EC 7-12.
The situation is somewhat clearer in the Model Rules. According to Model Rule 1.2(a), "[i]n a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a
plea to be entered." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a). Moreover, Model Rule
1.14 directs the lawyer who represents an impaired client to "maintain a normal client-lawyer
relationship with the client." Idl Rule 1.14(a).
246. "[Wlithin the D[rug] T[reatment] C[ourt], sanctions are not punishment. They are simply
'adjustments,' a device by which the court teaches addicts responsibility for their actions." McColl,
supra note 8, at 502 (citation omitted).
247. The description in the text of this alternative role conception clearly implicates the notion of
paternalism, which has been defined as "the imposing of constraints on an individual's liberty for the
purpose of promoting his or her own good." Dennis F. Thompson, Paternalism in Medicine, Law, and
Public Policy, in ETHICS TEACHING IN HIGHER EDUCATION 246 (Daniel Callahan & Sissela Bok eds.,
1980); see also Luban, supra note 188.
248. See, e.g., Lee Teitelbaum, Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties, in JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED (Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. ed., 1980) (urging advocacy approach for
attorneys representing juveniles that permits children to exercise control over representation).
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identification between the defendant and his or her lawyer can be found.249 If
the defense lawyer has significant links with the other ongoing participants in
the process, including prosecutors, corrections officials, and judges, and
shares with these actors a common set of interests, this sort of an
identification between the defendant and his or her attorney may be difficult
to establish or maintain.20 In such circumstances, a key element of the
adversarial system is absent.
Rehabilitative penal practices pose similar problems of fit with respect to
the requirements that there be neutral, detached decision makers and formal
rules of procedure, the other key characteristics of a traditional adversarial
system. These tensions further complicate the role problems faced by
advocates seeking to represent defendants in such proceedings. In his classic
essay exploring the importance of formal decisional rules and neutral
adjudication in adversarial disputing,2 Professor Martin Shapiro first
observes that traditional adversarial processes are essentially triadic in
structure.252 He then explains that this structure is inherently unstable because
of its tendency to collapse into "two against one," once the decision maker
announces a winner and a loser.2 53 It is important to avoid this sort of
collapse because it may undermine the legitimacy of the outcome in the eyes
of a nonprevailing party, who may believe the outcome resulted from an
alliance between the winner and the judge. Thus, Shapiro argues that
complex societies develop formal rules to govern the adjudicatory process
and rely on the office of the judge to insure that the decision maker remains
249. It may be difficult to define adequate identification for purposes of permitting lawyers to act
paternalistically on behalf of their clients. One very interesting attempt has been offered by David
Luban, who has proposed that lawyers may act paternalistically in certain circumstances, if they have a
sufficient understanding of their clients' "wants," "values," and "interests." Luban, supra note 188, at
467-74.
250. In the drug treatment court setting, for example, we are told that the defendant's attorney
must operate as a member of the treatment "team." Judge, supra note 30, at 1. Membership on this
team may undermine the ability of defenders to maintain a strong identification with their clients. One
experienced defense lawyer explained this process within the context of Brooklyn, New York's
treatment court as follows:
One attorney is assigned full time to the Treatment Court to handle all Legal Aid cases in that
court .... This one attorney attends the same training programs as the district attorney, the judge
and the court personnel, including a recent training trip to Los Angeles. The obvious risk is the
erosion of zealous defense advocacy as the three participants-judge, prosecutor and defense
attorney-begin to consider themselves "teammates."
Lisa Schreibersdorf, The Pitfalls of Defenders as "Team Players," INDIGENT DEFENSE (Nat'l Legal
Aid & Defender Ass'n), Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 7.
251. Shapiro, supra note 229.
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independent and professional. 254
Shapiro's argument depends on the premise that people are more likely to
perceive decisions as fair if they are derived through a process in which both
parties to the dispute have equal access to the decision maker.255 In this
sense, both the formality of the process and the neutrality of the judge are
designed to insure that the decision maker maintains appropriate distance
from the parties in order to prevent unfair alliances from developing.256 By
contrast, rehabilitative penal practice diminishes the stabilizing influence of
procedural formality and neutrality precisely because the goals and interests
of the parties are not understood to be in conflict.257 To the extent that this
characterization is true, as it may be in the relationship of helping
professionals and their clients,258 the collapse of the triadic structure may not
undermine the client's confidence in the integrity and legitimacy of the
system. On the other hand, when treatment is built into a system that has
retained at least some of the features of traditional criminal law blaming
practices, such as the power to use coercive measures,259 procedural
informality and a lack of detachment on the part of the decision maker can
result in severe negative consequences for the defendant260 and can present
254. See id. at 285-86. Shapiro argues that "the most fundamental device for maintaining the triad
is [the] consent [of the disputants]." Id at 285. Complex societies, however, tend to substitute law and
office for the particular consent of the parties. See id at 285-86; see also Golding, supra note 228, at
111-1 5 (discussing "procedural justice," which includes formal procedural elements such as notice, the
obligation of the decision maker to hear equally from both sides, and the obligation to hear a party
only in the presence of the other party).
255. See Golding, supra note 228, at 113.
256. This sort of collapse is likely to undermine the very goals of rehabilitation to which a
treatment-oriented regime is directed because it may leave the defendant with the clear impression that
"no one is seriously interested in hearing her side of the story," and that "the procedure is completely
stacked." Handler, supra note 147, at 31.
257. In discussing a similar rejection of procedural formality and decision-maker neutrality in the
context of mid-1960s juvenile courts, Joel Handler observed:
This foundational concept ofparenspatriae is the theoretical underpinning for the rejection of the
criminal law adversary procedures. The adult offender is the enemy of society .... The
delinquent, on the other hand, is not the enemy of society. He is society's child, and therefore the
interests of the state and the child do not conflict but coincide. Since the interests coincide there is
no need for the criminal adversary adjudicatory procedure.
Handler, supra note 147, at 10. In addition, advocates of informality in rehabilitative regimes often
argue that the formal application of procedural and evidentiary rules is poorly suited to the
"presentation of the relevant scientific behavioral data." Id at 26. They also contend that "the trauma
of a trial-by-battle adversary system would destroy rehabilitative goals." Id.
258. See id. The claim that medical professionals share the goals and interests of their patients
may not always be true, especially in an era of managed care in which the professional may be
obligated to fulfill a rationing role as well as a helping role.
259. Cf id. at 13-14 (describing juvenile justice system as retaining "power to take an adolescent
from his home and confine him in what amounts to a prison").
260. Writing in the juvenile court area, Joel Handler has argued that the "nonadversary, solicitous
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significant conflicts for the defendant's advocate.
B. Drug Treatment Courts and Attorney Role
While treatment-based drug courts vary considerably according to each
jurisdiction's statutory context, political environment available resources,
and operational goals, 261 virtually all of these institutions possess certain
similar core features. Almost without exception, these courts seek to
accomplish their goals by muting the traditional adversarial positions of
prosecutor and defendant, 262 and by making the process judge-driven rather
than lawyer-driven.263 This inversion of the traditional adversary system
paradigm, which ordinarily assumes that the parties' lawyers will play an
active, partisan role while the judge remains passive and neutral, 264 tends to
be coupled with a high degree of procedural informality.265 Taken together,
these features yield a setting in which familiar role expectations rarely serve
as accurate predictors of actual practice. As one commentator described it:
[W]hat makes these drug treatment calendars unique is the
nonadversarial nature of their proceedings and the active and ongoing
role that the drug treatment calendar judge plays-generally with the
support of both the prosecutor and defense counsel-in working with
the treatment provider and motivating the defendant to complete the
treatment program. Essentially, these "drug courts" are not courts at
all, but diversion-to-treatment programs, which are supervised through
regular (usually monthly) quasi-judicial status hearings at which the
drug court judge enters into a dialogue with each defendant about his
or her progress in the treatment/re-habilitation program.266
The underlying rationale for this situation recalls the thinking of the
leading rehabilitationists of a generation ago.267 As noted earlier, a key
procedure" is not only likely to delegitimate the process, but is also "ill-suited for the accurate
determination of what the adolescent did or what he is like." Id at 31.
261. See Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 94; see also Brown, supra note 5, at 84. One
observer has written that drug treatment courts "range[ from crowded dockets in huge courtrooms
where participants are managed in a brisk, assembly-line fashion, to more intimate courts where the
atmosphere resembles a fellowship meeting." Satel, supra note 13, at 50.
262. See Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 93,96; McColl, supra note 8, at 472,504-14.
263. See generally Satel, supra note 13; see also Pamela Casey, Court-Enforced Drug Treatment
Programs: Do They Enhance Court Performance?, 17 JUST. SYS.J. 117 (1994).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 227-29.
265. See Deschenes & Greenwood, supra note 143, at 105; Satel, supra note 13, at 55.
266. Cooper& Trotter, supra note 19, at 93.
267. See, e.g., MENNINGER, supra note 75; Woo-rON, supra note 94; see also, e.g., BARBARA
Woo'TrON, CRIME AND PENAL POLICY: REFLECTIONS ON FIFTY YEARS' ExPERIENCE (1978);
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feature of the rehabilitative ideal was the conviction that antisocial or
criminal conduct was the product in part or whole of some pathology
operating within the offender.268 Given this starting point, it was entirely
logical that rehabilitationist thinkers urged the criminal justice system to
respond to offenders with therapeutic treatment instead of retributive
punishment, either to assist the offender2 69 or, in the case of social defense
theorists, to protect society from future harmful conduct.270 Furthermore,
because rehabilitationists thought that criminal conduct was linked to
individual pathology, they concentrated less on the specific facts and
circumstances of the completed criminal offense and more on information
about the offender's personal characteristics that were necessary for
accurately determining the offender's diagnosis and prognosis.
271
Translated into the contemporary drug treatment court context, these
ideas generate a powerful set of related premises:272 Substance abuse is a
disease2 73 that contributes directly to the commission of criminal conduct.
274
Most offenders with drug abuse problems, who are prosecuted and sentenced
in the traditional punishment-oriented criminal justice system, do not receive
treatment for their disease. Therefore, upon release, they resume the
Wootton, supra note 163.
268. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100. Professor Allen reports that within the broad
definition of the rehabilitative ideal that he employs, "theories of rehabilitation have been advanced by
those who view crime as a product of moral default of offenders," as well as by those who "assume the
social causation of crime, and even by some who attribute it to individual biological propensities."
ALLEN, supra note 38, at 3. Allen states that his broad definition "does not resolve the perennial
controversies between freedom of the will and determinism." Id. Nevertheless, he does concede that
"modem expressions of the rehabilitative ideal lean heavily to [determinism]." Id.
269. Allen noted:
Treatment is directed toward producing an enduring change in the behavior of an individual as he
lives under natural conditions in the community. Included within the concept of treatment is an
idea of restoration or improvement rather than restriction or disablement.
ALLEN, supra note 38, at 91 n.4 (quoting Schwitzgebel, Development and Legal Regulation of
Coercive Behavior Modificaiton Techniques with Offenders, NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH No.
2067 (1971)).
270. See, e.g., Marc Ancel, New Social Defense, reprinted in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT:
VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS 132 (Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds.,
1972).
271. See Duff& Garland, supra note 49, at 8.
272. This set of related assertions is drawn especially from Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 94,
and McColl, supra note 8, at 500.
273. For a good general discussion of the disease model of addiction, see Bruce K. Alexander, The
Disease and Adaptive Models ofAddiction: A Framework of Evaluation, in VISIONS OF ADDICTION 45
(Stanton Peele ed., 1988).
274. See Brown, supra note 5, at 66-68; James C. Weissman, Understanding the Drugs and Crime
Connection, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND DRUGS 44 (James C. Weissman & Robert L. DuPont eds.,
1982).
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addictive use of drugs and associated criminal behaviors.275 If the disease is
treated, however, this linked cycle of addiction and criminality can be
disrupted.2
76
Although formal notions of guilt and responsibility as to particular
instances of past criminal conduct are not made irrelevant in the drug
treatment court setting,277 it is clear that the primary focus, and therefore the
design of the system, is centered upon the offender's future conduct and the
characteristics of his or her disease and progress in treatment that permit
useful predictions as to future criminality.278 This shift in focus is responsible
for the push toward a relatively nonpartisan, informal procedural approach by
drug treatment courts.
2 79
In light of this redirected emphasis and procedural informality, defense
attorneys must make difficult choices in formulating an appropriate role
conception. These choices fall into several broad categories. First, attorneys
must decide what posture to adopt when their clients are faced with deciding
whether to enter a treatment court program or to have the charges resolved
through the traditional adjudicatory system.280 Second, attorneys must decide
whether to play an active or a passive role in limiting the potentially severe
sanctions their clients may receive in instances of relapse.28 1 An important
question here is whether defense counsel should interpose himself or herself
between the defendant and the treatment court judge, or acquiesce in the
common practice of permitting the judge to interact directly with defendants
275. See Brown, supra note 5, at 77-78; Desehenes & Greenwood, supra note 143, at 100.
276. See Brown, supra note 5, at 81-83.
277. One could argue, however, that blame and responsibility for particular illegal acts become
irrelevant in deferred prosecution programs, where coercive measures are implemented without any
formal adjudication of guilt. See Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 95; see also infra text
accompanying notes 287-90.
278. See McColl, supra note 8, at 490,502.
279. As noted earlier, this is true in part because fact-finding with respect to diagnosis and
prognosis arguably does not lend itself to "trial-by-battle." See Handler, supra note 147, at 26.
Moreover, the typical posture assumed by defendants in the traditional adversary system, in which the
criminal denies responsibility for the alleged crime and the state must present persuasive evidence to
obtain a conviction, is thought to undermine the basic therapeutic goal of helping the offender
overcome unhealthy denial. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 17; McColl, supra note 8, at 490. Finally, an
adversarial approach founded on formal procedural rights designed to protect defendants against the
coercive authority of the state is unsuitable for the sort of cooperative venture contemplated by a
treatment court, in which the prosecution and defendant both seek to diagnose the problem and
monitor the course of treatment. See Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 96.
280. The traditional adjudicatory system includes standard plea negotiations.
281. See Bean, supra note 15, at 719 ("if progress is unsatisfactory, offenders maybe returned to
custody-3 to 7 days is not uncommon, but then neither is 14 to 90 days"). For a further description of
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in open court. 282 The final choices defense attorneys are likely to face involve
the degree to which potentially damaging or inculpating information will be
shared with the court and the prosecutor.
1. The Decision to Participate in Drug Treatment Court
Most drug treatment courts operate either as "deferred prosecution
programs" or "postdisposition programs."283 Treatment courts following the
deferred prosecution model attempt to identify suitable defendants within
days of their initial arrest in order to capitalize on the therapeutic value of the
"trauma and anxiety" associated with being taken into custody.284 If a
defendant is deemed appropriate for diversion into treatment, then the court
will stay the charges. If the candidate ultimately is successful in treatment,
those charges will then be dismissed or nolleprossed.285
At first blush it would appear that defendants eligible for a deferred
prosecution program have everything to gain and little to lose by
participating, given the opportunity to obtain treatment and avoid criminal
conviction. Concomitantly, it would appear that defense lawyers, acting in
their role as advisors,286  should recommend such participation
enthusiastically. In fact, defense attorneys faced with the task of counseling
clients at this threshold stage must confront several difficult issues if they
wish to proceed in a coherent fashion. For many defendants, the decision to
participate in the treatment court process means that they effectively forego
the presumption of innocence and the panoply of trial rights guaranteed by
the Constitution.287 In a literal sense, defendants who opt to enter a deferred
282. See Satel, supra note 13, at 47.
283. See Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 95-96. The National Legal Aid and Defender
Association reports that the Government Accounting Office has found that 44% of treatment courts
defer prosecutions pending the completion of treatment, while 38% require a plea, but withhold
sentencing pending the outcome of treatment. Presumably, the others make treatment a condition of
probation or use some other hybrid arrangement. See Feds, Others Scrutinize Drug Courts, INDIGENT
DEFENSE (Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n), Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 9.
284. Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 95; see also Brown, supra note 5, at 88. Being in "crisis"
may motivate addicts to enter treatment even if their denial would ordinarily result in their resisting
treatment. Supporters of treatment courts point out that patients coerced into treatment tend to do as
well or better than those who enter voluntarily. See Satel, supra note 13, at 53.
285. See Brown, supra note 5, at 88; Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 95.
286. See Judge, supra note 30, at 1.
287. At a minimum, this list includes the right to a jury trial. See U.S. CONST. art. In, § 2, cl. 3.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees the right not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a speedy and public trial, the
right to confront witness and to have the use of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses, and the
right to the effective assistance of counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right to be free from
conviction unless the state proves each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt is guaranteed
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prosecution program may still contest their guilt at a full adversarial trial if
they fail to complete the treatment mandated by the drug court.288
Nevertheless, defendants who progress through the entire treatment court
regime and who upon "graduation" have their charges dismissed ultimately
may have received "a more onerous disposition in terms of the length of time
[they are] subject to court control" 289 than they would have received if the
charges had been resolved through standard plea negotiations or trial. Given
that this "more onerous disposition"290 will have been imposed without a
formal adjudication of guilt, the "successful" defendant's decision to
participate effectively constitutes at least a partial waiver of trial rights.
The most obvious response to this apparent unfairness is that while the
treatment court's disposition is more onerous in some respects, it is
ultimately in defendants' best interests because it provides them with needed
treatment. Moreover, supporters are likely to point to numerous studies that
have shown coerced addictions treatment to be even more effective than
voluntary treatment in driving the disease into remission.291 This response,
however, frames the role conflict faced by defense counsel in this setting. If
their role is to facilitate the disposition that is in the client's best interests,
then attorneys should urge drug-addicted clients to participate in treatment
court.292 On the other hand, if attorneys adopt the standard role conception,
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
288. In some jurisdictions, the defendant will be transferred to a different section or part so that a
new judge will hear the case, while in other jurisdictions the treatment court judge will retain the case
and hear it if it goes to trial. See COOPER, 1997 StRvEY, supra note 18, at 28 (reporting that in 50% of
programs, the treatment court judge "adjudicates the defendant's case and imposes a final disposition"
when defendant is terminated from treatment regime). In jurisdictions that follow the latter practice,
defendants may be disadvantaged by virtue ofajudge's prior knowledge of their participation in, and
failure at, the treatment regime.
289. See GOLDKAMP, supra note 13, at 11.
290. Cooper and Trotter state that drug treatment court programs "represent a far more intrusive
set of obligations imposed on the participating defendant and a far more proactive response than
simply doing time." Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 97.
291. See Satel, supra note 13, at 53. This description of the treatment regime as "coerced" is not
meant to suggest that treatment court participants are denied the opportunity either to grant or withhold
their consent before entering the program. Instead, the reference is intended to make clear that that
consent is given under circumstances that greatly constrain the defendant's range of choice.
Many drug court participants have no desire to be in treatment; it was chosen on the basis of
expediency. They are resistant to treatment Nevertheless, they remain in treatment because of the
threat of sanctions andfor jail, and while they are literally captive in the program, they acquire
genuine, internal motivation.
Id. at 59; cf George C. Thomas I, A PhilosophicalAccount of Coerced Self-Incrimination, 5 YALE J.
L. & HuMAN. 79, 83-85 (1993) (discussing distinction between compulsion and coercion in context of
confessions).
292. "[flt is in the best interests of both the prosecution and the defense to work together to
promote defendants' entry in and successful completion of drug treatment programs." Cooper &
Trotter, supra note 19, at 94 (emphasis added).
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they should advise clients about the likely outcomes of available options, and
they should point out that rejecting the treatment court route may result in a
less intrusive sanction,2 93 or a sanction of shorter duration than that which is
likely to result from even the most successful encounter with treatment court,
and should then act zealously to effectuate their clients' choices.
While one might argue that defense attorneys can reconcile these two
alternatives by "provid[ing] thorough advice about the drug court and
let[ting] the client decide,, 294 this argument fails because many defendants
who would benefit from treatment predictably will reject this alternative if
they clearly understand the impositions it involves. At least with respect to
those clients whose short-term preference is "to avoid or minimize loss of
liberty or other sanctions,' 295 counsel must choose either to act as an
advocate for the treatment court option or as an advocate for the clients'
expressed goals.296
This conflict between zealous advocacy and membership on the treatment
team2 97 is likely exacerbated by one of the operational elements said to make
drug courts effective in reaching their treatment goals-their capacity to
"identify the drug offender and place him or her into the treatment program
as soon after arrest as possible."298 Defense lawyers acting within the
traditional role conception must attempt at least a rudimentary fact
investigation and should evaluate potential legal issues raised by available
information. This includes evaluating possible search and seizure arguments,
and asking questions about the sufficiency of the charging document, before
advising clients to enter a treatment court program.299 By contrast, defense
counsel, acting as a member of the treatment team, may conclude that the
293. See Judge, supra note 30, at I (suggesting that many defenders view "alternatives" like drug




296. Indeed, the Miami model has been described as requiring "a breakdown in the traditional
adversarial roles assumed by defense attorneys and prosecutors as it relies heavily on the defense
attorneys convincing offenders of the advantages of treatment and steering them away from accepting
a more traditional plea involving minimal, or no, supervised treatment." Barbara E. Smith et al.,
Introduction to Special Issue, 17 JUST. SYS. J. viii (1994) (emphasis added).
297. See Schreibersdorf, supra note 250, at 7. Robert Burke describes this as a shift "from
confrontation to cooperation." Robert Burke, Reconciling Drug Court Participation with Defender
Ethical Standards, INDIGENT DEFENSE (Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n), Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 5.
298. See Brown, supra note 5, at 87-88.
299. See Burke, supra note 297, at 5-6 (discussing ABA Defense Function Standards 4-6.1, 6.2,
which require, among other things, that defense counsel "[e]ontinue to prepare the defense of the case
during plea negotiations"); Judge, supra note 30, at 2 (pointing out that "[a]ssessing legal issues
particular to the case, including search and seizure issues, sufficiency of the charges, and timely filing
of the complaint must be seen as central to the defense function").
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delay necessitated by adequate factual and legal evaluation of the case will
undermine the therapeutic goal of instituting treatment while the defendant is
still in the midst of the "crisis" occasioned by arrest. To the extent that these
goals do come into conflict in individual cases, it is no answer to urge that a
balance be struck between them, as some have suggested,3° unless one is
willing to countenance a diminution, however slight, in the ordinary
obligations of partisanship imposed by the standard role conception and the
various performance standards now in place.3 '
Defense counsel's role conflict becomes even more pronounced in a
jurisdiction where the treatment court defers prosecution only if the
defendant agrees to a stipulated set of facts, 302 or in a'jurisdiction that has
adopted the "postdisposition model" for its treatment court, in which case the
defendant must enter a guilty plea.30 3 In either of these two contexts, the
lawyer's decision to facilitate the client's entry into the drug court program
not only exposes the defendant to coercive therapeutic measures that may be
more invasive and protracted than traditional dispositions, 304 but also
necessarily results in the waiver of factual and technical legal defenses,
leaving the client "vulnerable if [he or she] ultimately fail[s] treatment. 3 5
2. The Defender's Role with Respect to Graduated Sanctions
The second group of issues concerns counsel's role in limiting the
potentially severe sanctions a defendant in treatment court may receive upon
300. See Judge, supra note 30, at 2.
301. See STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standards 4-6.1,
4-6.2,4-8.1,5-1.1 (1993).
302. See McColl, supra note 8, at 496-97.
303. See Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 96.
304. See supra text accompanying notes 289-90; see also McColl, supra note 8, at 496.
305. Schreibersdorf, supra note 250, at 7; see also Burke, supra note 297, at 6 (suggesting that
defense counsel could not comply with A.B.A.'s Defense Function Standards relating to negotiated
pleas if structure of treatment court required lawyer "to counsel a client on a guilty plea without having
sufficient legal or factual information"); Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 96 ("[D]efense counsel
may advise a client to waive the filing of potentially dispositive motions in order to immediately enter
a [postdisposition] treatment program."). Counsel's choice may be starker still in those jurisdictions
that impose additional disabilities on eligible defendants who reject participation in drug treatment
court. In Brooklyn, New York, for example,
defendants who decline treatment will not receive the typical or "usual" plea offers, e.g. split
sentences and probation. The defendant retains the option, up until the point of hearing and trial, to
accept treatment. However, the longer the defendant waits to opt for treatment, the greater the
period of incarceration should the defendant fail to comply with the Court's treatment mandate. If
a defendant declines to be interviewed by the Treatment Court's clinical staff... the "usual" plea
offers will not be made.
Memorandum from Valerie Raine, Project Director Brooklyn Treatment Court, to Criminal Court
Practitioners 3 (Oct. 31, 1996) (on file with author).
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relapse. As indicated earlier, the fact that recovery from substance abuse
often involves relapse has been taken into account in the design of most drug
treatment courts through the use of graduated sanctions, rather than the all-
or-nothing approach of traditional probation or parole revocation
proceedings. °6 In some jurisdictions, these escalating sanctions are set out in
contracts307 or clearly written policies, so that judges have relatively little
flexibility once they find that defendants have failed to adhere to one or more
of the conditions of the program.30 8 In other jurisdictions, treatment court
judges have greater discretion in fashioning intermediate sanctions in
response to offender relapse.30 9
Here again, defense attorneys face a difficult set of choices between
acting as a zealous partisan, according to the standard role conception, or
acting as part of the treatment team. In jurisdictions that permit defendants'
attorneys to negotiate some of the terms of the contract,310 the standard
conception dictates that they seek the mildest sanctions possible that entail
the smallest loss of liberty.3 ' On the other hand, a role conception that
prioritizes the goal of helping defendants to succeed in treatment might lead
attorneys to agree to more intrusive sanctions, particularly if they believe that
small doses of "shock incarceration" will encourage their clients to take the
treatment protocol more seriously.
312
306. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29; see also Brown, supra note 5, at 91. One leader of
the drug treatment court movement defined graduated sanctions as "the measured application of a
spectrum of sanctions, whose intensity increases incrementally with the number and seriousness of
program failures." Jeffrey S. Tauber, Drug Courts: Treating Drug-Using Offenders Through
Sanctions, Incentives, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Feb. 1994, at 28, 33.
307. See Deschenes & Greenwood, supra note 143, at 101, 105; McColl, supra note 8, at 482. A
typical contract utilized in the Maricopa County, Arizona drug treatment court
spells out the conditions of program compliance and the rewards that are designed to motivate
offenders to stay in treatment The contract specifies the number of drug education classes,
counseling sessions, probation officer contacts, negative urine tests, and payment of fees needed to
earn the points to progress to the next phase of the program.
Deschenes & Greenwood, supra note 143, at 101.
308. See Satel, supra note 13, at 63-64 tbl.2 (reporting that 6 of 15 treatment courts within the
study employed "fixed sanction algorithm[s]").
309. See id.
310. McColl reports that in Baltimore
[t]he Public Defender and the State's Attorney agree before going to court on which track
[deferred prosecution or postdisposition] the defendant will enter. They then agree on a contract to
be presented to the defendant, which details the program and includes possible sanctions for
treatment failure.
McColl, supra note 8, at 482.
311. For example, counsel might seek a program that allows the defendant to attend extra
counseling sessions or undergo more frequent urine testing if a relapse occurs, rather than requiring a
period of confinement in jail. See Brown, supra note 5, at 91.
312. There is some research to support this view. Satel interviewed one participant in the Denver
Drug Court whom she quotes as saying: "When I relapsed and got disciplined, [the judge] said, 'well,
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In jurisdictions that do not permit prenegotiated limits on sanctions,
defense lawyers still face difficult choices when their clients are alleged to
have violated treatment court rules. Here, the question is whether to engage
in traditional forms of advocacy, such as introducing relevant exculpatory
evidence or cross-examining inculpatory witnesses, in order to justify a less
severe sanction by offering an explanation or justification for the defendant's
behavior, or by challenging the factual basis for a finding that a violation has
occurred. In drug courts where judges have considerable discretion, this sort
of advocacy might significantly impact the sanctions meted out.3 13 Even in
treatment courts that use a rigid sanctioning schedule, counsel's choice either
to engage in vigorous advocacy or to take a relatively passive role will be of
great moment because judicial discretion will still reside in the interstices of
the graduated formula and in the judge's fact-finding that a violation has
taken place. 14
The active role played by drug treatment court judges with respect to the
monitoring of defendants and the imposition of intermediate sanctions
conspires with the relaxed procedural approach typical of these courts to put
great pressure on defense lawyers to adopt the role of "team player" instead
of the zealous advocacy approach common in most criminal defense
practice.315 Indeed, one published report describes the norm in Miami's Drug
Court as one in which "all the justice system players are on the same team,
making the same demands on the defendant and standing ready to impose the
same penalties for noncompliance."31 6 In order to appreciate fully the extent
to which the norms of formal triadic disputing are discarded, and the standard
defender role conception jeopardized, this Article closely examines how this
shift toward judicial activism and procedural informality functions in the
treatment court setting.
you still owe me a day.' But he didn't do it out of vindictiveness, you know, like a spanking or
something. Actually, it was what I needed." Satel, supra note 13, at 56.
313. See Schreibersdorf supra note 250, at 7.
314. See id. Indeed, one study found that
[u]nder one Denver Drug Court judge, 66% of participants got "good and passable reviews" and
14% were sent to jail over the course of a year. Under his successor, only 40% received "good and
passable reviews" and 40% went to jail. This drug court program was stable over the years
examined, save for the switching ofjudges.
Satel, supra note 13, at 50.
315. See Schreibersdorf, supra note 250, at 7.
316. FiNN & NEWLYN, supra note 29, at 4.
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3. Judicial Activism, Procedural Informality, and Defender Advocacy
Roles
Many students of the drug treatment court movement have noted that
these courts require a shift in the judicial role.317 They note that the
conception of the judge "as someone who takes a neutral position in the
resolution of conflict 318 has been supplanted by a new understanding that
"the judge is partisan, aiming to cure the offender of his addiction."319 To a
significant extent, this revision of the traditional judicial role results from the
very design of these treatment courts, which requires judges to play a central
part in the treatment of defendants' addictions.320 Before the advent of
treatment-based drug courts, when judges ordered addiction treatment as a
condition of probation, judges were essentially uninvolved in supervising or
monitoring the course of treatment.32 In contrast, drug treatment court
judges regularly meet with participants in open court to review defendants'
compliance or noncompliance with the conditions of their treatment.322 The
purpose of these status hearings is to hold defendants publicly accountable
for their progress or lack thereof through the use of rewards or graduated
sanctions when appropriate.323
The fact that drug court judges are directly involved in monitoring
defendants' behavior and imposing sanctions or conferring rewards is more
than merely stylistic. There is good reason to believe that many substance
abusers, in the initial stages of recovery, are likely to benefit most from a
treatment regime focused on "practical problem solving and the acquisition
of cognitive-behavioral relapse prevention skills,"324 which judges are
capable of managing. By contrast, recovering adicts are less likely to benefit
from the sort of insight-oriented therapy that is the exclusive province of
317. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 5, at 85; Casey, supra note 263, at 118-19.
318. Bean, supra note 15, at 720.
319. Id.
320. See Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 94; Satel, supra note 13, at 44-46.
321. See Satel, supra note 13, at 45.
322. See Brown, supra note 5, at 85-86; Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at 93; Satel, supra note
13, at 45.
323. See Satel,supra note 13, at 45-46.
324. Id. at 58.
For addicts-as well as some other individuals whose behavior is self-destructive-insight can
follow change, it need not precede it as conventional psychodynamic theory has it-and thus
formal exploration of deep-seated psychological conflicts is contraindicated. To put it another
way, it often takes a period of abstinence for the addict to understand why he or she needed drugs
in the first place.
Id. at 58-59.
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mental health professionals.325 In operational terms, this means that the
judge's role in sanctioning and rewarding defendants is to help them
understand that their choices have consequences for which they will be held
responsible, and that they control their own fate.326 Thus, when the judge
responds promptly with a proportional sanction to a positive urine test or a
missed group therapy meeting, the judge is helping to provide treatment for
the defendant
327
The fact that the judge personally performs these therapeutic interventions
is critical. In effect, drug treatment courts invoke the moral authority of the
judicial office,328 the "symbolic impact of the black robe, ' 329 to show
defendants the seriousness with which their behavior is being taken.330 In
order for this model to work, however, judges must be able to establish a
functioning therapeutic relationship with each of the defendants they are
supervising.33' The formation of this sort of a direct relationship has two
significant consequences. First, the judge and the defendant will interact
without the formal distance that ordinarily characterizes traditional criminal
law adjudications. 332 This, in turn, raises the greater possibility that the
judge's reactions to an individual defendant's successes or failures may be
influenced by personal considerations or the effects of an unconscious
process of counter-transference.333 In gross terms, the informality and
325. Although the drug treatment court model appears to be structured around this conception of
treatment, it is unclear whether behavior-based therapies must always precede insight-oriented
treatment in order to be most effective. Some treatment modalities probably work better for a given
individual than others, depending on a range of factors, including the patient's age, social functioning,
and treatment history. For a treatment court program to be fully effective, therefore, program officials
must use a broad range of diagnostic and therapeutic tools designed to tailor the program to meet the
needs of each participant. For a fuller discussion of substance abuse treatment modalities, see supra
text accompanying notes 110-13.
326. See Satel, supra note 13, at 46 (treatment court judge's use of escalating sanctions
"demonstrates to the participant that his actions are taken seriously and that he predictably controls his
fate"); An Interview with Judge Jeffrey S. Tauber, supra note 39, at I 1 (drug court model permits
defendants to "control" outcomes of their cases and holds them "accountable" for "consequences" of
their conduct).
327. See GOLDKAMP, supra note 13, at 11; Satel, supra note 13, at 46-47.
328. See Deschenes & Greenwood, supra note 143, at 103; Cooper & Trotter, supra note 19, at
94.
329. Satel, supra note 13, at 47.
330. See id. ("[T]he drug court model creates a very health and transparent system of authority.
The actions of the judge depend directly on the patient's own performance; it's all observable. .. .').
331. This claim does not mean that drug treatment court judges engage in insight-oriented
psychotherapy, see Satel, supra note 13, at 58. Rather, "[i]n optimal instances . . . the judge is
genuinely engaged with the participants and has become a central and respected figure in their drug
court and recovery experience." Id. at 56.
332. See, e.g., Deschenes & Greenwood, supra note 143, at 103 ("clients are able to build a
personal relationship with the judge").
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immediacy of the judge's relationship with the defendant confers a
potentially ungovernable discretion similar to that which so riled critics of the
rehabilitative ideal nearly thirty years ago.334 As one keen observer of drug
treatment court judges has observed:
[D]rug court is fertile ground for the unfolding of psychological
drama. Perhaps, for example, the judge is a recovering alcoholic or has
loved a one who is addicted to drugs. This could stir up
inappropriately strong feelings of sympathy, impatience or even
hostility toward a participant who happens to remind him of his or her
former self (or his or her loved one). Consider the participant who
casts the judge in the parental role. He or she may elicit deep feelings
in the judge, rooted in the latter's own experience as a parent or a
once-needed child. Or consider the participant who related to the
judge in a provocative manner-or, more precisely, in a manner that
the judge finds provocative--stemming from an unconscious desire to
be punished or controlled or to elicit concern through censure.
These kind of psychodynamic scenarios are more likely to get
played out in a drug court, with its somewhat relaxed structure, than in
a standard court where proceedings, expectations and personnel roles
are clear, traditional and fairly predictable.335
A second, related consequence of this more direct, personal relationship
between treatment court judges and individual participants is that it tends to
complicate participants' relationships with their attorneys. As noted earlier,
ordinary criminal proceedings rely on formal procedural rules to help
maintain distance between the parties and the decision maker, to insure that
333.
The Freudian concept of transference refers to the patient's "transferring" tightly held attitudes
(beliefs) and emotional dispositions forged in childhood onto new individuals in their lives....
Counter-transference is the inverse of transference; it describes the therapist's reaction to the
patient. In the context of drug court, "judicial" countertransference would thus refer to the
personal reactions that are invoked in the judge by the participant (in the clinical setting, by
analogy, it would refer to the therapist's response to the patient). Classically, these reactions are
unconscious-that is, outside the awareness of the judge (or therapist)-but are manifested in
ideas, feelings or behaviors that are inappropriately intense (in the positive or negative direction)
or somehow not fully rational.
Satel, supra note 13, at 53-54. For more on the relationship between countertransference and substance
abuse treatment, see Howard J. Shaffer, Denial, Ambivalence, and Countertransferential Hate, in THE
DYNAMICS AND TREATMENT OF ALCOHOLISM: ESSENTIAL PAPERS 421 (J. Levin & R Weiss eds.,
1994). For more on countertransference in psychotherapy generally, see EDA G. GOLDSTEIN, EGO
PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 200-01 (1984).
334. See supra text accompanying notes 124-36.
335. Sate], supra note 13, at 54-55.
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the triadic structure does not collapse into two against one.336 The defense
lawyer's role in such a proceeding is to help the defendant negotiate this
formal adjudicatory system and, in the process, to limit the arbitrary exercise
of coercive state power by safeguarding the defendant's entitlement to basic
procedural rights.
337
In the drug treatment court, this conception of counsel as an intermediary
between the lay defendant and the court is likely to be difficult if not
impossible to maintain. Indeed, given the active role assumed by the judge in
directing the defendant's course of treatment, and given the lack of formally
distancing procedural obstacles,338 observers of these courts not surprisingly
report that "some judges discourage the presence of the attorneys" at status
hearings and other similar proceedings. In courts where defense attorneys
typically attend hearings, questions with respect to their appropriate role are
even more difficult. According to one experienced drug treatment court
attorney:
[T]he judge has become so accustomed to this "team approach," that
in a recent letter to me, she specifically stated that "the automatic
nature of the sanction scheme necessarily transforms to some degree
the role of defense attorneys from adversary to counselor."...
Indeed, she appeared to suggest that defender advocacy on points
of law may have no place in her court at all .... 340
This notion that defense attorneys should "take a step back, ... not
intervene actively between the judge and the participant, and allow that
relationship to develop and do its work' '341 makes sense from the perspective
of judges who view their role as entirely consistent with the best interests of
the defendant From the perspective of a given defendant, however, even the
most well-intentioned interventions by a treatment court judge may seem
belittling, punitive, or unfair.342 The conundrum for defenders is how to
mediate this clash of perspectives: Should they proceed principally as
members of the treatment team and seek to persuade their clients that the
336. See supra text accompanying notes 252-56.
337. See, e.g., JUDGE, supra note 43, at 1-2 (stating that traditional role of defense counsel is to
resist efforts of prosecutor by using protections of Constitution and derivative case law).
338. Some drug treatment court judges even arrange to have out-of-courtroom contacts with
defendants, including picnics, Christmas parties, or, in one case, monthly one-mile runs. See Satel,
supra note 13, at 69.
339. Id at 67.
340. Schreibersdorf, supra note 250, at 7.
341. An Interview with Judge Jeffrey S. Tauber, supra note 39, at 11.
342. Cf STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 25-27; CULLEN & GILBERT, supra note 86, at
116; see also supra text accompanying notes 196-99.
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court's position has integrity, or should they adopt the point of view of at
least some defendants and seek to undermine the judge's efforts by raising
potentially available points of law? Moreover, if rehabilitative impulses do
have a tendency to become debased into punitive responses, and if
individual treatment court judges may on occasion be moved to act out of
personal pique or unconscious reactions to an individual defendant, should
defense lawyers conceptualize their role as that of a vigilant advocate, even if
this sort of advocacy has the tendency to undermine the therapeutic power of
an otherwise direct relationship between treatment court judges and the
defendants with whom they are working, or should they act to reinforce that
relationship in the hopes that it will prove to be in their client's interest in the
long run?
One response to these questions is to suggest that they do not lend
themselves to resolution in the abstract, but rather require individual defense
attorneys to make careful choices in the context of a given treatment court
and a particular case.3" Unfortunately, this approach assumes defenders can
identify each moment of decision as it arises345 and can act accordingly
despite pressure from the very institutions that have created the role tension
in the first place.346 In addition, many of these choices effectively culminate
in questions over disclosure of information possessed solely by the
defendant.347 If the defendant is engaged by the judge in a colloquy in open
343. See supra text accompanying notes 185-87.
344. This response finds support in some feminist scholarship, which urges the use of
contextualized reasoning as a way to solve problems. Katharine Bartlett, for example, has explained
the premise by saying:
Practical reasoning approaches problems not as dichotomized conflicts, but as dilemmas with
multiple perspectives, contradictions, and inconsistencies. These dilemmas, ideally, do not call for
the choice of one principle over another, but rather "imaginative integrations and reconciliations,"
which require attention to particular context.
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 851 (1990) (citation omitted).
345. Deborah Rhode and David Luban, writing about ethics in organizational settings, have made
a similar point about the difficulty of identifying moments of decision in a clear, straightforward way.
They note that, even though "[v]irtually every theory of normative ethics, from the Ten
Commandments to the latest nuance in philosophy journals, presupposes that moral decisions are
clearly demarcated" so that decision makers will "recognize that they have come to a crucial fork in
the road," the reality in many organizational settings is that such a "condition[ often [is] absent."
RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 244, at 405-06.
346. Cf Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1128 (asserting that "defense lawyers who routinely practice
in juvenile court face tremendous institutional pressure to cooperate in maintaining a smoothly
functioning court system."); Federle, supra note 47, at 1673 (stating that "[tihe zealous lawyer also
could expect some pressure from the bench to conform to the nonadversarial and informal nature of
juvenile proceedings"). For a fuller discussion of the analogous role problems faced by defenders in
juvenile court and drug treatment court, see infra text accompanying notes 385-416.
347. See generally Robert L. Ward, ConfidentialiO and Drug Treatment Courts, INDIGENT
DEFENSE (Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n), Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 4; TREATMENT DRUG COURTS,
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court, without the benefit of formal rules of procedure or the opportunity to
prepare a measured response, it is likely that damaging concessions or other
harmful statements will be made before counsel has had the opportunity to
review their legal and practical consequences with his or her client.3 48 Thus,
even if the lawyer is able to discern that a critical decisional moment is at
hand, he or she may may not be able to intervene in order to preserve the
choice or share its significance with the defendant.
These concerns about the untoward disclosure of sensitive information
implicate both the partisanship and confidentiality duties that are central to
the standard attorney role conception. 349 Once again, this tension between
zealous advocacy and cooperation derives, in significant part, from the
blending of punitive and therapeutic functions in drug treatment courts.
Clearly, the open and frank acknowledgment by defendants of their past or
continuing abuse of alcohol or illegal substances, their attitudes toward
treatment, their involvement in criminal activity, and other like information
plays an important role in the recovery process. 35° At the same time, much of
this information is likely to be relevant to the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of defendants, either for the charges that are the basis of their
involvement in the treatment court or for other crimes.35 1 Defense lawyers
practicing in treatment courts necessarily face a host of difficult choices with
respect to this information, and these decisions form the final group of role
conflicts mentioned earlier.
4. Confidentiality and the Defense Lawyer's Role
If treatment court judges' direct conversations with participants during
status hearings have an important therapeutic function, there is good reason
for defense attorneys who understand themselves to be members of the
treatment team either to encourage or permit their clients to proceed in an
unguarded fashion. Clearly, however, some participants will "openly
confessf_ offenses to the judge." '352 According to a recent survey conducted
by the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, only half the drug court
supra note 8, at 47-59.
348. See Profile: Dalit Moskana, INDIGENT DEFENSE (Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n), Nov.-
Dec. 1997, at 12; Ward, supra note 347, at 4.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 236-38.
350. See Ward, supra note 347, at 4.
351. As one observer has observed: "[W]here information is provided in open court or through
reports available to all drug court team players, the prosecution necessarily gains more knowledge
about the stability or instability of the client, use of drugs, home and employment situations, prior
history, and continuing information about sobriety and relapse." Ward, supra note 347, at 4.
352. Profile: DalitMoskana, supra note 348, at 12.
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defense attorneys surveyed reported that their clients received immunity for
anything said in open court "in the event of a subsequent prosecution.' 353 For
a considerable number of defendants who do not obtain immunity, these
"therapeutic" statements can have severe negative consequences. Thus,
defenders who adhere to the standard role conception may feel obliged to
depart from the cooperative norms associated with a treatment orientation. In
deferred prosecution programs, admissions made by defendants with respect
to the facts and circumstances of their pending charges may serve as the basis
for a later conviction, if they do not successfully respond to a treatment
program.354 Even in jurisdictions that use a postdisposition model, statements
made by defendants without immunity may be used in determining their
sentences or to institute or support other charges for other offenses in a new
or separate prosecution.355
Perhaps the most difficult confidentiality problems for defense attorneys
to manage result from the close cooperative relationship typically established
between treatment court judges, prosecutors, and treatment providers. In
order to carry out the evaluation and prognosis functions inherent in a
rehabilitative approach,356 the criminal justice members of the treatment team
require considerable information from drug counselors and others regarding
defendants' participation and progress in treatment Often, however, clients
reveal "sensitive personal and family information or incidents of relapse and
drug activity during therapy sessions. 357 Ordinarily, this sort of information
is protected by federal laws and regulations governing the confidentiality of
substance abuse treatment records. 8 These laws exist because the threat of
disclosure of this sensitive information to investigators or prosecutors would
undermine the treatment providers' ability to create the atmosphere of trust
353. Defenders Largely Satisfied with Drug Court Experience, INDIGENT DEFENSE (Nat'l Legal
Aid & Defender Ass'n), Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 8.
354. Indeed, a particularly serious admission might provide the basis for a decision to terminate
the treatment regime and return the defendant to an ordinary prosecution track.
355. Robert Ward has pointed out, for example, that prosecutors might seek "to disprove the
client's sincerity for rehabilitation by introducing statements made during treatment sessions that the
client never really wanted to be in the program," or might seek "to use damaging evidence from the
drug court treatment records to deny bail or show a similar pattern of conduct," if the client is
prosecuted in the future for new crimes after successfully completing a treatment court program.
Ward, supra note 347, at 4.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 91-107.
357. Ward, supra note 347, at 4.
358. See Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255, § 408, 86 Stat. 65,
79 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994)). This law and its implementing regulations
apply to virtually all treatment providers that are used by drug treatment courts. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-
.67 (1987). For a fuller discussion of this confidentiality scheme, see Boldt, supra note 24, at 2330-34.
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and safety required for effective therapy.359 Nevertheless, this information
sometimes is made available to the court and prosecutor pursuant to broadly-
worded patient consent forms that defendants routinely execute when they
begin the treatment court program. 360 Although such waivers of
confidentiality rights are voluntary in the sense that defendants can refuse to
grant permission for disclosures, 361 such a refusal will likely lead to their
exclusion from the treatment court program.
362
In the final analysis, the waiver of some confidentiality protections may
be a fair trade-off for a great many defendants, but difficulties remain for
defense counsel who must give advice on the scope and wording of consent
forms. 3 63 Defense attorneys who seek to negotiate narrowly-worded consent
359. This purpose of encouraging an open and trustful relationship between a substance abuse
patient and treatment provider was set out explicitly in the first set of regulations promulgated by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which was the agency originally responsible for
implementing the federal confidentiality laws. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.4 (1975). In addition, the drafters of
the regulations also identified a second purpose animating the strict confidentiality requirements that
apply to substance abuse treatment, which was to protect the entire treatment system by maintaining
the perception "on the street" that addicts and alcoholics can safely seek treatment for their highly
stigmatized conditions. See Boldt, supra note 24, at 2330-31. The regulations allow the disclosure of
patient-identifying information without the patient's written consent, but only in linied situations. The
most important exceptions to the general rule requiring patient consent is for disclosures made
pursuant to an authorizing court order. Before a court may issue such an order, however, it must give
notice to the patient. Additionally, the treatment program, must follow elaborate fact-finding
procedures, must find "good cause" for disclosing the information, and must strictly limit the
disclosure to that information that is essential and that cannot be obtained in any other fashion. These
procedural and substantive requirements make it more difficult to obtain an authorizing court order
than other, more common, orders, including subpoenas and search warrants. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.61-.67
(1994). As a result, few courts have ordered disclosure orders. See, e.g., Commissioner of Soc. Servs.
v. David R.S., 436 N.E.2d 451, (N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 439 N.E.2d 396 (N.Y. 1982)
(holding that no "good cause" was shown for disclosure of treatment records in child custody matter,
and stating in dicta that court will not find good cause in cases where information is sought to support
criminal prosecution of patient).
360. The regulatory provisions governing disclosures pursuant to written patient consent are at 42
C.F.R. §§ 2.31-.35 (1994).
361. Cf TREATMENT DRUG COURTS, supra note 8, at 51-52 (discussing mix of voluntariness and
coercion underlying defendants' decisions with respect to their participation in drug treatment courts).
362. This consequence is inherent in the design of drug treatment courts, which rely on the judge's
receipt of information from the treatment provider in order to supervise the defendant and conduct
regular status hearings. If defendants refuse to consent to such disclosures, then they cannot meet the
requirements for participation in the program. See Memorandum from Valerie Raine, supra note 305,
at 4.
363. The consent provisions of the federal confidentiality regulations require that the patient
execute a written waiver of confidentiality. This written form must identify the patient, the treatment
provider, and the recipient of information. In addition, it must contain a statement of the purpose for
the proposed disclosure, a description of the precise information to be communicated, an identification
of the date, event or condition on which the consent will expire, and a statement that the consent is
subject to revocation at any time unless the program has already acted in reliance on it. See 42 C.F.R.
§ 2.31 (1994). A special provision governing consent forms for "criminal justice system" disclosures
modifies somewhat the expiration and revocation rules. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.35 (1994).
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forms that allow treatment program workers to disclose only objective data
relating to a defendant's attendance, participation in treatment, and the results
of urine tests may find the court or prosecutor unwilling to circumscribe the
information they receive. 364 In fact, many treatment courts use standardized
confidentiality waiver forms that contain few, if any, limitations on the kinds
and amount of information that treatment providers must share with the
criminal justice officials involved in the case.365 In these instances, defenders
and their clients must make difficult choices, without any assurance that
treatment information will be used solely to further the goals of treatment
that the state officials share with the defendant, rather than the ends of
punishment that they do not hold in common.3 66
Ill. THE JUVENILE COURT MODEL OF DEFENSE ADVOCACY
To gain some analytic purchase on the role problems faced by defense
counsel in drug treatment courts, and, by extension, on the inherent dangers
of merging therapeutic and blaming practices in a single institutional setting,
it is helpful to review the longstanding, thoroughly chronicled story of the
juvenile court movement in the United States.367 This story depicts an
institution that has exhibited virtually all of the characteristics defining the
rehabilitative ideal, including individualized treatment of offenders,
indeterminacy of sentences, and broad discretion on the part of decision
makers. 368 Additionally, the juvenile justice system has attracted each of the
principal criticisms of rehabilitative practice that dominated liberal penal
discourse in the late 1960s and 1970s. These include concerns over
unnecessary restrictions of individual liberty, the debasement of good
intentions into punitive responses, and the inadequacy of the diagnostic and
treatment tools required to accomplish rehabilitative ends.369 Owing to the
364. This limitation to objective data is built into the court order provisions of the federal
confidentiality regulations. See id. § 2.63 (1994).
365. The Brooklyn, New York Drug Treatment Court, for example, requires participants to "sign
an authorization permitting disclosure of information regarding 'diagnosis, attendance, scope of
treatment, treatment progress and quality of participation, dates and results of urine testing and
termination or completion of treatment.' See Memorandum from Valerie Raine, supra note 305, at 4.
366. For a discussion of the adverse interests of criminal defendants and the state, see supra text
accompanying notes 201-02.
367. See generally ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
(2d ed. 1977); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAiD PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT
(1978); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187
(1970).
368. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 84; see also supra text accompanying notes
91-151.
369. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 34-36; see also supra text accompanying notes 182-206.
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inherent tension between the rehabilitative ideal and traditional notions of
adversarial dispute resolution,370 the juvenile justice system also has been the
site of a pitched battle between those who have believed that defense attorney
advocacy is inappropriate3M injuvenile cases 372 or that such advocacy should
be muted in favor of a cooperative, paternalistic approach,3 73 and those who
have favored a defense attorney role consistent with the zealous advocacy
model that long has predominated in adult criminal court.37 4
Both the theory and practice governing juvenile court proceedings have
changed over time. These changes, particularly as they relate to the relative
balance between the system's rehabilitative and punitive tendencies,375 have
influenced the ongoing debate over the appropriate role for defense attorneys.
Nevertheless, a number of striking parallels exist between the conflicts faced
by defenders in juvenile courts and those who seek to represent defendants in
drug treatment courts. Therefore, an examination of the solutions proposed
by juvenile court experts seeking to overcome these apparent conflicts may
reveal a corresponding set of solutions for drug treatment court defenders.
A. The Juvenile Court Analogy
Historians of the juvenile justice system generally agree that the concept
of a specialized therapeutic court for children was largely created by
Progressive-era reformers.376 Reform proposals centered on the notion that,
when parental supervision failed to prevent a child from engaging in
antisocial conduct, the state should provide a substitute socializing
370. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 47-48; see also supra text accompanying notes 239-60.
371. Indeed, some have argued that "children would be better served by nonprofessional
advocates," who would better be able to "temper [their) approach to adversarial representation."
Federle, supra note 47, at 1673 (citation omitted).
372. References throughout this section to "juvenile cases" or 'Juvenile court" refer to
proceedings involving juvenile delinquency.
373. See, e.g., Richard Kay & Daniel Segal, The Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court
Proceedings: A Non-PolarApproach, 61 GEO. L.J. 1401 (1973).
374. See, e.g., Chester James Antieau, ConstitutionalRights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q.
387 (1961); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 1967 Sup.
CT. REV. 233 [hereinafter Paulsen, Constitutional Domestication]; Monrad G. Paulsen, Fairness to the
Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1957) [hereinafter Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile
Offender]; Thomas A. Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in a
Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REV. 653 (1966).
375. See infra note 401.
376. Historians of the juvenile court movement have linked the development ofjuvenile courts to
a larger reform movement that led to the creation of "reformatories" and "houses of correction" for
adult offenders. In addition, these historians have identified the roots of the juvenile court concept in
earlier "houses of refuge" or "almhouses." See PLATr, supra note 367, at 108-52; RYERSON, supra
note 367, at 16-56.
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influence.377 This emphasis on benevolent rehabilitation and socialization in
lieu of retributive punishment was reflected in the first juvenile court act,
promulgated in Illinois in 1899.378 The Illinois model proved extraordinarily
attractive and, within two decades, virtually every state enacted legislation
creating separate juvenile courts. 7 9
Important elements of the Progressive ideology led to the founding of
these early juvenile justice institutions. Of particular importance was the
belief that adolescents are not "morally accountable for their behavior"38 and
should not be subjected to retributive punishment for their unlawful conduct.
The Progressives believed in a disease model of social deviance38' and
treated such behavior as a "symptom" of a larger "underlying social
pathology." 382 Consistent with other iterations of the rehabilitative ideal, the
Progressives treated instances of unlawful conduct as appropriate occasions
for state intervention, not to punish juvenile offenders, but to help "save them
from a life of crime that might otherwise be their fate.' 383 The Progressives
were optimistic that rehabilitative measures could "cure juvenile
delinquency. As with other rehabilitative movements, including the drug
treatment court efforts now underway, this optimism stemmed from an
abiding faith in the malleability of human beings. 84
In a number of other respects, the juvenile court movement of the early
twentieth century exhibited characteristics similar to those found in the
current drug treatment court movement. First, juvenile court judges played an
active, partisan role in the development of the juvenile court model and in the
377. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1097.
378. See 23 ILL. REV. STAT. 169-189 (Hurd 1899); see also PLATT, supra note 367, at 101-36.
379. See RYERSON, supra note 367, at 81.
380. Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1097. On the problems of defining what constitutes responsible
moral agency, see Boldt, supra note 7, at 2254-85.
381. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1097. Professor Ainsworth quotes an early twentieth
century juvenile court judge as comparing his role to that of a "physician' engaged in a proper
diagnosis of the case, of the 'outbreak' of criminal behavior." Il at 1097 n.90 (quoting HARVEY H.
BAKER, PROCEDURE FOR THE BOSTON JUVENILE COURT (1910)).
382. See id. The view of early supporters of the juvenile court movement that "squalid urban life"
was responsible for much antisocial behavior on the part of children, id., is central to Anthony Platt's
account that juvenile courts were developed in order to exercise social control over poor, largely
immigrant juveniles. See PLATT, supra note 367. This account is one example of the more general
view of the radical critics of the rehabilitative ideal, that correctional practices had more to do with
controlling class and race conflict than with crime control in the traditional sense. For a fuller
discussion of the radical critique, see supra text accompanying notes 153-68.
383. Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1097; cf McColl, supra note 8, at 500 ("To break the cycle of
recidivism and crime, there must be effective treatment of addicts.").
384. See RYERSON, supra note 367, at 120. Many early supporters of separate juvenile courts
drew a sharp distinction between the juvenile, who was in need of socialization and rehabilitation, and
the adult, who was, by definition, a responsible agent subject to ordinary retributive punishment. See
Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1098.
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day-to-day operation of the juvenile justice system. One commentator noted,
"The juvenile court movement gained momentum from the proselytizing
efforts of some of its early judges. '38s These efforts helped to insure the
development of a specialized court for children. Similarly, the current drug
treatment court movement is led in important respects by the efforts of
charismatic judicial figures. 386 Just as early juvenile court judges generally
exercised broad discretion in fashioning dispositions for the young offenders
who appeared before them, drug treatment judges appear to possess a
considerable degree of discretion in individualizing the treatment of addicted
offenders.387 To some extent, the scope of juvenile court judges'
discretionary authority resulted from an extraordinarily flexible definition of
"delinquency." This flexible definition permitted judges to impose coercive
measures in response to behavior that was not itself unlawful or criminal. 38
This feature ofjuvenile court practice, which grew out of the premise that the
juvenile court's purpose was "not penal but protective," 389 was coupled with
a heavy reliance on probation. Because courts could place juveniles on
probation until they reached the age of majority and could impose a wide
array of conditions pursuant to a probationary disposition, juvenile court
judges exercised nearly "total control over every aspect of the probationer's
life.
390
The early juvenile courts, like contemporary drug treatment courts, relied
385. Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1097.
386. See Bean, supra note 15, at 718-19.
Traditionally, judges have played the passive role of objective, impartial referee, only reluctantly
stepping beyond the boundaries of their own courtroom. However, where the fair and effective
administration ofjustice is threatened (as in this case by an exploding drug problem), the court has
the responsibility to come forward and become a leader and activeparilcipant in the organization,
design and implementation of coordinated criminal justice and community-wide drug control
efforts.
Casey, supra note 263, at 118-19 (quoting Jeffrey S. Tauber, A Judicial Primer on Unified Drug
Courts and Court-Ordered Drug Rehabilitation Programs (Aug. 20, 1993) (paper presented at
California Continuing Judicial Studies Program)) (emphasis added).
387. Cooper and Trotter report that the advent of drug treatment courts and the availability of
graduated sanctions have "permitted much greater judicial involvement in individualizing sanctioning
strategies-a role that judges in many jurisdictions felt they had lost as a result of mandatory
sentencing provisions, sentencing guidelines, and the sheer volume of cases before them." Cooper &
Trotter, supra note 19, at 85.
388. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1098 (listing "smoking, sexual activity, stubbornness,
running away from home, swearing, and truancy" as sufficient to trigger juvenile court jurisdiction).
This "unprecedented expansion of state social control over adolescents" goes both to the liberal and
radical critiques of the rehabilitative ideal. Id. By defining the pathologies subject to therapeutic state
intervention this broadly, traditional restraints on governmental authority derived from the notion of
relevance are rendered relatively ineffective. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 47.
389. Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1098 n.97 (citing In re Holmes, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954)).
390. Id. at 1099.
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on informal procedures to accomplish their goals. The drug treatment court
movement has rejected the use of formal procedural rules because of an
abiding conviction that the formal adversarial process undermines the
therapeutic goals of the enterprise.391 Similarly, the clear pattern in the state
statutes creating juvenile courts in the early part of the twentieth century was
to eschew the formalities of a regular criminal trial, both because informality
was considered a necessary adjunct to the rehabilitative process, 392 and
because the benevolent aims of the state rendered the protections accorded to
adult criminal defendants unnecessary in this forum.
393
The parallel between juvenile courts and drug treatment courts is most
apparent, however, with respect to the role of defense counsel. Although a
debate between proponents of zealous advocacy and supporters of a
relatively nonadversarial role conception for juvenile defenders had existed
for some time,394 this contest was joined in earnest following the United
States Supreme Court's 1967 decision in the case of In re Gault.39 1 In Gault,
the Court adopted, at least within the context of the juvenile court system,
many of the criticisms that opponents of the rehabilitative ideal had voiced
more generally. The Court recognized that, despite its expressed benevolent
purpose to socialize and rehabilitate wayward children, the juvenile justice
system often imposed dispositions that were as punitive and coercive as those
meted out by adult criminal COuIts. 396 Additionally, the Court questioned
whether the use of informal procedures and broad judicial discretion could be
justified by the need to individualize rehabilitative treatment, given the
dangers of arbitrary and unfair dispositions.3 97 The Court concluded that
many of the formal procedural protections accorded to adult criminal
defendants were also required as a matter of constitutional right for children
in juvenile delinquency proceedings.398
391. See supra note 279.
392. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1100. In fact, the commitment to informal procedures even
expressed itself in the arrangement of the judge and other participants in the courtroom. Thus, the
judge was instructed not to sit at a bench, but was to be "[sleated at a desk, with the child at his side,
where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him." Id. at 1100 n.107
(quoting Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 117 (1909)). This attention to
manipulating the level of informality within the "theater of the courtroom" has been expressly adopted
by some within the contemporary drug treatment court movement. See supra text accompanying note
220.
393. See RYERSON, supra note 367, at 38-39; see also Anthony Platt & Ruth Friedman, The Limits
ofAdvocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1156, 1156-61 (1968).
394. See Antieau, supra note 374; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, supra note 374.
395. 387 U.S. 1(1967).
396. See id. at 17-18, 27.
397. See id. at 18-19.
398. Seeid. at31-57.
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Although a right to the assistance of counsel was prominent among the
procedural protections mandated by Gault39 9 the Court's opinion failed to
delineate the role that counsel was required to play as a constitutional
matter.40 ° Moreover, the opinion neither rejected the notion that rehabilitation
was an appropriate goal for the juvenile justice system, nor the premise that
juveniles require different treatment than adults charged with criminal
offenses.40 1 Consequently, the debate over the role of defense counsel in
399. See id. at 36. The other procedural protections mandated by the Gault court include the right
to notice of charges, see id. at 31-34, and confrontation of witnesses, see id. at 56-57, as well as the
privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 44-56.
400. In addition, the Court based its holding on the Due Process Clause rather than the Sixth
Amendment. This may have resulted in the Court's subsequent decision not to require trial by jury in
delinquency proceedings. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
401. Professor Janet Ainsworth has described in considerable detail changes in both the theory and
practice of juvenile courts over the past twenty-five years. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1101-18.
Her work demonstrates that these fundamental shifts have developed because of changes in the way
that society conceptualizes adolescents, see id. at 1101-04, and because of a widespread rejection of
the rehabilitative ideal as a governing principle of the criminal justice system, which also has
influenced the development of the juvenile justice system. See id. at 1104-12. With respect to the
former cause, Ainsworth argues that over the past decades, there has been a breakdown in the "binary
opposition" between the socially-constructed notions of "child" and "adult," id. at 1103, so that
adolescents in particular are now understood as more like adults than they were at the inception of the
juvenile court movement. See id, at 1103. As a consequence of this shift in perception, she argues,
blaming practices also have evolved in order to reflect the developing consensus that juveniles often
have sufficient cognitive and emotional competence to be treated as responsible moral agents. See id.
at 1101-04. With respect to the general decline in societal support for rehabilitative penal practices,
Ainsworth suggests that a growing emphasis on "just desserts" and retributive notions of responsibility
and punishment has led many states to amend the statutory provisions governing juvenile courts to
make clear that their primary purpose is to hold young offenders accountable for their antisocial
conduct. See id. at 1105-06. Ainsworth suggests that these changes in perception are directly linked to
shifting practices. Among the most important modifications, she identifies a trend toward the
promulgation of determinate sentencing schemes that limit the discretion of juvenile court judges to
individualize therapeutic measures, see id. at 1107, the adoption of formal procedural rules that mirror
practice in adult criminal courts, see id. at 1108-09, and the development of rules increasing the
number of juvenile offenders who are "waived" into ordinary criminal courts where they are tried and
punished as adults. See id. at 1109-12. Notwithstanding this dramatic evolution of the juvenile justice
system, Ainsworth acknowledges that juvenile courts have retained important rhetorical and practical
characteristics attributable to their rehabilitative origins. The most important continuing legacy of the
past is the fact that separate courts for juveniles have not been abolished. In addition, the attitudes of
many participants in the juvenile justice system, including defense attorneys, continue to reflect
"decades of paternalistic parenspatriae ideology." Id. at 1129. Ainsworth concludes that this mix of
rehabilitative and punitive impulses disserves juveniles, particularly because it leads many defenders
to adopt a role conception that fails to provide sufficient protection for their clients from the retributive
consequences of the new juvenile justice system. Ainsworth advocates the abolition of a separate
juvenile court to guarantee that children will receive the same level of procedural protection accorded
adults in the criminal justice system. See id. at 1118-32. In addition, and somewhat ironically,
Ainsworth has also argued that such a consolidation could have the salutary effect of importing some
of the more humane elements of the juvenile court system into a contemporary criminal justice system
that has become increasingly harsh and dehumanizing. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Youth Justice in a
Unified Court: Response to Critics of Juvenile Court Abolition, 36 B.C. L. REV. 927 (1995). For a
discussion of how this prescription relates to similar concerns about contemporary drug treatment
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juvenile proceedings has been fought more vigorously since the Gault
decision than it was in the period preceding the Court's intervention.40 2
Notwithstanding the Gault Court's observations with respect to the harsh
sanctions possible in juvenile court, the available empirical data reveal that
most juveniles still do not receive vigorous and effective advocacy by
defense counsel. Indeed, some studies demonstrate that a great many children
receive no legal representation at all in juvenile court.40 3 More importantly,
other studies show that "juveniles with lawyers fare worse... than those
proceeding without counsel, [and are] more likely to be incarcerated and
jailed for longer periods than if represented pro se." 44 The studies detail a
level of practice by defenders in juvenile court that diverges markedly from
the sort of vigorous advocacy envisioned by the standard role conception. A
summary composite provided by one commentator reveals that:
[T]rials in juvenile court are frequently "only marginally contested,"
marked by "lackadaisical defense efforts." Defense counsel generally
make few objections, and seldom move to exclude evidence on
constitutional grounds. Defense witnesses rarely are called, and the
cross-examination of prosecution witnesses is "frequently perfunctory
and reveals no design or rationale on the part of the defense attorney."
Closing arguments are sketchy when they are made at all. Watching
these trials, one gets the overall impression that defense counsel
prepare minimally or not at all. The New York Bar Association study
estimated that in forty-five percent of all juvenile trials, counsel was
"seriously inadequate"; in only five percent could the performance of
defense counsel be considered "effective representation."
4 °S
This less than zealous advocacy is due to a number of factors, including
the inexperience of attorneys typically assigned to handle juvenile matters
and the crushing caseloads that characterize juvenile court practice.40 6 In
addition, it appears that the absence of adversary effectiveness by defenders
also may result from the rehabilitative elements that remain in this
institutional setting, as well as the attorney role conception that persists as a
courts, see infra text accompanying notes 547-52.
402. See, e.g., Norman Lefstein, In re Gault Juvenile Courts and Lawyers, 53 A.B.A. J. 811
(1967); Paulsen, Constitutional Domestication, supra note 374.
403. See Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile Court: An Empirical Study of When
Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1199-1200
(1989).
404. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1127.
405. Id. at 1127-28 (quoting MARVIN FINKELSTEIN ET AL., PROSECUTION IN THE JUVENILE
COURT: GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE 31-62 (1973)).
406. See id. at 1128.
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consequence of these therapeutic aims.
Supporters of this nonpartisan role rely on many of the same reasons
articulated by supporters of the "team player" approach to drug treatment
court defense practice. First, they point out that an insistence on pressing the
juvenile's technical legal rights or on following formal procedural rules is
likely to produce a hostile response from many juvenile court judges used to
informal, cooperative relations with counsel. 07 Further, they suggest that
such an approach often will result in an undue narrowing of the range of
possible dispositions for the child, which in turn could lead the court to
impose more restrictive measures than necessary.40 8 Some argue that zealous
advocacy is inappropriate, even when it is likely to result in the child's
release from custody, if the juvenile would benefit from a rehabilitative
disposition. From this perspective, the attorney's proper role is "to interpret
the philosophy of the juvenile justice system to the child and to assist in the
minor's rehabilitation by insuring the child's cooperation with the court's
order. 40 9
Not all commentators and juvenile court practitioners have endorsed the
nonadversarial approach. Even before Gault, a number of writers expressed
skepticism over the juvenile justice system's rehabilitative objectives,
suggesting that the claims of benign intention did little to mitigate the harsh
407. See Federle, supra note 47, at 1672. Indeed, such an approach might lead a judge to waive
the child into adult criminal court. See William B. McKesson, Right to Counsel in Juvenile
Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REV. 843, 846 (1961).
408. See Kay & Segal, supra note 373, at 1417. In light of this concern, some commentators have
suggested that, even if counsel adopts an adversarial stance during the adjudicative stage of juvenile
proceedings, counsel should limit this adversariness at the dispositional stage, when the court evaluates
the child's bests interests. See Julian Greenspun, Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court, 18 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 599, 601 (1969).
Certainly, assisting the court in searching for the truth does sacrifice some of the client's rights;
the child, however, may be advantaged by her lawyer's nonadversarial approach. By presenting
the court with information about the child, rather than simply the offense, the attorney may help
structure a less punitive disposition.... This approach may actually advance the child's right to
rehabilitative treatment because the court may be forced to consider the child's needs.
Federle, supra note 47, at 1678.
409. Federle, supra note 47, at 1672. One writer on this subject has included the following
narrative example of this way of thinking:
My own experience as a student attorney in Boston Juvenile Court in the late 1970s is illustrative.
In one case, I was representing a teenager accused of possessing drugs that had been seized in an
arguably unlawful search. After I presented my motion to suppress, the judge asked me point-
blank if I really wanted to bring this motion in light of my client's obvious and untreated drug
dependency. He offered to call a recess so I could consult with my supervising attorney, who to
his credit encouraged me to press the issue. In granting the motion and dismissing the case, the
judge commented on what he saw as my misguided zeal in vindicating my client's constitutional
right at the expense of his true best interests ....
Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1130 n.315.
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realities ofjuvenile incarceration and the other forms of coercive therapy that
resulted from uncontested dispositional hearings. 410 In the view of these
writers, when the power of the state is brought to bear against the most
powerless individuals in society, children, the system should provide these
juveniles with zealous advocates.41  A number of writers also suggested that
the cooperative, nonadversarial approach is inappropriate for juvenile
defenders, because it requires them to make therapeutic judgments, for which
they are not trained, regarding the child's best interests4 1 2 Thus, not only was
the nonadversarial role criticized for being paternalistic and insufficiently
concerned with limiting state abuses, it was also questioned on the purely
instrumental grounds that attorneys are ill-equipped to carry it out.
Since Gault, these criticisms have been supplemented by additional
arguments drawn from the Court's reasoning that the assistance of counsel is
required in juvenile proceedings because of their similarity to adult criminal
prosecutions.413 Supporters of a more adversarial approach have argued that
if a sufficient similarity exists between delinquency proceedings and criminal
cases to create a constitutional right to a lawyer, then the constitutionally-
required assistance of counsel should include all of the features of the
standard conception that go to define zealous advocacy on behalf of adult
criminal defendants. 41 4 At a minimum, they argue, attorneys for juvenile
defendants should protect their clients' confidences, should assert all
available procedural rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination,
and should require the state to meet its constitutional burden of proof.
415
Moreover, they assert, children in juvenile court proceedings should be
entitled to exercise the same degree of control over their attorneys'
representation as any other client Thus, while retaining the authority to make
strategic litigation choides, defense attorneys should seek whatever ends their
juvenile clients have identified, after having received due advice and
counsel.4 6
410. See, e.g., Antieau, supra note 374, at 387; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, supra
note 374, at 550. Indeed, in some cases, juveniles received longer sentences of incarceration than they
would have received for the same offenses in an adult criminal court. This was the situation in Gault,
where fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault had been committed to a juvenile facility until his twenty-first
birthday for making an obscene telephone call, an offense that carried a maximum adult penalty of two
months in jail and a fifty dollar fine. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1967).
411. See Antieau, supra note 374, at 387.
412. See Paulsen, Constitutional Domestication, supra note 374, at 262.
413. Gault, 387 U.S. at 24, 27-29.
414. See Paulsen, Constitutional Domestication, supra note 374, at 261-63.
415. See Theodore McMillian & Dorothy L. McMurtry, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the
Juvenile Court-Advocate or Social Worker?, 14 ST. LOUIS U. L.. 561, 598 (1970); Paulsen,
Constitutional Domestication, supra note 374, at 262-63.
416. See Federle, supra note 47, at 1675.
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B. Proposed Solutions to the Problem ofinadequate Juvenile Court
Defense Advocacy
Supporters of the nonadversarial approach have founded their arguments
on the essential premise that zealous advocacy is inappropriate in juvenile
court because it disrupts the court's ability to formulate and implement
rehabilitative dispositions that are in the child's long-term best interests.417
Their opponents argue that the absence of zealous defense practice
undermines the legitimacy of that rehabilitative system altogether.418
Professor Janet Ainsworth offers one of the most thoroughly worked out
versions of this argument, noting that "juvenile defendants invest the legal
system with legitimacy only insofar as they see it to be a just system." 419
Ainsworth uses sociological research that demonstrates that participants'
perceptions of justice in any decision-making institution turn less on
substantive outcomes than on the characteristics of the process by which
those outcomes are produced. Ainsworth identifies several elements that
must be present for participants to view a process as procedurally fair:
"consistency in the process, control of the process by the litigant, respectful
treatment of the litigant, and ethicality of the fact-finder."420 For each of these
elements, she argues that practices in the juvenile justice system are
inadequate.
For example, juveniles are unlikely to perceive the system as consistent
because it persists in treating children differently than adults by withholding
jury trials and other procedural formalities required in adult criminal
prosecutions. 421 Similarly, Ainsworth argues that a nonpartisan approach to
defense advocacy diminishes the juvenile's sense of control, particularly to
the extent that it "assume[s] that juvenile accuseds are incapable of
exercising sound judgment in making the decisions that affect their cases. '422
Because children in juvenile court are not accorded the full complement of
procedural rights available to adult defendants in the criminal justice system,
Ainsworth suggests that these children are denied respectful treatment.423
Finally, she argues that the perception of ethicality of juvenile court fact-
finders is undercut by an appearance that guilt has been "pre-judged," which
417. See Kay & Segal, supra note 373, at 1416-17.
418. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1126-30.
419. Id. at 1119.
420. Id at 1120.
421. See id.
422. Id.
423. See id. This point is conceptually linked to the dignity critique of rehabilitative regimes
generally. See supra text accompanying notes 188-95.
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results from the absence of a fully adversarial adjudication and from the fact
that juvenile court judges serve both as fact-finders and sentencing
authorities.424 The consequence of this failure of procedural justice,
concludes Ainsworth, is that the juvenile justice system is hampered in its
ability to inculcate society's norms and to serve as an effective institution of
social control.
425
Ainsworth's description of the consequences flowing from the juvenile
justice system's partial rejection of adversarial norms is compelling, and her
prescription is equally intriguing; she urges the abolition of juvenile courts
entirely.426 To date, however, that approach has not been adopted. In the
interim, Ainsworth's solution provides little concrete guidance for attorneys
who represent clients in juvenile court. Her work clearly suggests that these
practitioners should seek to resolve role conflicts in favor of zealous
advocacy in order to maximize the sense of litigant control and procedural
formality of the proceedings. Nevertheless, her solution, by definition,
ignores the concern that a full implementation of the standard role conception
within the juvenile court setting would cause more harm than good to
individual juveniles who might receive more punitive dispositions as a
consequence.427
At the heart of the controversy over the proper role for defenders in the
juvenile justice system is the perception that juveniles lack the judgment and
insight to make wise choices in their own interest.428 Many in the drug
treatment court movement have a similar perception, which helps explain the
widely held view that defenders in that setting should mitigate their partisan
advocacy in favor of an approach that prioritizes therapeutic dispositions for
their clients. As noted earlier, this is true even when addicted defendants do
not believe that substance abuse treatment is in their ultimate best interest 429
This fundamental perception, that children in juvenile courts and
defendants in drug treatment courts frequently cannot exercise good
judgment, conflicts with the principle of autonomy that is central to the
424. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1120. In some respects, this is the collapse into two against
one discussed earlier. See supra text accompanying notes 251-56.
425. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1121.
In a legal culture as deeply permeated by due process concepts as ours, strict observance of
procedural rights in and of itself contributes to an inculcation of the values of the social and
political order. Ifjuveniles perceive their exposure to the legal system as unjust, however, the legal
socialization process fails.
l (citations omitted).
426. Seeid at l118-30.
427. See Kay & Segal, supra note 373, at 1417-20.
428. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1120; Federle, supra note 47, at 1676-77.
429. See supra text accompanying note 291-96.
1998] 1279
Washington University Open Scholarship
1280 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
standard attorney role conception.430 One particularly interesting effort to
overcome this tension has been offered by Professor Katherine Hunt Federle,
whose work seeks to demonstrate that both the standard attorney role
conception and its nonadversarial alternative are based on "incoherent"
theories of rights.4 3 1 This conclusion, in turn, permits Federle to suggest a
completely different theory of rights that generates a new role conception,
which she claims avoids the tension that has plagued juvenile court
defenders.4
32
Federle begins her analysis by linking each of the attorney role
conceptions that have dominated the debate to a corresponding theory of
rights. She locates the standard conception of zealous partisanship within a
category she terms the "client autonomy model," while she places the
nonpartisan alternative within a category she calls the "lawyer autonomy
model. ' 433 Her elaboration of the first category is familiar enough, containing
descriptions of partisanship, loyalty, zealousness, and role amorality.
Equally familiar is her assertion that the normative basis for this standard
conception is the claim that "the attorney's act is, in and of itself, a moral one
... because it promotes the expression of client autonomy within the legal
system. '435 Zealous advocacy, in short, is commended regardless of the
morality or wisdom of the client's goals because it promotes individual
autonomy, which is itself an independent social good.
436
Federle's second category, the lawyer autonomy model, is distinguishable
from the standard conception in a number of respects. First, it rejects the
claim that client autonomy is a normative good in and of itself. Instead,
supporters of this perspective argue that autonomy is socially valuable only
when it facilitates the expression of other values, such as responsibility. 37
Moreover, the lawyer autonomy model recognizes that the social goods that
result from zealous advocacy often come at the expense of other values of
equal or greater moral weight. Even in a criminal prosecution, where the
normative value of partisanship is at its greatest, competing interests in
"uncovering the truth and in promoting fairness place limitations on zealous
430. For a good discussion of the importance of autonomy to the standard attorney role
conception, see Pepper, supra note 230. See also supra note 238.
431. Federle, supra note 47, at 1656, 1693.
432. See id. at 1693-97.
433. Id. at 1657-58.
434. See id. at 1657-63.
435. Id. at 1660.
436. See id. at 1659-60.
437. See Federle, supra note 47, at 1667-68. Responsibility in these terms may include the
freedom to exercise choice, but only when that choice is made pursuant to identifiable moral
principles. See id. at 1668.
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advocacy and client 1oyalty. ' 438
Perhaps the key distinction between the two models, however, is their
very different treatment of role amorality. Under the first model, lawyers are
not held morally responsible for pursuing their clients' objectives, even when
these goals are morally suspect, because client autonomy is regarded as an
independent moral good.439 Under the second model, by contrast, attorneys
remain morally accountable for their actions, even when undertaken on
behalf of a client.440 The ethical discretion" 1 this model accords lawyers
allows them to refuse to engage in professional activity that violates their
ethical compass, but it also imposes responsibility for those activities that
they do undertake.442 Given that this second model requires lawyers to make
ethical judgments about their clients' ends, it imposes an obligation on
attorneys to enter into a "moral conversation" with clients." 3 Through this
moral conversation, lawyers must ascertain sufficient information to make an
ethical judgement about their clients' wishes and attempt to reconcile their
own ethical positions with those of their clients.444
Under either of these two models, the competence of the client is a central
concern. This is so, explains Federle, because both perspectives employ
notions about the client's capacity in order to determine who may possess
and exercise rights.445 The client autonomy model is premised on traditional
liberal theory, which holds that civil society consists of separate, self-
interested individuals who deal with one another through arm's-length
transactions." 6 Lawyers who satisfy the duties of partisanship and loyalty, by
zealously pressing their clients' claims of right or resisting demands made on
their clients, promote client autonomy by seeking to maximize their clients'
438. Id. at 1664.
439. See id. at 1659-60.
440. See id. at 1664-65.
441. This phrase is taken from an article by William Simon. See William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1083 (1988).
442. See Federle, supra note 47, at 1666. For a fuller discussion of this vision of the lawyer's role,
see David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to
Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1021-22 (1990).
443. See Federle, supra note 47, at 1666.
444. See id. Thomas Shaffer is the leading proponent of this conception of the attorney's role, in
which the lawyer and client engage one another in "moral discourse." See generally Thomas L.
Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1979). Shaffer
suggests that such a conversation is not genuine moral discourse unless it contains both the possibility
that the client will be persuaded to adopt the lawyer's moral position, and the possibility that the
lawyer will adopt the client's position. See id. at 248.
445. See Federle, supra note 47, at 1656.
446. For a discussion of "the liberal paradigm [in which] society is comprised of rational, egoistic
individuals," see Boldt, supra note 24, at 2358-59.
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"freedom to make choices about and to control [their] li[ves]." 7
By definition, argues Federle, if autonomy involves the exercise of
choice, a professional role conception founded on fostering client autonomy
becomes incoherent when clients lack the capacity to identify alternatives,
consider consequences, and make decisions through rational calculation of
the relative advantages of each option.448 In addition, she argues, this
theoretical tradition conditions the enforcement of rights on the rights
holders' decision to raise a claim of entitlement. 4 9 When clients lack the
competence either to recognize that such a decision must be made or to make
a choice that furthers their self-interest, they have "no status as a rights
holder."A"5 Here again, explains Federle, the theory becomes inadequate,
because it necessarily excludes the possibility that children and other
disadvantaged groups who are systematically treated as less than fully
competent can assume the status of rights holders.45'
The lawyer autonomy model rests on a different conception of rights but
is no less problematic in Federle's view. Because this perspective does not
prioritize client autonomy, its theory of rights does not revolve around the
client's capacity to engage in rational decision making. Instead, it determines
rights by reference to "interest[s] that the legal or ethical system recognizes
as worthy of advancement or protection by imposing duties on others." 4 2
This interest-based theory of rights leads to a lawyer role conception
characterized by ethical discretion because its evaluative component-the
question whether an interest is worthy of advancement-demands that
lawyers evaluate not only the interest of their clients, but also the competing
interests of those against whom a demand of right may be made.453
Moreover, this ethical evaluation process necessarily implicates the
relationship between the lawyer and the client, because the lawyer must be
able to enter into a genuine moral conversation with the client to ascertain
whether to advance the client's interest.454 In Federle's account, this requires
that the client be "capable of understanding moral argument, of giving and
receiving moral advice.' 455 With respect to juvenile clients, Federle says that
447. See Federle, supra note 47, at 1661.
448. See id. at 1661-63.
449. See id. at 1661. A right is an entitlement to demand the performance of an obligation owed
by another. See id.
450. Id.
451. Seeid. at 1662.
452. Id. at 1668.
453. See id. at 1669. In some cases the lawyer may also be required to consider the interests of the
public in general. See LUBAN, supra note 45, at 160-74.
454. See Federle, supra note 47, at 1668.
455. Id at 1669.
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there is a strong presumption that they are not competent to engage in moral
conversation because many youngsters have not reached the requisite level of
moral development. 6 Given this incompetence, the theory permits the
lawyer to act paternalistically. Thus, the lawyer may act on the client's behalf
based on what the lawyer believes to be in the client's best interests,
notwithstanding the client's expressed wishes to the contrary.45 7 This theory
is deemed inadequate to support a fully coherent lawyer role conception
because clients who lack the capacity to engage in moral conversation, and
thus do not qualify as full rights holders, nevertheless often have interests
that deserve protection through the legal system.45 8 Moreover, because this
perspective will often result in paternalistic practices by attorneys on behalf
of children and other disadvantaged clients, it is criticized by Federle as
promoting their "dependent status," thereby increasing their marginalization
and powerlessness.
45 9
Federle seeks to resolve the debate between advocates of the standard role
conception and supporters of morally activist lawyering 46° by suggesting a
unique conception of rights which flows from a reconfigured "lawyering
paradigm. ' 461 In Federle's view, a coherent theory of rights must begin by
recognizing that "[p]ower structures the interactions between and among
individuals and the state. It is power that permits an individual to assert a
claim against another and power that permits the enforcement of that
claim.'A62 Given this understanding of the essential role that power plays in
all relationships, Federle's theory of rights focuses not on the capacity of a
rights holder to exercise choice or to evaluate the relative moral importance
of competing interests, but on the disparate positions of power held by parties
to a dispute.463 In her conception, rights permit those with less power to
enforce their claims, even against those with greater power.464 In this sense, a
right is an enforceable entitlement to redistribute the power in any given
relationship from the more powerful party to the less powerful. "Rights
prohibit those who have power from exercising it over those who do not and
456. See id. at 1670.
457. See id.
458. See id.
459. Id. at 1694-95.
460. The characterization of this role conception as "moral activism" suggests that attorneys must
actively evaluate and take responsibility for the moral consequences of their practices. See LUBAN,
supra note 45, at 160-61.
461. Federle, supra note 47, at 1693.
462. Id.
463. See id
464. See id. at 1693-94.
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create zones of respect in which the excluded may be empowered.'
465
By placing power at the center of her theory of rights, and by making the
empowerment of disadvantaged or marginalized clients the principal goal of
her vision of lawyer advocacy,466 Federle is able to describe a practice for
juvenile court defenders that she claims avoids paternalism. 467 In the abstract,
however, power is a broad concept and empowerment is a vague goal.
Presumably, these concepts could subsume some of the values held to be
important by advocates of both the standard role conception and the morally
activist conception of lawyering. Thus, the empowerment of clients could
include efforts to assist them to become more autonomous, by helping them
to gain control over features of their lives about which they have been unable
to exercise meaningful choice. Alternatively, lawyers could help clients
attain a sufficient level of moral development to permit them to enter into
moral conversations. At a minimum, Federle indicates that an empowering
practice is one in which clients are accorded respect, both by their own
lawyers and by other participants in the process.468
The actual contours of a power-based theory of rights ultimately will
depend on how the corresponding lawyer role conception is operationalized
in practice. Federle begins this project by describing approaches to
interviewing and counseling child clients that she believes are likely to be
empowering. With respect to interviewing, Federle notes that client
interviews primarily serve an investigatory function under both the client
465. Id. at 1694.
466. See id. at 1695.
467. See id at 1694.
468. See id. at 1694-95. It is possible that Federle envisions her theory of rights as a general
conception applicable to situations far beyond the juvenile court context. If she intends to construct a
more general theory of rights, this raises questions with respect to the rights of relatively powerful
actors. Federle's analysis implies that in the absence of any enforceable rights, the claims of the more
powerful would always prevail against the competing claims of those with less power. See id. Rights
exist, therefore, not to reflect the superior position of the powerful, for that position is already by
definition in place; rather, rights function to overcome situations of powerlessness. See id. at 1695.
Thus, a person becomes a rights holder within this alterative theory only by virtue of powerlessness.
See id. at 1694. While conceptualizing rights in this fashion may have the advantage of suggesting a
lawyer role well-suited to the representation of children and other relatively powerless clients, it is not
at all clear that rights always "flow downhill" to the less powerful. Id. at 1658. Indeed, it is just as
likely that rights serve to advance the interests of more powerful actors in society. Often, for example,
powerful parties will advance rights claims not because they wish to gain additional power over others,
but because the enforcement of those rights will obviate the need to use force in order to effectuate the
powerful parties' goals. If this description is true, then the practice of asserting rights on these
occasions does not have a redistributive effect, as Federle suggests. See id. at 1693. Rather, it has the
effect of reinforcing already existing power relationships. For more on the role of law in reinforcing
existing relationships of social power, see generally Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: An
Introduction to its Origins and Underpinnings, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 516 (1986).
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autonomy and lawyer autonomy approaches.469 The first model supports the
use of client-centered techniques, such as empathic listening and the
avoidance of legal jargon, to promote client autonomy.470 But neither model
insists on thorough interviewing designed to include the client in the lawyer's
decision-making process when the client is clearly incompetent either
because of age or some other disabling condition.471 With regard to
counseling, Federle again suggests that both the client autonomy and the
lawyer autonomy approaches relieve attorneys of their ordinary
responsibility to assist incompetent clients in reaching their own decisions.472
Both models permit attorneys to persuade incompetent clients to adopt an
alternative that is in their best interests, even though the clients have
indicated that their "expressed wishes are to the contrary."473 Indeed, in
extreme cases of incapacity, both models "even authorize the attorney to
make decisions on behalf of the child." 474
Federle's reconfigured model of lawyering prohibits these instances of
paternalism on behalf of incompetent clients. This model does not conceive
of interviewing as primarily investigative in nature. Instead, it treats
interviewing as an opportunity to empower the incompetent client to become
a "full participa[nt] in both the legal system and the attorney-client
relationship. ' 475 Federle directs lawyers to foster communication between
themselves and their clients and to "utilize whatever techniques may be
necessary to accommodate the child cient.'476 Federle describes the
counseling function as "focussed not on the correctness of the decision made
but on the process by which the client reaches her decision.' 77 Thus, the
attorney should use counseling techniques that avoid not only
469. By this she means that the primary purpose of interviewing a client is to gather information
that the lawyer needs to conduct the representation. See Federle, supra note 47, at 169 1.
470. See generally DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 14-18 (1977).
471. See Federle, supra note 47, at 1691.
472. See id. at 1691-92. Federle acknowledges that both models ordinarily require the lawyer to
identify alternatives available to the client, and to evaluate the legal and nonlegal consequences of
each alternative, to assist competent clients in making decisions about their cases. See id.
473. Id. at 1692.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 1695.
476. Id. For a discussion of practical approaches to interviewing and counseling child clients in
ways that permit children to participate in the lawyer-client relationship, which incorporates
considerations of child cognitive development stages, moral development stages, language barriers,
and the like, see Nancy W. Perry & Larry L. Teply, Interviewing, Counseling, and In-Court
Examination of Children: Practical Approachesfor Attorneys, 18 CREIGHToN L. REV. 1369 (1985).
477. Federle, supra note 47, at 1696; cf Simon, Ideology of Advocacy, supra note 45, at 38
(discussing notion of "procedural justice," which "holds that the legitimacy of a situation may reside in
the way it was produced rather than its intrinsic properties").
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"[m]anipulative and deceptive practices,' ,47S but also practices that trigger the
inherent imbalance of power between lawyers and clients.479 The attorney
accomplishes this by exhibiting "a deep respect for the client as a rights
holder" and by "promoting the client's status in the face of domination. 'A8O in
short, counseling within this new paradigm does not aim to assist clients in
reaching decisions that are necessarily correct, rational, or even in their best
interests; rather, the goal is to encourage clients to undertake a decision-
making process that "ensures that the child, and no other, has truly made her
own choice. 'A81
IV. ADjUSTING TO DRUG TREATMENT COURTS
For lawyers representing children in the juvenile justice system or adult
defendants in drug treatment courts, these proposals regarding interviewing
and counseling are helpful but incomplete. Attorneys in the drug treatment
court setting, for example, still face difficult questions regarding the concrete
steps they should take given the activist role of judges, the informality of
procedural rules, and the dangers of disclosing confidential information. The
mix of therapeutic and punitive impulses in treatment courts will continue to
place pressure on defenders to determine at any given moment whether an
adversarial stance or a cooperative approach is more likely to empower their
clients. Lawyers must tailor a more fully realized account of an empowering
role conception to the specific features of their setting. The next section sets
out the beginning of such an account geared toward the drug treatment court
context.
A. Responsible Advocacy in Drug Treatment Court: A Vision ofPractice
for Defenders
Common to both Professor Ainsworth's analysis of procedural justice and
Professor Federle's account of an empowering defense practice is a relatively
greater emphasis on how the defendant is treated during the process than on
478. Federle, supra note 47, at 1696.
479. See id. at 1695-96.
480. Id. at 1696.
481. Id. Federle explains:
Of course, this may mean that some decisions will be made by the child that the lawyer believes
are wrong or ill-conceived, but then, all clients, not just those of a certain age, are capable of
making and have made bad choices. Nevertheless there is value in allowing a client to speak in her
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the final outcome reached. In Professor Ainsworth's view, the legitimacy of
the process often will turn on whether defendants perceive that they were
permitted to exercise control over decisions affecting their Cases,48 2 and
whether the defendants were accorded respectful treatment by their attorneys
and others in the system.483 In Professor Federle's view, a process
characterized by a coherent theory of rights must insure that the defendant is
allowed "to speak in her own voice and to determine her own goals. '' 4 For
lawyers representing defendants in drug treatment courts, these injunctions to
facilitate client control and promote respectful treatment are a sensible
starting point for constructing an operational role conception because they
embrace some of the central values that long have animated liberal critics of
the rehabilitative ideal. To ascertain the full outlines of a responsible vision
of practice, however, defenders must formulate adequate responses to each of
the principal criticisms of rehabilitative penal practice as set out earlier in this
Article. This approach requires defenders to proceed cautiously before
joining with other criminal justice officials in promoting a therapeutic
response to drug-involved defendants within the criminal justice system, at
least to the extent that such a team player model undermines their ability to
protect their clients' dignity interests, their ability to voice their clients'
unique perspectives, and their ability to guard against the debasement of
rehabilitative impulses into punitive outcomes.485
1. Protecting Defendants' Dignity Interests
As noted earlier, the critics' concerns about the dignity interests of
defendants in rehabilitative penal practices centered on the fact that
involuntary treatment regimes undermine human dignity when they treat the
recipients of therapy not as responsible moral agents, but as malleable
objects. 486 Paradoxically, this objection appears to be inapposite to the sort of
substance abuse treatment involved in drug courts because the very purpose
of this therapeutic approach is to assist defendants in learning how to take
responsibility for their conduct.487 In this regard, a setting in which addicted
defendants are given genuine choices, are helped to understand the likely
consequences of competing alternatives, and are held responsible in a
predictable and rational fashion for the decisions they make, likely serves
482. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1120.
483. See id.
484. Federle, supra note 47, at 1696 (discussing interviewing and counseling child clients).
485. See supra text accompanying notes 182-206.
486. See supra text accompanying notes 190-95.
487. See An Interview with Judge Jeffrey S. Tauber, supra note 39, at 11.
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both a therapeutic function and a dignity-enhancing purpose.
For this fortuitous coincidence of purpose to take hold, however, defense
attorneys must insure that their clients have the opportunity to exercise
genuine choice in making the decision to enter a drug treatment court
program. This notion of genuine choice is not meant to suggest that such a
decision will be unconstrained or that the defendant's participation will be
fully voluntary. Often, defendants on the threshold of drug treatment court
will face a set of alternatives in which each choice carries undesired
consequences.488 If defendants reach a decision with some significant
understanding of the costs and benefits of each available alternative, and if
defendants are permitted to decide based on their own calculation of the
relative weights of these costs and benefits, then their choice will be genuine
and consistent with basic notions of human dignity.489
But at least three potential problems may impede this sort of responsible
decision making by drug court defendants. First, as discussed earlier, many
treatment courts pace the initial steps of the program to insure that defendants
will begin their participation while still experiencing the sense of "crisis"
occasioned by their arrest. This may require defendants to act, sometimes by
entering a guilty plea, before counsel can conduct a meaningful factual or
legal investigation of the case.49 If this push to initiate treatment quickly
prevents defense attorneys from adequately evaluating defendants' chances
of avoiding conviction in the traditional adjudicatory system, defendants'
decisions to enter drug treatment court will not rest on a full consideration of
the likely consequences of each available alternative.
The second potential impediment to treatment court defendants making
genuine choices relates to the problem just discussed. Even if the goal of
substance abuse treatment is to help individuals learn to take responsibility
for conduct by anticipating consequences and exercising impulse control in
response to predictable outcomes,491 it is clear that addicts are likely to have
significant denial at the start of the process regarding their substance-abusing
behavior and their need for treatment.492 Thus, many defendants, if given a
thorough briefing by counsel on the choice either to enter drug treatment
court or to have criminal charges resolved through the traditional system, will
opt to avoid treatment court, even though their lawyers, acting in their
488. See generally TREATMENT DRUG COURTS, supra note 8, at 25.
489. For a good discussion of the relationship between moral agency and practical reasoning, see
Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1139-49 (1985) (asserting that
opportunity and capacity to engage in practical reasoning renders one subject to praise and blame).
490. See supra text accompanying notes 298-300.
491. See Satel, supra note 13, at 58-59.
492. See Boldt, supra note 7, at 2297.
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clients' best interests, would have decided otherwise.493 Ironically then, in
order to gain the assent of those eligible defendants whose denial would
otherwise lead them to reject treatment, the process pushes defense counsel
to advocate for the treatment court option on the grounds that participation in
therapy will ultimately permit clients to assume the status of a responsible
moral agent
The third impediment to genuine choice grows out of a potential lack of
transparency in the information defendants receive about the confidentiality
consequences that are likely to flow from their agreement to participate in a
treatment court program. Virtually all drug treatment courts require
participants to sign written consent forms that permit the providers of
substance abuse treatment to convey information back to the court, to the
prosecutor, and to other members of the criminal justice treatment team. This
written consent is required by federal statutes and implementing
regulations494 that otherwise provide extraordinary protection for persons
receiving drug or alcohol abuse treatment,4 95 including persons mandated by
judicial authorities to enter treatment. 4 96 Because these authorities need some
modicum of information about defendants' attendance and participation in
treatment programs to adequately perform their supervisory functions, the
federal confidentiality laws and regulations permit judges and prosecutors to
condition defendants' entry into treatment on their agreement to waive some
or all of these rights to confidentiality.497
By definition, if the choice to enter treatment is to be genuine, defendants
493. See supra text accompanying note 295.
494. See supra note 24. Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-255,
§ 408, 86 Stat. 65, 79 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994); Confidentiality of Alcohol
and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.67 (1994).
495. The regulatory provision governing "unconditional compliance" provides an indication of the
extraordinary nature of these confidentiality protections:
The restrictions on disclosure and use in these regulations apply whether the holder of the
information believes that the person seeking the information already has it, has other means of
obtaining it, is a law enforcement or other official, has obtained a subpoena, or asserts any other
justification for a disclosure or use which is not permitted by these regulations.
42 C.F.R. § 2.13(b) (1998). Moreover, the section governing "restriction on use" of confidential
information provides:
The restriction on use of information to initiate or substantiate any criminal charges against a
patient or to conduct any criminal investigation of a patient applies to any information, whether or
not recorded which is drug abuse information obtained by a federally assisted drug abuse program
... for the purpose of treating alcohol or drug abuse, making a diagnosis for the treatment, or
making a referral for the treatment.
42 C.F.R. § 2.12(a)(2) (1998) (citations ommitted). Finally, it should be noted that the regulations
provide for criminal penalties in the case of violations. See id. § 2.4 (1998).
496. See id. § 2.35 (1998).
497. Seeki
1998] 1289
Washington University Open Scholarship
1290 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
must be helped to understand the potential costs and benefits involved,
including the potentially harmful consequences that can result from the
disclosure to judges or prosecutors of personal and sometimes incriminating
information gained in the course of substance abuse treatment.498 Defendants
must be informed of the considerable benefits in terms of confidentiality to
which defendants are entitled if they enter treatment on their own without
mandate from the criminal justice system. In other words, a genuine choice
with respect to the waiver of confidentiality requires that defendants be
informed of the unusually generous privacy protections already in place,
which their consent will extinguish.499 If defendants are simply presented
with a standardized waiver form and told little beyond the fact that their
signature is required in order to enter the treatment court program, it is
unlikely that they will appreciate the full legal or practical significance of
their decision to execute the form or to undertake the treatment court regime.
Drug treatment court defenders who wish to be responsive to the dignity
concerns of the critics must address each of these impediments. With respect
to the first, a vision of practice centered upon protecting the moral agency of
the defendant cannot afford to trade the client's opportunity to consult with
an attorney before deciding to participate, in favor of a generalized goal of
"expedited disposition. 500 Therefore, defenders must resist all efforts to
force a decision from their clients until such time as they have adequately
examined the case and can provide their clients with a good assessment of
the likely outcome of each available option, including trial.50l Even if the
defender's insistence on having sufficient time results in the loss of the
therapeutic benefits derived from starting treatment while the defendant is in
"crisis," and even if the client's eligibility to participate in drug court will be
withdrawn altogether, counsel must demand that his or her client receives
adequate time to make a fully informed, and therefore, genuine choice.
As to the second impediment, this vision of practice demands that
defenders engage in a process of consultation with their clients in which each
available option is described in detail, and the consequences of each choice
explained in dispassionate terms, so that clients will be able to exercise
control over their own cases. Specifically, this means that counsel must:
498. See Ward, supra note 347, at 4.
499. The confidentiality regulations recognize the importance of educating patients about their
rights in this regard. In fact, they require that patients receive a written summary of the federal law and
regulations. See 42 C.F.R. § 2.22(a)(2) (1998). Notwithstanding this injunction, treatment court
defendants will not likely appreciate the full extent of the protections they are waiving unless they
receive substantial individual counseling.
500. See Judge, supra note 30, at 2.
501. See Burke, supra note 297, at 5-6.
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help the client weigh the value of a relatively short jail term against
the possibility of longer involvement with the [drug treatment court].
[The drug treatment court] involvement could include shock
incarceration and, in the case of complete failure, imposition of a
sentence for probation-track defendants or a trial and possible sentence
for diversion-track defendants. 0 2
In some instances, defendants who would benefit from treatment will
choose not to enter the drug court program because of this counseling. This
may be a poor choice, when viewed from the point of view of the
defendant's long range well-being. Nevertheless, this vision of practice
includes the process-oriented values of respect and empowerment discussed
by Professors Ainsworth and Federle,0 3 and it demands that these interests
receive relatively greater weight in the formulation of an appropriate
defender role conception, in order to prevent defendants from being treated
as objects rather than as responsible agents.5°
Finally, this vision of practice calls on treatment court defense lawyers to
insure that clients who execute confidentiality waiver forms grant truly
informed consent. This requirement directly relates to a frequently identified
goal of the drug treatment court model, which is to give defendants sufficient
control over their participation so that they can justly be held accountable for
their conduct105 Persons with substance abuse problems often experience
very little control in their daily lives. Therefore, before they can develop a
sense of responsibility for their actions, they must be helped to identify those
features within their environment over which they can and should begin to
exercise control.506 With respect to the waiver of confidentiality protections,
502. McColl, supra note 8, at 513.
503. See supra text accompanying notes 420-25, 472-81.
504. This conclusion is not meant as a categorical condemnation of paternalism in all instances.
As a number of commentators have noted, paternalism is a "persistent feature of much of our law."
RHODE & LUBAN, supra note 244, at 598. David Luban has persuasively argued, however, that the
decision to act paternalistically must be justified in any individual case by attending to the relationship
between the "helped" person's immediate desires, his or her objective interests, and his or her values.
With respect to the last of these elements, Luban explains that "values ... are those reasons [for
acting] with which the agent most closely identifies-those that form the core of his personality, that
make him who he is." Luban, supra note 188, at 470. Luban's conclusion is that paternalistic practice
based upon a conflict between a person's immediate desires and his or her best objective interests is
only justified if it is based upon evidence that those desires do not express the person's "genuine
values." Id. at 473. This is likely to be a heavy burden for treatment court defenders to satisfy in
practice.
505. "It is critical that people be given control of their own rehabilitation or their own lives, and
that they understand that they are accountable and that there will be consequences for their actions."
An Interview with Judge Jeffley S. Tauber, supra note 39, at 11.
506. See Satel, supra note 13, at 58.
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this set of ideas requires that defendants be clearly informed of the legal
rights that give them virtually exclusive control over a broad array of
personal information that might be elicited during the course of treatment.507
Further, defendants must understand that they alone can choose whether to
permit others to share some or all of this information with criminal justice
officials.508 In addition, they must realize that each of the alternatives open to
them is likely to carry certain predictable consequences, and they must be
prepared to accept responsibility for whatever resolution of this difficult
choice they adopt.509 If defense lawyers insure that each of these elements of
informed consent is in place before their clients either sign consent forms or
refuse to waive their confidentiality rights, the goal of preserving genuine
choice, which is central to maintaining basic notions of dignity, will be
furthered.510 On the other hand, if consent is obtained as a mere bureaucratic
formality, with little or no attention given to ascertaining whether defendants
actually understand the significance of their decisions, then the process will
have failed to accomplish this basic requirement.
2. Representing Defendants' Perspectives
Closely related to the critics' concerns over protecting defendants' dignity
interests was their observation that rehabilitative penal regimes tend to
submerge the perspectives of individual offenders within the claims of
507. The federal confidentiality laws and regulations are structured around a general prohibition
against the communication of any information that is patient identifying, in the absence of properly
obtained patient consent. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 2.12, 2.13(a) (1998). There are a few extremely limited
exceptions to this general prohibition: for reporting extremely serious medical emergencies to medical
personnel, see id. § 2.51, for reporting crimes against program staff or on program premises, see id.
§ 2.12(c)(5), for limited reports of suspected child abuse or neglect, see id. § 2.12(c)(6), or to comply
with an authorizing court order. See id. §§ 2.61-.67.
508. This assumes that none of the other exceptions to the prohibition on disclosure apply. See
supra note 507.
509. For many defendants, the decision to grant consent will mean that harmful information will
be made available to criminal justice officials. Conversely, the decision to withhold consent will mean
that their eligibility for the drug treatment court program will be withdrawn.
510. For several reasons, this conclusion may be overly optimistic. First, it is at least suspect
whether consent obtained from one who is incarcerated or otherwise under state control can ever really
be regarded as an expression of that person's autonomous judgment. See ROBERT BURT, TAKING
CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS (1979). In addition, the
very notion of consent, which is "derived from liberal political values," ALLEN, supra note 38, at 45,
rests on a set of assumptions about the self-interested nature of individual choice that simply may not
hold for everyone in society. For example, Robin West has argued that a fundamental assumption of
liberal theory, "that human beings consent to transactions in order to maximize their welfare may be
false" with respect to the consent granted by many women. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's
Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN's L.J 81, 91
(1987). For an elaboration of West's hypothesis and an application of it to the consent provisions
within confidentiality law, see Boldt, supra note 24, at 2363-67.
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benevolent therapeutic purpose that characterize the enterprise. As discussed
earlier, rehabilitative practices, including drug treatment courts, merge two
ordinarily distinct state functions-treatment and punishment. Intertwining
these functions creates a risk that the absence of any overt conflict of interest
between the state and the individual participant which may characterize
therapeutic state activities, will mask the inherent conflict present when the
state seeks to punish individual defendants. 1 Attending to this danger,
defenders in rehabilitative penal institutions, including drug treatment courts,
must give voice to the individual defendant's experience of the process as
potentially coercive and punitive.
Ordinarily, the conflict between the state's penal interests and the
individual defendant's liberty interests is managed through the application of
formal procedural protections implemented within a stable adversarial
system.512 This due process model is at the core of liberal legal theory, which
seeks to restrain state power by granting citizens basic procedural rights.
513
As the critics noted a generation ago, these essential procedural rights may be
jeopardized by the tendency of rehabilitative penal regimes to use an
alternative approach, characterized by informality, indeterminacy, and broad
discretionary decision making, which is thought better suited to the goal of
providing treatment to offenders.514
The occasion for any defendant's participation in drug treatment court,
however, is the state's decision to bring criminal charges. Moreover, under
any variation of the treatment court model, the defendant necessarily
progresses through the mandated treatment regime under threat of criminal
sanction. Indeed, the defendant's participation in each of the various
therapeutic activities that constitute this treatment regime is, in some sense,
coerced conduct. In short, the individual participant is first and foremost a
criminal defendant subject to a loss of liberty as a direct result of the state's
exercise of its prosecutorial powers. In order to emphasize their clients'
status as criminal defendants, drug treatment court defenders should therefore
seek to preserve the basic features of ordinary criminal proceedings. These
features of adversary disputing, including formal procedures, clearly defined
decisional rules, and detached, neutral decision makers, constitute the
fundamental mechanisms by which persons accused of crimes are guaranteed
511. See supra text accompanying notes 201-03.
512. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 26-27 (discussing conflict between
defendant's self-interest and state's role).
513. See Boldt, supra note 24, at 2359-60.
514. See ALLEN, supra note 38, at 47-48.
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a fair opportunity to be heard.515 In the absence of such formal procedures,
defendants' voices are not structurally protected, and their perspectives are
likely to be lost within the often sincere claims of the state to be acting in
their best interests.
Defense lawyers who wish to be responsive to these perspective concerns
should concentrate their efforts on representational tasks. In order to
represent their clients' perspectives effectively, however, defenders cannot
undertake other roles that require the adoption of competing perspectives.
516
In particular, they must resist invitations to join the treatment team, or to
form structural alliances with other repeat players within the treatment court
environment, 517 because to do so would deny the essential conflict of interest
that exists between those other criminal justice officials and the defender's
515. See supra text accompanying notes 251-56; see also Handler, supra note 147, at 25
(identifying "procedural safeguards commonly found in the adversary system" to include "a clear and
definite charge, the separation of functions between the prosecutor and judge, a meaningful right to
counsel, the right of confrontation, proof by competent and relevant evidence, a relatively high degree
of burden of proof and the right of appeal").
516. Even under the best of circumstances, the job of representing a criminal defendant is
problematic. James Doyle, writing about death penalty cases, has demonstrated that the process of
representation often involves two related tasks. The first is to represent the client "in the familiar sense
of speaking for him," and the second is to represent the client "by shaping and presenting to a judge or
jury a representation of the client" James M. Doyle, The Lawyers'Art: "Representation" in Capital
Cases, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 417, 420 (1996). Insuring that a drug treatment court defendant's
perspective is "represented" throughout the process necessarily requires the defense lawyer to attend to
both of these undertakings. Difficulties with respect to the obligation to speak for the defendant arise
from the myriad of ways that attorneys misunderstand or misread their clients' statements, silences,
and conduct. See, e.g., Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text:
Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298 (1992). Difficulties with
respect to the second task occur because this form of representation inevitably produces a "copy" of
the "original," rather than the fully situated real-life defendant. This distance between the client as
represented and the client, in reality, is impossible to overcome in criminal defense practice or in
anthropology or in art, because "[a] copy can resemble an original more and more, but it can never
achieve identity with it." Doyle, supra, at 420. Finally, the difficulties attendant on both of these
representational tasks are compounded by the distorting effects of social power and race. As Doyle
puts it:
Other disciplines acknowledge a "crisis in representation" because they recognize the dangers that
hide in any process in which the strong describe the weak, the dominant culture describes the
subordinated one. In psychologists' representations of their patients, or anthropologists'
representations of native societies, the representations "hear as much on the representer's world as
on who or what is represented."
Doyle, supra, at 429 (quoting Edward W. Said, Representing the Colonized: Anthropology's
Interlocutors, 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY 205, 224 (1989)). In light of all the impediments to effective
representation that confront even the most zealous advocates, the notion that counsel in a drug
treatment court might further fracture his or her identity with the client by serving simultaneously as a
member of the treatment team is remarkable indeed.
517. For a thorough discussion of the distinction between participants in litigation who "have only
occasional recourse to the courts" and those who are "engaged in many similar litigations over time,"
see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits ofLegal Change, 9
L. & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974).
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In addition to forming a singular identification with the defendant and his
or her perspective,51 9 defense counsel should make choices designed to force
an appropriately formal distance between the treatment court judge and the
parties.52 At a minimum, defenders should insist on playing a mediating role
in any initial proceedings before the judge and in subsequent status hearings
involving their clients. Occasionally, it may be appropriate for a defendant to
interact directly with the court, but the decision to proceed in this fashion
should result from a careful evaluation by counsel with respect to the client's
ability to give voice to his or her experience of the process.52' In any event,
counsel should always attend court proceedings involving the client, and
should be prepared to address the court on the client's behalf whenever the
client's perspective diverges from that of the other criminal justice officials
involved in the case. 22 While it is difficult to say in advance what specific
interventions might be called for at any given moment, it is clear that even
the small rhetorical details of the setting may demand the defender's
advocacy. So, for example, counsel may be obligated to raise objections to
the practice in some treatment courts of referring to graduated sanctions,
including periods of incarceration, as "adjustments" rather than punishments
or sanctions. 2 Or, counsel may appropriately insist that the judge refrain
from awarding T-shirts to defendants who have been successful in
treatment, 524 or from sponsoring picnics and other out-of-court activities. 525
518. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 26-27.
519. For example, this vision of practice would regard as inappropriate any efforts on the part of
defense counsel to "actively participate [with the judge and prosecutor] in the design of the 'theater' of
the courtroom," in order to encourage the client's compliance with the treatment court program.
JUDGE, supra note 43, at 7.
520. See supra text accompanying notes 328-43.
521. In particular, counsel should be attentive to the danger that power imbalances between
participants in informal decisional processes can subvert those processes' outcomes. Cf Lisa G.
Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on
Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984) (discussing disadvantages to mediation in domestic abuse
cases); Richard Abel, Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law?, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 375
(1985) (arguing that informal procedures are inferior to formal procedures in law).
522. One student of drug treatment courts has described the failure of defense counsel to fulfill
this important role in the following terms:
Generally the defender will argue for leniency if a client is sent to shock incarceration. By
definition, however, the defender is part of the systems approach team and is also responsible for
treating the client. Therefore, because shock incarceration is defined a treatment, the defender has
incentives to mute his dissent. Often the defender is reduced to making arguments destined to be
disregarded, and therefore there is no incentive to interfere with the treatment.
McColl, supra note 8, 513-14.
523. See id at 502-03.
524. See Bean, supra note 15, at 719.
525. See Satel, supra note 13, at 69.
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At root, the critique about perspective shows that the legitimacy of the
criminal justice system and its ultimate effectiveness as an institution for the
inculcation of basic societal values526 depends on the rigor with which its
formal triadic structure is maintained. The therapeutic goals of a drug
treatment court should not disrupt the fundamental elements of a
procedurally just process by, for example, undermining the unambiguous
loyalty of defense counsel or the neutrality of the judge.527 The core
commitments of liberal theory demand that the state justify its coercive
practices by reference to legitimate collective interests.528 At the least, the
individuals whose liberty is to be restrained deserve a meaningful
opportunity to be heard, and their perspectives should be evaluated fairly
along with the state's expressed purposes. Finally, this evaluation should be
undertaken by a decision maker who is neither a partisan nor an active
participant in the state's coercive enterprise.529  To be sure, these
requirements may make it more difficult to institute a process of therapy in
any given case. All the same, they are essential because they serve
instrumental interests in preventing unnecessary restrictions on individual
liberty, as well as larger ideological goals with respect to maintaining the
integrity of the community's official blaming practices.
526. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1121; see also Boldt, supra note 7, at 2278-85 (setting out
theory of criminal law blaming practices as constitutive of social understandings of responsibility and
desert).
527. Professor Ainsworth's observations about juvenile court judges are particularly apt in this
regard. She argues that:
Confidence in the ethicality of the fact-finder is undercut by the dual roles of the juvenile court
judge as finder of fact and sentencing authority. Particularly for the repeat offender, the judge's
knowledge of the accused's background and previous criminal record creates the unseemly
appearance that guilt has been pre-judged. In the sentencing role, expressions by the judge of
paternalistic concern for the juvenile accused coupled with stem judicial sanctioning likewise is
inconsistent with the normative model ofadjudicatorial behavior.
Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1120 (footnotes omitted).
528. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 41, at 22-23.
529. Shapiro, however, points out:
[E]ven in those few societies that seek to insulate the judge from the rest of government, he is
expected to administer the criminal law, that is, to impose the will of the regime on a party being
prosecuted by the regime. With extremely great care to the various rituals of independence and
impartiality, some criminal courts may succeed in maintaining the appearance of thirdness.
However, few of the defendants in contemporary Western criminal courts are likely to perceive
theirjudges as anything other than officers of the regime seeking to control them.
Shapiro, supra note 229, at 287. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the structure of the triad, and hence
the perception of the tribunal as fair, is weakened by virtue of the criminal court judge's membership
in the same government as the prosecution, is no reason to give up entirely on larger efforts to prevent
a complete collapse into two against one.
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3. Guarding Against the Debasement of Treatment into Punishment
Insuring that the unique perspectives of defendants in treatment courts are
effectively heard serves both to protect their individual entitlement to be
treated with dignity and to guard against the debasement of the state's
therapeutic goals into purely punitive outcomes. Defense attorneys who insist
on the enforcement of basic procedural rights in order to prevent their clients'
voices from being silenced can also undertake other activities as well to
guard against debasement. Defenders should address two particular measures
if this vision of practice is to be operationalized fully.
The first measure to help prevent the debasement of treatment into
punishment involves the wording of the written confidentiality waiver form
used by the defendants. As noted above, confidential information obtained by
a treatment provider and disclosed to criminal justice officials pursuant to
written consent may form the basis for the imposition of sanctions, either
under a system of graduated penalties governing the charges that are the basis
for the treatment court's jurisdiction over the defendant, or by way of
additional charges brought against the defendant.5 3° The regulations
implementing the federal confidentiality statutes make clear that information
disclosed pursuant to a criminal justice consent form may only be used in
connection with the matter for which consent was obtained.5 31 But once
inculpating information relating to other events reaches the hands of
prosecutorial officials, compliance with this requirement becomes more
difficult. Even if the information is not the formal basis for instituting a new
investigation or for filing additional charges, it may trigger an investigation
that leads to independent evidence available for use in a subsequent
532prosecution.
Because of the likelihood that broadly-worded consent forms that permit
wholesale disclosures may lead courts to impose greater sanctions in at least
some cases, defenders should insist on narrowly-worded waiver forms at the
beginning of their clients' involvement in drug treatment court. Such
insistence is entirely consistent with the general philosophy of the
confidentiality laws and regulations, which clearly provide that disclosures of
confidential information by treatment providers pursuant to patient consent
should be limited to information necessary to carry out the purpose of the
530. See supra text accompanying notes 356-62.
531. See42 C.F.R. § 2.35(d) (1998).
532. Cf Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (exclusionary rule
applicable to all evidence tainted by unconstitutional search, including evidence subsequently obtained
by using information acquired in unconstitutional search).
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disclosure. 33 In concrete terms, this means that the drafting of consent forms
should not be accomplished in a routinized or standardized fashion, but
should be undertaken individually in each case after careful negotiation
among the parties to determine the precise scope of the permission that is to
be granted.
Given the regulations' insistence on narrowing the scope of disclosures
made pursuant to consent, it should not be surprising that the provisions
governing the contents of written waiver forms require a clear statement of
"the purpose of the disclosure. ' 534 Indeed, the logic of the consent provisions
suggests that the drafters of a waiver form should identify the purpose in
writing before determining the remaining elements of the document. The
purpose statement can then serve as a reference point for delimiting the other
items that constitute adequate consent, including the "kind and amount of
information to be disclosed, ' 535 the "name or title of the person or
organization to which disclosure is to be made,' 536 and the duration of
consent.537 In contrast, it is inconsistent with the spirit of the federal
confidentiality laws and regulations to adopt a practice of using standardized
consent forms that permit the disclosure of virtually all information
possessed by the treatment provider without regard to the need that criminal
justice officials have for this information in the particular case. Such
standardized consent forms increase the danger that rehabilitative intentions
will become punitive in operation.
Defenders who insist upon tailoring confidentiality waiver forms in each
case, in order to limit the permissible scope of disclosure to the minimum
required for the supervision of any given treatment court defendant, are likely
to encounter resistance from other officials within the treatment court setting.
At the least, these officials may complain that such a process of obtaining
written consent is inefficient and unnecessary.538 Even greater resistance is to
533. See42 C.F.R. § 2.13(a) (1998).
534. Id. § 2.31(b) (item five on sample consent form).
535. Id. (item three on sample consent form).
536. Id. (item two on sample consent form).
537. The duration requirements for written consent in situations where "persons within the
criminal justice system ... have made participation in the [treatment] program a condition of the
disposition of any criminal proceedings against the patient or the patient's parole or other release from
custody ... " id. § 2.35(a), direct the drafters of the waiver form to "state the period during which it
remains in effect... taking into account... [t]he anticipated length of the treatment ... , [t]he type of
criminal proceeding involved, the need for the information in connection with the final disposition of
that proceeding, and when the final disposition will occur.., and [sluch other factors as the program,
the patient, and the person(s) who will receive the disclosure consider pertinent." Id. § 2.35(b)(I)-(3).
538. Indeed, resisting officials may argue that tailored confidentiality waivers are unnecessary
because the treatment court's purpose in obtaining this information is not punitive, but rather facilitates
the defendant's supervision and encourages his or her recovery.
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be expected if defenders demand a second measure to guard against
debasement, separately negotiated contracts specifying the limited
circumstances under which the imposition of graduated sanctions will occur
and defining the possible sanctions.
Certainly, "fixed sanction algorithms," 39 which set out these terms in
considerable detail for all defendants, have both efficiency advantages and
advantages in terms of limiting judicial discretion. On the other hand, these
standardized provisions do not necessarily describe the most restrained
incursions into an individual defendant's liberty required to encourage his or
her success in treatment. Thus, defense attorneys who take seriously this
vision of practice, including its injunction to guard against the debasement of
treatment into punishment, must attempt to negotiate separate sanctioning
schemes. These schemes should limit the range of potential punishments the
individual client may receive to the minimum required to accomplish the
treatment court's stated therapeutic goals.540
In addition, given significant open questions about the quality and range
of the addiction treatment services provided by many drug treatment
courts, 541 defenders should also seek to negotiate at the inception of the
process about the nature of the treatment their clients will receive. 542 If
clients can obtain more appropriate or more extensive treatment outside of
the drug treatment court setting, they might be well advised to seek a
traditional resolution of the pending criminal charges, so that ongoing
treatment needs can be addressed separately.543
Currently, few drug treatment courts are likely to permit either separately
539. See Satel, supra note 13, at 63.
540. Paradoxically, this call for the individualization of measures is relevant to another of the
liberal critics' concerns about the rehabilitative ideal-that the push to individualize sentences results
in a lack of equality in the treatment that offenders receive. See supra text accompanying notes 134-
36. Nevertheless, if specialized drug courts are to continue to offer a treatment component, the very
definition of rehabilitative practice mandates that treatment regimes be tailored to suit the needs of
individual participants. See Judge, supra note 30, at 3 ("[o]ne treatment program will not fit the needs
of all clients").
541. See, e.g, Robert Burke & Alvita Eason, Defender Perspectives on Drug Courts: Successful
Programs Which Could Be Doing More 8 (1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with author)
(reporting that survey of lawyers working in drug courts found some complaining about "lack of
sufficient resources for treatment"); see also, e.g., PLANNING GUIDE AND CHECKLIST, supra note 118.
542. The GAO's study of drug treatment courts around the country found "wide variation in the
types of treatment offered, the types of related services (e.g., job skills, housing, family and medical
services), and in the types of graduated sanctions imposed for relapse or program noncompliance."
Feds, Others Scrutinize Drug Courts, INDIGENT DEFENSE (Nat'l Legal Aid & Defender Ass'n), Nov.-
Dec. 1997, at 9.
543. The clearest example of this would be a defendant in need of intensive residential treatment
who is deciding whether to enter a treatment court regime that offers little beyond a twelve-step
program and urine testing. See PLANNING GUIDE AND CHECKLIST, supra note 118.
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negotiated confidentiality waiver forms or sanctioning algorithms, let alone
individually tailored treatment plans. Absent these minimum guarantees
against the very real dangers of debasement, defenders who embrace this
proposed vision of practice should advise their clients not to undertake
treatment court programs. 5"
B. Looking Beyond the Drug Treatment Court Model
The contemporary drug treatment court movement owes much to the
history of rehabilitative penal practice established at the beginning of the
twentieth century. 4  The fact that the vision of defender advocacy proposed
in this article diverges so dramatically from the articulated expectations for
defense counsel set out in the various written descriptions of the drug
treatment court model, suggests that the liberal critique of the rehabilitative
ideal has continued vitality with respect to today's rehabilitative
undertakings.546 Perhaps, as Professor Ainsworth has argued in connection
with juvenile court practice, the inhospitable treatment accorded zealous
defense advocacy in contemporary rehabilitative penal regimes is grounds for
544. The recommendation in text, to opt for a traditional resolution of charges if the treatment
court is unable to provide essential guarantees of procedural regularity and fairness, raises an
important empirical question regarding the quality of ordinary criminal defense practice. Moreover,
the prediction in text, that drug treatment courts generate significant risks of debasement because they
are unlikely to provide adequate procedural protections, can also be tested empirically. With respect to
the former question, it is certainly the case that the American criminal justice system represents
a world of [defense] lawyers for whom no defense at all, rather than aggressive defense or even
desultory defense, is the norm; a world of minuscule acquittal rates; a world where advocacy is
rare and defense investigation virtually nonexistent; a world where lawyers spend minutes, rather
than hours, with their clients; a world in which individualized scrutiny is replaced by the
indifferent mass-processing of interchangeable defendants.
Luban, supra note 45, at 1762. As to the latter inquiry, the danger of debasement in drug treatment
courts is only partially apparent from the data currently available from the Government Accounting
Office, the Department of Justice, and others. See supra notes 123 and 138. Indeed, the conclusions
drawn in text are based as much upon extrapolation from analogous experiences with rehabilitative
penal practice in the past and ongoing accounts of the juvenile justice system as they are upon the
available data regarding drug treatment courts. Notwithstanding the clear inadequacies of traditional
criminal defense practice in many jurisdictions and the open empirical questions about comparative
outcomes between traditional criminal courts and treatment courts, the structural problems inherent in
merging treatment and punishment identified throughout this Article, together with the outcome data
we do have, do form a reasonable basis for the conclusions drawn. Clearly, more empirical work must
be done in this area before a final resolution of this question can be reached.
545. See supra Part LA.
546. In a recent survey of defenders in drug treatment courts, conducted by the National Legal Aid
and Defender Association, 69% of those responding said that they were able to "be adversarial on a
constitutional or fact issue and still go to drug court later." Defenders Largely Satisfied with Drug
Court Experience, supra note 353, at 8. At the same time, 31% reported that "they sometimes feel like
they are 'selling out' as a defense lawyer." Id.
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seeking their elimination altogether.5 47 Ainsworth's analysis is heir to earlier
accounts of the juvenile court movement by Anthony Platt and others, who
suggested an even more radical understanding of the rehabilitative ideal. 48
This radical perspective, which also bears upon a clear understanding of
current drug treatment courts, is built on observations regarding the ways in
which socially constructed categories of meaning are reflected in legal
institutions, 549 as well as on observations about the capacity of legal practices
to play a role in shaping common understandings of the social world.5 0 For
Ainsworth, culturally and historically contingent notions about adolescence
and childhood have grounded juvenile court approaches toward young
people engaged in antisocial conduct, and in turn have been subject to
modification as a consequence of the operation of legal doctrine.55'
547. Ainsworth observes that "[t]he process of cooptation, or being rendered unthreatening to a
system by assimilating oneself to its values and practices, has long been a problem for defense
attorneys in juvenile court." Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1128 n.307. She continues, "[c]ooptation of
defense counsel is not a phenomenon peculiar to juvenile court; it exists to some degree among
defense lawyers in all criminal justice systems." Id. at 1129 n.307. When the norms of a particular
legal institution are dramatically at odds with zealous defense advocacy, however, as they are
apparently in many juvenile courts and drug treatment courts, these institutional pressures raise
significant concerns about the legitimacy and fairness of the process.
548. See PLATT, supra note 367. In Platt's widely cited work, the roots of modem juvenile courts
are located in the "child-saving movement" that began at the end of the nineteenth century. He argues
that this movement "served to reinforce a code of moral values which was seemingly threatened by
urban life, industrialism, and the influx of immigrant cultures," and that "[t]he 'invention' of
delinquency consolidated the inferior social status and dependency of lower-class youth." Id. at 177. In
its more contemporary version, Platt asserts that ongoing social welfare efforts directed at young
people "contribute to the maintenance of the subordinate social status of powerless groups." Id. at 180.
He concludes that "[r]ather than increasing opportunities for the exercise of legitimate power by
adolescents, public agencies have opted for closer supervision as a means of decreasing opportunities
for the exercise of illegitimate power." Id.
549. Ainsworth provides this useful summary of the constructivist perspective:
To the constructivist, categories within which we understand reality do not correspond to [a]
reality mapping [based on empiricism alone], but rather are humanly created artifacts, produced
by culturally and historically situated participants in a collective social enterprise. These socially
[constructed] categories are propagated through social discourse, which is itself a culturally and
historically situated practice. Thus, constructivism insists that all human knowledge, whether
composed of experientially gathered information or the shared categories that impose meaning on
that information, takes its form through social discourse.
Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1086. See generally PETER BERGER & THOMAS LCKMANN, THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); CLIFFORD
GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY (1983). For a
discussion of the ways that socially constructed understandings influence the criminal law, see Boldt,
supra note 7, at 2278-85.
550. For a discussion of the ways in which legal practices function to construct social meaning,
see GEERTZ, supra note 549, at 217-18; Boldt, supra note 7, at 2282-83.
551. See Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1091-96, 1101-04 (describing differing viewpoints over
time and between cultures as to number of life stages between infancy to adulthood and noting greater
number of defined stages between infancy and adulthood in later portion of twentieth century, but then
concluding that distinction between children and adults is perhaps no longer relevant when dealing
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The analogous set of socially constructed understandings implicated by
the drug treatment court movement requires further study. In particular,
interrelationships between the notions of criminal responsibility, addiction,
social and economic power, and race merit the attention of those concerned
about the disabling effects that alcohol and other drugs have had on
individuals, families, and communities, especially poor communities of
color.552 As a starting point, however, it would be well to remember the
general observations of the Friends and other left critics challenging the
claims of neutrality made by the corrections establishment in the middle
portion of this century.
These claims of neutrality, which related both to the processes by which
individuals were identified as appropriate subjects for rehabilitation and to
the more general assertion that rehabilitative practices were apolitical,553 are
deeply troubling when offered today on behalf of the drug treatment court
movement, which is but the latest chapter in the United States' ongoing "war
on drugs."554 Studies conducted over the past ten years demonstrate that
African-Americans and Latinos are greatly overrepresented among those
who are arrested and convicted of drug-related criminal offenses, relative to
the percentage of these groups who engage in the use of illegal drugs.5
Assuming that there is no systematic sorting for race or race-correlated
factors among drug treatment court officials, defendants of color are likely
overrepresented in treatment court programs as well.
The overrepresentation of African-Americans and Latinos in the criminal
with criminal offenders).
552. For a very thoughtful, recent attempt to explore these interrelationships, see GORDON, supra
note 174. On the particular problems caused by the addictive use of drugs in poor communities of
color, see Boldt, supra note 24, at 2325 n.2.
553. See supra text accompanying notes 161-62.
554. To the extent that the drug treatment court model was devised, at least in part, to respond to
the problems of criminal court overload and prison overcrowding exacerbated by the war on drugs, see
supra text accompanying notes 7-12, this movement must be seen as linked to that earlier set of public
policies.
555. See Ryan, supra note 54, at 226 ("While whites make up the vast majority of regular users of
illegal drugs in the United States, blacks are four times more likely to be arrested on drug charges,
making up 41% of all those arrested on drug charges in 1991. In some states, . . . this disparity rises to
7-9 times the probability of arrest for whites.'); see also GORDON, supra note 174, at 144-47 (drug use
among African-Americans and Latinos no higher than among whites); Lowney, supra note 170, at
131-32 (setting out criminal justice statistics from late 1980s through mid-1990s). Representative of
the studies discussed by Lowney is a report by the United States Sentencing Commission. The study
examined the sixty mandatory sentencing statutes enacted by the federal government from about 1984
to 1991. The study noted "that four of these statutes were responsible for 94% of the mandatory
sentences imposed. Over 91% of these convictions were for drug offenses. Consequently, over 63% of
the defendants convicted for crimes requiring federal mandatory minimum sentences were Black or
Latino, and 33% had no prior criminal record." Id. (citations omitted).
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justice system556 may be due in part to the fact that law enforcement efforts
often are geared toward sale and distribution offenses and other property
crimes or crimes of violence, rather than simple possession offenses.557
Nevertheless, larger problems remain with respect to the claimed apolitical
nature of public policies governing the control of addictive substances. One
consequence of locating principal responsibility for responding to addiction
in the criminal justice system is that the problem is inherently characterized
as one of individual wrongdoing. 8 Even when treatment components are
built into the criminal system, as the various drug treatment courts around the
country are attempting to do, the dominant social construct governing
discourse about addiction remains embedded in notions of individual
responsibility. Thus, in addition to the ordinary understandings of individual
choice and desert that generally guide criminal blaming practices, treatment
courts add an additional layer of socially contingent understandings anchored
in notions of individual pathology and treatment.55 9 Lost in this web of
images is any clear sense that the abuse of addictive substances and the
attendant array of harms that result is, or could be viewed as, a public health
problem rooted in larger structural dynamics as well as individual choice.560
To be sure, it is critically important that members of the community who
556. See MAtER & HULING, supra note 88, at 4 (reporting that one out of three African-American
males between ages of twenty and twenty-nine is under supervision of criminal justice system).
557. Even this explanation for the overrepresentation of African-Americans and Latinos in the
criminal system is suspect. Although the data are not entirely clear, it appears that members of these
groups do not participate in the "drug trade" at a rate any higher than do whites. See Ryan, supra note
54, at 226. What is clear is that "law enforcement attention to the drug trade tends to be concentrated
in inner-city, minority neighborhoods, yielding vastly more arrests of minorities than of whites, and
fostering the public impression that the drug business is almost entirely the domain of black and
Hispanic youth." ma; see also CHRISTINA JAQUELINE JOHNS, POWER, IDEOLOGY AND THE WAR ON
DRUGS: NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIUE FAILURE (1992) (describing targeting of poor communities in war
on drugs); cf Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1255 (1994) (arguing that large percentage of defendants of color in criminal system is
not racial discrimination because victims of criminal offenses are also disproportionately persons of
color).
558. See Boldt, supra note 7, at 2254-85.
559. See BERTRAM ET AL., supra note 2, at 186-88; Ryan, supra note 54, at 234,237.
560. See Ryan, supra note 54, at 233 ("The punitive paradigm .... filters out disturbing evidence
and narrows public debate."). For a discussion of public health responses to substance abuse, see
Boldt, supra note 7, at 2314-16.
Public health practitioners are focused on the health of entire communities. Indeed, public health
can be defined as organized community activities that promote the improvement of physical,
occupational, behavioral, and social health. The public health system is grounded in an
epidemiological approach that studies the determinants of disease and health risks, their
distribution, and the incidence of disease across and within population subgroups. It is a "big
picture" approach quite different from the focus on individual clients or defendants that is
characteristic of many substance abuse treatment and justice system practitioners.
TREATMENT DRUG COURTS, supra note 8, at 9 (emphasis in original).
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have lost the capacity to refrain from obtaining and using addictive
substances have access to therapeutic services. Addiction does involve
problems of individual pathology.S61 But the decision to locate significant
treatment resources within the criminal justice system, or to designate the
criminal system as a major point of entry into treatment, is not the only
method available for structuring these services. Making drug abuse treatment
a part of the public health system, and linking these individualized
therapeutic efforts conceptually and practically to the full arry of structural
responses inherent in such an approach, is also a reasonable public policy
alternative. For many, however, this alternative appears inappropriate
precisely because of historically and socially contingent notions about
addiction and addicts that dominate public discourse.562 These social
constructs regarding individual blame and responsibility make it
extraordinarily difficult to generate a public discussion about addiction that
does not also impose a vocabulary and a set of policy imperatives directed
toward treating addicts as criminals.
5 63
From the point of view of constructivist social theory, however, official
governmental practices, including legal blaming practices, do not simply
reflect dominant social understandings; they also play a central role in
shaping the categories of meaning that either reveal or obscure alternative
depictions of reality.s64 In this sense, a policy decision to maintain the strong
association between addiction and criminal responsibility, even as public
officials move to increase the treatment resources available to addicts, is not
an apolitical choice; rather, it diminishes opportunities for the development
of competing understandings of the issues involved in substance abuse and
reduces the likelihood that government decision makers will adopt these
561. On the disease model of addiction, see generally Bean, supra note 148.
562. See Ryan, supra note 54, at 234-35 (describing work of other academic observers of U.S.
drug policy who have concluded that it "militate[s] against rational appraisal of alternative drug
policies and distract[s] attention from the structural problems of contemporary society").
563. See Ryan, supra note 54, at 231-32. See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race and
Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. R1EV. 1945 (1993) (discussing use of race as factor in describing crime and
identifying criminals). For a more general discussion of the history of narcotics control in the United
States and of the construction of drug-related behaviors as criminal conduct, see MUSTO, supra note
55.
564. Ainsworth observed:
Contemporary constructivist legal scholarship carries th[e] insight [of legal realists] one step
further, describing law as both constituent of social reality and as created by it in a dialectic
process, a kind of constitutive hermeneutics. This constructivist view of law has two corollary
implications; first, that the apparent intrinsicality and immutability of basic legal doctrine is
illusory; and second, that understanding the process through which reality is constructed provides
a mechanism for meaningful change in law.
Ainsworth, supra note 47, at 1090.
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competing responses.565
An array of interventions that are now treated as inappropriate or
impossible could become plausible strategies for adoption by public officials
if many of the dominant images surrounding the problem of addiction were
challenged. These disfavored responses could press beyond the individual
characteristics of persons suffering from substance abuse. Self-destructive
addictive behaviors could be understood within a larger account of the social
and political marginalization that dominates the lives of most of the
defendants who now find themselves in the criminal justice system and
consequentially in drug treatment courts.566 These alternatives fall out along a
continuum from relatively modest innovations, such as needle exchange
programs,567 to more ambitious plans to regulate the availability of all
addictive drugs, including alcohol, within a single unified set of public
policies.5 68 Additionally, emphasis could be placed on efforts to foster and
support grassroots community-based prevention strategies, in which groups
within subordinated communities work together to identify alternative
responses to the feelings of alienation, despair, and powerlessness that grow
out of the concrete realities of life at society's margins.569 At its most
ambitious, this array of possibilities would include the adoption of public
policies targeting the lack of legitimate employment opportunities and
enterprise capital that currently make poor communities such fertile sites for
the manufacture and sale of illegal drugs.
570
In the end, the problems of addiction, crime, social and economic
powerlessness, and racism are not only interconnected, but they are also
made intelligible in public discourse through the mediating influence of
official governmental practices. The adoption of drug treatment courts is the
565. See id. at 1086; see also Ryan, supra note 54, at 235 ("mhe [punitive] paradigm distorts
treatment and prevention. Public support for these alternative strategies is undermined by images and
beliefs embodied in the paradigm ...
566. See GORDON, supra note 174.
567. See Ryan, supra note 54, at 239 (noting that under public health approach to drug policy,
"[l]aw enforcement strategies that encourage harmful behaviors such as needle sharing would be
eliminated").
568. See, e.g., Legalization of illicit Drugs-Impact and Feasibility, Part I: Hearing Before the
House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 190, 201-02 (1988)
(testimony of Honorable Kurt L. Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore).
569. See Boldt, supra note 24, at 2372-73 (describing possibility of women building "organic
groups within the social spaces created by Head Start," in order to "undertake the difficult work of
sharing, and responding to, their common experiences of subordination," as means of "grappl[ing]
with their chemical dependency").
570. For a general discussion of the transformation of inner city neighborhoods, see WILLIAM
JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996). On the
links between declining economic conditions and underground drug manufacturing and distribution
businesses, see Henderson, supra note 173.
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most recent manifestation of a long history in the United States of attempting
to manage a great many problems through the relatively limited institutional
apparatus of the criminal justice system. As the early critics of rehabilitative
penal practice noted, this sort of approach imperils some of the most
fundamental commitments of liberal society. These critics also taught a more
radical lesson about the consequences of pursuing the rehabilitative ideal in a
penal setting. Their insights still have considerable force and serve as the
basis for approaching contemporary efforts at rehabilitative punishment with
great caution.
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